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Roads (Scotland) Act 1984; Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) (Scotland) Act 1947 M74 Special Road (Fullerton Road to West of Kingston Bridge) Orders - Report of Public Local Inquiry Into Objections

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ROADS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1984; ACQUISITION OF LAND (AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE)(SCOTLAND) ACT 1947
M74 SPECIAL ROAD (FULLARTON ROAD TO WEST OF KINGSTON BRIDGE) ORDERS
REPORT OF PUBLIC LOCAL INQUIRY INTO OBJECTIONS
VOLUME 1 : MAIN REPORT

PART 2 : SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE : GENERAL OBJECTIONS
CHAPTER 3 : TRANSPORT : STRATEGIC ISSUES AND MODE SHARE

The principle of the new motorway : summary of evidence on behalf of objectors

3.1 A large number of objectors have objected to the proposed motorway on the basis that it would be an undesirable piece of transport infrastructure that would detract from the effectiveness of public transport and would not reduce congestion levels; and that it represents poor value for money which would be better spent on public transport improvements. JAM74/FoES, the Scottish Association for Public Transport (SAPT), and a number of individual objectors presented evidence on these matters at the public local inquiry.

3.2 There are several main strands of objection to the principle and broad effects of the proposed motorway :

  • conflict with published Government policies for transport;
  • the overall cost of the project, and the implications of that expenditure on the budget available for public transport investment;
  • the overall effect of the proposal on travel patterns, particularly in relation to mode share, induced traffic, the potential shift of trips from public transport to cars due to the availability of the new road, continuing traffic growth, and Scottish Executive targets for road traffic stabilisation;
  • implications for Scottish Executive policies for social inclusion, urban regeneration, and environmental justice;
  • the overall environmental effects of the new road during construction and in relation to climate change, air quality, noise, visual intrusion and community severance once it is in use; and
  • urban regeneration and economic benefits.

3.3 This chapter contains a summary of the main arguments put forward by the various objectors relating to the implications the new motorway for transport policies and strategy, followed by the corresponding rebuttal evidence presented on behalf of the TRA. Road traffic issues are covered in the following chapter, while objections relating to social inclusion, environmental issues, and regeneration and economic issues are covered in chapters 5 and 8 below.

Conflict with Government transport policies

3.4 JAM74/FoES witnesses and other objectors (notably Patrick Harvie MSP) cited published Government policies which they considered would be breached by the M74 proposal. These were:

"We want to see new roads built only where it makes sense to do so: that is, after a thorough appraisal of the costs and benefits associated with any proposed scheme and any possible alternative modes which might serve the same route." (Scottish Transport White Paper 1998)

"Our transport system should be sustainable, minimising impacts on our environment, particularly by greater use of public transport." (Scottish Executive Partnership Agreement)

"Before including major[road] schemes in their strategy, local authorities should be able to demonstrate that they have looked at alternative or complementary solutions……..and that the road scheme is consistent with an integrated transport strategy." (Scottish Executive guidance on Local Transport Strategies, 2000)

Where a transport project is to be justified on economic development grounds "..it needs to be demonstrated that devoting resources to the transport project would represent a more cost effective means of developing the local economy than the use of other existing strategy instruments." (Scottish Executive guidance on Local Transport Strategies, 2000)

"We want a Scotland that delivers sustainable development; that puts environmental concerns at the heart of public policy and secures environmental justice for all of Scotland's communities." (Scottish Executive Partnership Agreement)

This is interpreted to require that no population group should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of environmental damage or degradation, due to their lack of political or economic strength.

3.5 The objectors also consider that the proposal would be at variance with the Government policy to stabilise and reduce traffic levels to the 2001 level by 2021. In contrast, the computer modelling of traffic flows on the new road and other parts of the road system were based on the assumption that traffic would grow by about 10%-12% (morning and evening peak hours) for the medium growth scenario and 24%-26% for the high growth scenario. Research commissioned by the Scottish Executive had stated that "spending more on roads will, perhaps unsurprisingly, make it less likely that objectives relating to the reduction in car use are achieved." (Transferability of Best Practice in Transport Delivery Policy; Colin Buchanan and Partners, 2003)

The cost of the project

3.6 Objectors noted that the estimated cost of the M74C project at the time of the public inquiry was in the range £375-£500 million, although this was based on various assumptions and without full detailed estimates of various aspects where the final costs were not yet known, such as land decontamination and noise protection works. The objectors also noted that during the course of the inquiry, the Scottish Executive had placed an advertisement in a European journal inviting preliminary notes of interest in a possible PPP/PFI scheme that would embrace the building of the M74 and the ongoing maintenance of the new road and some 30 miles of other roads. The indicators in that advertisement suggested that the M74 project could cost as much as £800 million, after allowance for the maintenance elements, if private finance was to be used. Thus the eventual cost of the new road would be far higher than the current estimate, due to borrowing charges on both the local authority and central government components of the scheme.

3.7 Some objectors noted that the estimated cost of the M74C was of the same order as that of the new building for Scottish Parliament. It was suggested that some of the deficiencies exposed by the Fraser inquiry into the escalation of the costs of the building were equally applicable to the decision to proceed with the M74, and that there should be a similar level of public concern about whether this would represent a wise use of considerable public funds.

3.8 Objectors were concerned that the proposal would absorb a very large proportion of transport expenditure on capital projects in Scotland, undermining the published commitment of the Scottish Executive to raise public spending on public transport projects (including walking and cycling projects) to 70% of total transport spending by the end of 2006. The lists of proposed transport capital projects in the west of Scotland for 2004-2008 showed a package of proposed road investment (excluding maintenance) amounting to £837-£1181 million, compared to committed public transport projects totalling around £75 million, and further uncertain prospects for public transport projects totalling an extra £360-£560 million. Expenditure of around £500 million on the M74 would distort the situation, with little prospect of achieving the 70% public transport target, especially if future cutbacks reduced the transport budget but the M74 construction contracts were committed.

3.9 The M74 project was said to result in substantial economic advantages in terms of direct time savings for those using the new road, but there were serious doubts about the validity of counting time savings for private individuals on personal journeys, including commuting. This approach valued time spent in cars, whereas the Government was seeking to reduce unnecessary car travel. The scheme would be of little benefit to those who did not have cars, who were the majority of households in the Glasgow area. The provision of better public transport and more effective regeneration of derelict and contaminated land should form the basis of assessing the benefits.

3.10 There was also doubt about the scale of any indirect benefits to the Scottish economy, in terms of regeneration of land along the M74 corridor, benefits to existing businesses further to the west, and attraction of new investment in competition with other parts of Scotland. (The evidence relating to these indirect potential economic benefits is covered in chapter 8 below.) Benefits for freight distribution had also been overstated, as the Freight Transport Association had made it clear that congestion and unpredictable journey times were only one part of the industry's problems, with delays at points of collection and delivery (which are under the control of management) being the main causes of delay. Steps could be taken to give priority to freight traffic on the existing motorway system, and by providing a freight lorry (only) link east from Kinning Park.

Travel patterns and mode shares

3.11 Objectors criticised the travel forecasting and appraisal methods on which the M74C proposal was based. Unlike the M8 and M80 corridors, there had been no full multi-modal study of travel options in the M74 corridor, and thus no analysis of other transport options. The new section of the M74 had been accepted as a commitment, rather than an option for consideration alongside other alternatives. The draft Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (document TRA/C/16) made it clear that the range of options to be considered should not be constrained by the capabilities of the modelling framework. There were various possible responses to the problem of road congestion, and these should be examined. The guidance states that simply retro-fitting existing proposals or those with a planning history may be tempting but is clearly not the way to proceed, but this was exactly what had been done in the case of the urban M74.

3.12 The analysis also failed to take account of the possible impact of road charging, especially peak period charging, which would both reduce traffic levels and assist public transport. Road user charging was supported by the Scottish Executive ( Scotland's Transport : Delivering Improvements, 2002, page 16). These factors led to over-estimation of the traffic flows on the roads within the corridor, and under-estimation of the potential role of public transport. This was at variance with the observed stabilisation of non-motorway traffic levels in the Glasgow area, and the higher expectations of the public transport operators.

3.13 The acceptance of the M74C scheme as a commitment was at variance with Scottish Executive policies for overall road traffic stabilisation and modal shift away from cars. The traffic predictions were based on the assumption that there would be a substantial and continuing increase in traffic (see paragraph 3.5 above). This contradicted the policy objective that traffic volumes should be reduced to 2001 levels by the year 2021. The additional capacity that the new motorway would provide would encourage modal shift towards car travel. The evidence given on behalf of the TRA indicated that the M74C would generate a 2-3% increase in vehicle trips in the Glasgow area, and about 10% increase in vehicle kilometres.

3.14 Objectors argued that travel patterns in Glasgow and other Scottish cities need to move towards a much higher proportion of trips by public transport, as in European towns and cities, where there were higher levels of car ownership, but where public transport travel costs are less and there is much greater use of public transport. Comparing Scotland and Switzerland, where Switzerland has approximately 50% larger population and 20% higher car ownership than Scotland, the Swiss Federal Railway (SBB) carries nearly 6 times as many passengers as Scotrail, charging passengers one third less per kilometre. The M74C would pass through a densely populated corridor, where there were good prospects for improved public transport as a realistic alternative to major road investment.

3.15 The M74C was not required to handle extra traffic movement, but would encourage more traffic, in conflict with published policy objectives. The increased traffic levels along the new motorway and the approach roads would lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions, and more noise, air pollution, and social disruption, especially along the elevated sections (see chapter 5 below). The space released on the M8 (due to trip transfers to the M74) would attract yet more traffic to the M8, leading to problems further west where the M8 and the M74C converged. The increased motorway capacity would allow ever longer commuter journeys for those having access to cars, while doing little for the majority dependent on public transport and local employment. Thus the new road would promote social exclusion rather than inclusion, and would be contrary to the Executive's objectives for social justice.

3.16 Objectors argued that the completion of the M74 would do little for transport integration, as it is essentially a road project with a few add ons to assist public transport on the parallel surface streets. There would be adverse effects for public transport, due to the commitment of such a large proportion of transport funding, as well as local effects on users of Rutherglen railway station and the proposed new station at West Street on the new Strathbungo rail link, both of which would have elevated motorway viaducts passing over the platforms, with consequential effects of overshadowing, noise, and fumes. Although the structure and local plans made provision for the road, the failure to deliver successful public transport improvements, because of funding shortages and other hindrances, would result in imbalanced implementation, swinging travel patterns in favour of car journeys and to the detriment of public transport.

3.17 The Scottish Association for Public Transport accepts that in a few cases, the benefits for local economic growth might over-ride the need to restrict road building in favour of public transport. However there was no convincing evidence to show this to be the case for the extension of the M74. The economy of the west of Scotland would benefit much more if traffic levels were stabilised and £500 million spent in other ways to improve public transport, including better links to the Clyde Waterfront project and to Glasgow Airport.

3.18 Individual objectors argued that Glasgow had no need for more road building. Congestion occurs mainly at peak hours and when there are special events such as football matches. Although the current proposal is described as the Completion Scheme and "the missing link", there were ongoing plans for further roadbuilding, in the form of the East End Regeneration Route linking the M8 and M74, which would form an eastern inner ring road by stealth, and the Southern Orbital. Throughout the developed world, it is recognised that building major urban roads does not offer a solution to congestion. Where cities continued to build new roads, congestion continues to rise, and already, some freeways in the US are being dismantled, or not replaced following destruction by an earthquake.

3.19 The congestion solutions now being pursued elsewhere are the managed use of the existing system, and provision of attractive and efficient public transport services. The sequence for decision making on transport projects should be :

(a) priority, promotion, and facilities for walking, cycling, and public transport;
(b) facilitation of the transport of goods;
(c) demand management measures which reflect the requirements of (a) and (b); before turning to
(d) localised changes in the road system; and then finally
(e) the building of new roads.

This represents a fully integrated approach to transport planning and provision, but there is no evidence that an approach of this kind has been entertained, let alone applied, by the applicant. While a decision to build the M74C may have been made on political grounds, it is the function of the current public inquiry to test whether that decision can be sustained on other grounds, which are the issues covered by the objectors to the principle of the scheme.

Alternatives

3.20 With regard to alternatives, objectors would prefer to see the proposed expenditure re-directed towards public transport projects and numerous small projects to assist road safety, walking, and cycling. These would offer better value for money in terms of delivering useful travel improvements available to all of the population, stabilising traffic levels, reducing air pollution, and increasing road safety. Better and cheaper public transport would allow people to make less use of cars, while more attractive and safer conditions for walking and cycling would lead to healthier communities. Smaller and less costly road schemes, such as the East End Regeneration Route, would ease local congestion problems, and could open up brownfield areas for regeneration.

3.21 Road freight traffic could be accommodated by priority use of lanes on existing motorways, and a lorry only road link along the M74C corridor. Alternatively restricting the M74C to a 2 lane dual carriageway, with fewer junctions and thus more segregated from local roads, would provide for lorry traffic, while not providing capacity for commuter car use. A lower capacity road could be built at or below ground level, reducing environmental intrusion. This would be in line with US examples where elevated road structures were being demolished and the land reclaimed for public transport and urban uses. Objectors see little benefit in building the M74C to 6 lanes (as proposed) but reserving one lane each way for priority use by buses and possibly lorries. The funds involved would be better spent directly on public transport improvements, with any improved facilities for buses focussed on the existing street network where there is better access for users.

3.22 SAPT accepts that significant road improvements on the M74 corridor could play an important part in an integrated transport strategy for the west of Scotland, but remains totally opposed to proposals which do not fit clearly in the context of traffic stabilisation, reduction, and sustainable development and which do not meet the highest design and community benefit standards. Any package for the next 5 years must be capable of demonstrating that the public transport spend, plus a public realm allowance for walking and cycling, will rise to 70% of total transport spending in the west of Scotland. While there might still be some congestion on parts of the motorway network at peak periods, this was inevitable.

3.23 SAPT considers that the appropriate package for road improvements in the M74 corridor should include :

  • The introduction of peak period road user charging in Glasgow, including motorways, not later than 2007, with proceeds earmarked for fares reform and sustainable transport development.
  • Any new road in the M74 corridor not to exceed 2 lanes each way, with a 40/50 mph speed limit, in the interests of noise reduction and road safety.
  • Road improvements in the area should include a link from the current end of the M74 at Fullarton Road to the west of Rutherglen (bypassing Rutherglen) and passing under, not over, the Argyle line railway at Rutherglen; a modest upgrade of the existing road between Rutherglen and Caledonia Road; and a new link road, restricted to priority users in peak periods, between Caledonia Road and Kinning Park.
  • Land safeguarding for a new surface and subsurface 2 lane road between Rutherglen and the M8/M77 south of the Kingston Bridge, pending the results of the implementation of the elements listed above.

3.24 JAM74/FoES considers that an alternative approach to building the M74 completion should include :

  • The introduction of priority lanes for buses and lorries on the M8, to assist businesses in the area to the west and southwest of Glasgow; while this might pose practical traffic management problems, it could also provide a solution to the need for better access to and from the west for business purposes.
  • Provision of improved rail services, including cross-Glasgow passenger services, with a rail extension serving Glasgow Airport, electrification of the Glasgow - Livingston - Edinburgh railway line, which runs parallel to the M74C, and rail freight feeder services between the areas to the west and southwest of Glasgow and rail freight hubs at Coatbridge and Mossend.

3.25 JAM74/FoES accepts that the M74C would afford some relief to traffic congestion on the M8. However that relief would be likely to be short lived, as any spare capacity would be absorbed by traffic growth due to rising levels of car ownership in the Glasgow area. Improved public transport should provide an attractive alternative to car commuting.

The principle of the new motorway : summary of evidence on behalf of the Trunk Road Authority

Evolution of the scheme

3.26 On behalf of the TRA, it was stated that the M74 Completion project would be a very desirable scheme in its own right, and that adequate alternative support would be given to the promotion of public transport and restraint on travel by private cars, especially for commuting. The scheme would provide the vital missing link in the main strategic route between west central Scotland and the motorway network in England.

3.27 A previous version of the scheme (3-4 lanes in each direction) was included in the Strategic Roads Review carried out by the Scottish Office. The scheme had been the subject of appraisal under 5 key criteria : environment, safety, economy, integration, and accessibility. It had been found to have substantial economic and accident reduction benefits, and integration and accessibility aspects were also found to be positive. However the environmental effects were mixed, especially the adverse effects on listed buildings along the route. There were also concerns that the route would be used for a substantial volume of car commuting.

3.28 A further reduced scheme was devised, with 3 lanes in each direction and only two intermediate interchanges, incorporating a local realignment at Polmadie to avoid the railway depot. That is the scheme that is the subject of the present orders and public local inquiry.

3.29 Work on developing other complementary transport proposals was carried out within the Central Scotland Transport Corridor Studies. However a full multi-modal corridor study was not completed, as the Executive was satisfied that the M74C was fully justified on traffic, road safety, and economic grounds. Similarly an assessment based on Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (STAG) was not carried out, as it was not intended that this guidance should apply to projects that had already reached an advanced stage of planning.

Government transport policies

3.30 The Scottish Executive's report " Working Together for Scotland - A Programme for Government" included a clear commitment to complete the M74 strategic link by 2008, and this commitment was carried forward into the most recent programme : " A Partnership for a Better Scotland". The scheme has been included in the structure plan and two local plans that cover the area (see chapter 2 above). The Government wishes to overcome key blockages in the trunk road network, and to have free flowing traffic on the motorway network so as to improve motorway links to England and Europe.

The effect on public transport expenditure

3.31 The estimated cost of the scheme was around £240 million in January 2001, and was estimated to be in the range £375-£500 million (2008 prices, including an allowance for inflation) at the time of the public local inquiry. An additional £4.9 million would be required for localised improvements to the existing M8/M77 junction to accommodate the increased traffic flows where the westbound M8 and M74 flows converged to the southwest of the Kingston Bridge.

3.32 Regarding the possible use of a PPP/PFI scheme, a TRA witness confirmed that no decision on the procurement route had been made, but that procedure might be used if it represented good value for money. The £375-£500 million estimate for the project did not include loan charges. Government capital projects were usually financed out of revenue, while the local authority element of the scheme (about 12%, corresponding to some £45-60 million) would be likely to involve borrowing. These finance routes would involve additional costs to the public purse.

3.33 The Executive is committed to provide funding for numerous important public transport improvements, and for bus and pedestrian priority, road safety, and traffic management measures that would complement the M74C scheme. Expenditure on public transport is expected to account for 70% of the transport budget by the end of 2006. Some of this money is ring-fenced for spending only on public transport. The M74 is expected to relieve traffic on much of the local road network, freeing up space for the local authorities to introduce effective measures to improve facilities for bus users, cyclists, and pedestrians. Communities can expect to benefit from the scheme through reduced traffic on local streets, as set out in tables 3.2-3.7 of document TRA/E/4 (see chapter 4 for more details).

Direct economic benefits

3.34 The economic benefits of the scheme are set out in document TRA/E/4. The forecasts show a Benefit/Cost ratio of 8.98 (higher traffic growth) and 6.57 (medium traffic growth). The first year rates of return would be respectively 25% and 19%, representing an immediate substantial return on the capital investment. These benefits were largely due to time saved during road trips. The accident reduction forecasts contained in the same document (based on average accident rates for different standards of road under different traffic volumes) suggest that between 760 and 975 accidents could be avoided/saved during the 20 year period from opening, with very large consequential cost savings. The economic benefits of accident reduction during the whole design life of the motorway (30 years) have been valued at £40 million. In addition, there would be economic benefits in facilitating the redevelopment of vacant and derelict sites to provide employment that would be conveniently accessible to local residents.

3.35 Even if traffic levels were to be stabilised at year 2000 levels, the new road would still have a favourable rate of return in the range 2.1-2.8, based on a net present value of £480-588 million, including accident reduction benefits.

3.36 The TRA accepted that the appraisal methods that had been used did not allow a comparison to be made with spending the same amount of money in different ways to improve public transport.

Transport strategy and mode share

3.37 The TRA accepted that the new motorway would result in increased traffic, representing a shift from public transport to private cars, due to the more attractive car journey options that would become available. This is a separate matter from the re-routing of existing trips from the M8 and the local road network onto the new motorway (see chapter 4 below), and the predicted growth in vehicle traffic irrespective of whether the new road is built or not. The general traffic growth assumptions are national figures, in the order of 10%-12% (morning and evening peak hours) for the medium growth scenario and 24%-26% for the high growth scenario.

3.38 The traffic modelling carried out for the TRA indicates that the M74C scheme would result in an induced increase of around 600 trips in each of the peak hours (2010, high growth scenario). This would represent about 0.1% of the global total of road based trips throughout the Central Scotland traffic study area, with a corresponding decrease in public transport trips of up to 1.3%. However these changes would be focussed in the Glasgow conurbation area, where the local induced increase would be in the order of 1.5%-2.5% in road based trips for 2010. There would be a greater increase (perhaps about 5%) in vehicle/kilometres due to the increased length of trips on the strategic road network. It was accepted that the small induced shift from public to private transport, and the general traffic increases that underpin the forecasting, would be at variance with the Executive's intention that road traffic should be stabilised at 2001 levels by 2021. This was an ambitious target requiring sustained action on a number of fronts.

3.39 The TRA considers that the M74C proposal should be seen in the wider context of the Executive's policies to tackle traffic growth, worsening congestion, and climate change. The Executive is committed to delivering a transport system which is sustainable, minimises the impact on the environment, and encourages greater use of public transport. Specific examples of this are :

  • The intention that by the end of 2006, 70% of the Scottish Executive transport budget will be targeted on public transport.
  • The Cycling, Walking and Safer Streets Fund is currently £8 million per year. This fund has provided almost £21 million during the period 2000-2004.
  • The Public Transport Fund has provided Scottish local authorities with over £18 million.
  • The Trunk Roads Cycling Initiative has funded works valued at £7 million, for trunk road sections of the National Cycle Network.
  • Public transport projects that will benefit the M74 corridor include the improvements for the Glasgow/Whifflet rail service (£16 million); improved train services between Glasgow and Carfin/Holytown; and funding for bus and pedestrian priority, road safety, and traffic management measures that are complementary to the M74.

3.40 The TRA does not accept that a reduction in the size of the new motorway from 3 lanes to 2 lanes in each direction would assist in restraining traffic and promoting increased use of public transport. Such a narrow motorway with intermediate junctions would have serious capacity problems even with 2006 traffic levels (ie from opening). However through traffic (ie end to end of the new section of motorway) could be accommodated on two lanes each way by omitting all intermediate interchanges.

3.41 Although there would be an overall increase in traffic flows on the whole network, the TRA expects the M74C scheme to relieve congestion on the heavily used section of the M8 between Baillieston and the Kingston Bridge, as well as reducing traffic on the local street network. Peak hour tailbacks on this part of the M8 already occur regularly for periods of 2-3 hours, extending some 2-3 miles along the motorway. The modelling indicates that the redistribution of traffic from the M8 to the M74 and other routes would give significant relief to this congestion. ( See chapter 4)

Glasgow City Council transport policies and projects

3.42 The Glasgow City Council Local Transport Strategy " Keep Glasgow Moving" (document TRA/Q/2) was published in 2000. It has been prepared in the context of the emerging Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Joint Structure Plan and the Glasgow City Plan ( see chapter 2), and confirms the policy objective to "seek completion of the motorway network (M74 Fullarton Road to M8 south of Kingston Bridge including junctions)".

3.43 Completion of the M74 would allow more freight traffic to be carried on the motorway system instead of local roads. It would also allow traffic to be diverted from the M8 to the M74 if there was an accident or roadworks on the parallel section of the M8. It would also reduce traffic on most main local roads, giving improved conditions for those using or living alongside these streets, including reduced congestion, better opportunities for public transport and delivery vehicles, better and safer conditions for pedestrians and cyclists, and better living conditions for local residents. The main local roads that would enjoy these benefits would be London Road, Gallowgate, Duke Street, Alexandra Parade, Dalmarnock Road, Cumbernauld Road, Tollcross Road, Westmuir Street, Shettleston Road, Edinburgh Road, and Kings Drive ( see chapter 4 for more details).

3.44 Consequential improvements for public transport on these local main roads could include reserved bus lanes, widened pavements and traffic islands, cycle lanes, and bus boarder pavement extensions. These local improvements were not committed schemes, but funding programmes were already in place for this type of work. Although there had been recent delays in introducing more quality bus corridors, Glasgow Council now had £30m to spend on this type of project, and preparation work was in progress for the Hardgate - Baillieston corridor, with 4 more corridors to follow, including Rutherglen Road and Dalmarnock Road. They would have integrated bus signal control.

3.45 The completion scheme would also result in increased traffic at various locations on the local streets. Detailed studies have been carried out and recommendations made for remedial works where these are considered to be necessary ( see chapter 4). These local improvements were not committed schemes, but could be brought forward in time to coincide with the opening of the M74C, if it was approved and implemented.

3.46 The Council was promoting a relief road at Oatlands as part of the renewal of that area. It would pass close to the proposed Polmadie Road interchange on the M74C scheme, swinging northeast to form part of the proposed East End Regeneration Route. The EERR was an important element in the Clyde Gateway renewal project, and would benefit from the construction of the M74C. However both of these local road schemes could proceed independently of the M74C, and the necessary funding was mainly in place.

3.47 Glasgow City Council is also involved in various public transport improvements, although these were primarily the responsibility of the Strathclyde Passenger Transport Authority. Among the key public transport schemes with the highest priority were the airport rail link, the Larkhall-Milngavie rail link, Crossrail, and new stations at Jordanhill and Parkhead Forge. The Scottish Executive had set aside funds for these projects. The M74C project would be compatible with the Crossrail project where they both passed through the proposed West Street public transport interchange, where a closed (ie roofed) station might be preferable as the motorway would be overhead.

3.48 Glasgow City Council is seeking a modal shift away from car travel, especially for commuter journeys. Public transport was already the dominant mode for peak hour travel to the city centre, and the Council expected to reinforce this pattern by extended control of parking provision in the central area. Glasgow City accounted for one third of the conurbation population (600,000 out of 1.8 million), with half of those employed in the city commuting inwards across the city boundary. The Council is promoting green travel plans for all new developments above a specified size. The Clyde Waterfront project would involve a green travel plan, and also perhaps a new public transport facility. It was impossible to say what level of modal shift might be achieved, but this was a long term approach based on the cumulative effect of a number of smaller components. The regular annual traffic surveys showed stable traffic levels in recent years at the mid suburban cordon, but a 2.3% increase at the city boundary cordon, mainly due to the flows on the motorways. Bus usage of First Group buses was increasing at 6% per annum The Council has no current plans to introduce congestion charging, but keeps the matter under regular review.

South Lanarkshire Council transport policies and projects

3.49 The South Lanarkshire Council local transport strategy (" A Vision for Genuine Travel Choices" - document TRA/P/2) was approved and published in 2001. One of the key issues identified in the document was that the strategic road network was incomplete. The strategy supports the completion of the M74, in order to :

  • complete strategic transport links for West of Scotland business and industry, currently handicapped by severe congestion on the M8;
  • improve national economic competitiveness, including better access to Glasgow and Prestwick airports;
  • allow development of prime sites in high unemployment areas along the Clyde Corridor;
  • relieve traffic congestion on the local road network, allowing higher priority for public transport; and
  • improve road safety and reduce accidents.

3.50 The Council is taking steps to promote the use of public transport, including the provision of park and ride facilities at rail stations. Regular traffic surveys showed a modest reduction in traffic levels on main roads, probably due to congestion levels, but the Council had no plans to introduce road pricing. The local transport strategy was seeking a 2.5% traffic reduction on Rutherglen Main Street, to be achieved whether or not the M74 completion was built.

3.51 The potential implications of the M74C scheme for traffic on local roads had been assessed by traffic modelling, reported in document TRA/E/21. The council had confidence in the modelling, as the same program (Paramics) had been used successfully elsewhere by the Council. The modelling predictions indicate that traffic growth is likely to lead to congestion at a number of locations in the Rutherglen area by 2010 if the M74 completion scheme is not built, notably Rutherglen Main Street corridor, Farme Cross junction, Western Road/East Kilbride Road junction, and the Dukes Road/Cambuslang Road junction. Some alleviation could be obtained by local junction improvements and signal optimisation.

3.52 If the M74C scheme is built, and with modest changes in junction layouts and traffic signal optimisation, the various increases in traffic flows on local roads could be accommodated. There would be a significant general reduction in congestion across the local road network, giving greater opportunities to implement a range of measures to give greater priority to public transport, cyclists, and pedestrians. These would include quality bus corridors on the Rutherglen Main Street corridor, linking to the quality bus corridors to be developed by Glasgow City Council, and more green time for pedestrians at signal controlled junctions. A larger share of local road space would be allocated to pedestrians and cyclists, where there was to be a reduction in vehicle flows. Funds for bus lanes had been earmarked by the Scottish Executive, and the detailed plans could be worked out and installed prior to the opening of the motorway, once it was known whether the orders were confirmed. Some of these improvements would proceed in any event, but the traffic reductions resulting from the construction of the motorway would allow the improvements for buses, cyclists, and pedestrians to be more effective.

3.53 The Council expects the M74C project to result in better road safety in a wide area (document TRA/A/23). Local road safety benefits would result from the removal of traffic from surface streets to a new high standard motorway. All local roads where traffic flows are expected to increase by more than 5% as a result of the construction of the M74C scheme would be the subject of appropriate mitigation measures, including measures to address the needs of cyclists and pedestrians, such as traffic calming and improved pedestrian crossing facilities. The main affected locations are those listed at paragraph 4.11 below, although there were many minor roads where existing low flows would increase by more than 5%, which was the standard professional rule of thumb to trigger consideration of mitigation measures. Some of these mitigation measures would be paid for from the M74C budget, and the Council had funds for further road safety improvements. The details of the mitigation schemes would be developed in consultation with the emergency services, Strathclyde Passenger Transport, public transport providers, the local community, and other interested parties, and would be installed prior to the opening of the new motorway. The situation would also be reviewed after the opening of the motorway.

3.54 Local traffic increases in the vicinity of the new motorway junction at Cambuslang Road would be addressed through adjustments to the junctions and signal arrangements (document TRA/C/14, drawings 474000/SK/156-158). South Lanarkshire Council is satisfied with these proposals.

Objectors' alternatives

3.55 TRA witnesses had considerable reservations about the alternatives to the M74C put forward by the objectors. The points of rebuttal included :

  • The Government had no plans to introduce tolls on motorways. Any such proposal would require new legislation, and a reappraisal of the traffic implications for the M74C. It was thus most unlikely that such tolls would be introduced on the M74C.
  • Similarly there would be serious practical difficulties in introducing priority lanes for buses and lorries on the M8, leaving only one through lane in each direction for general traffic.
  • Taking the motorway below the railway at Rutherglen station would add £30-50 million to construction costs, due to the tunnelling work and the need to deal with contaminated land that would be disturbed.
  • A tunnel option at Tradeston would cost about £100-115 million, whereas a well designed viaduct would have little effect on the businesses in the area, and the perceptions of passengers using the new elevated station proposed at West Street.
  • Rail arrangements for freight and airport passengers would be likely to attract only a very small proportion of the traffic.

Support for the project : written submissions

3.56 Various organisations have expressed support for the proposal (see preamble to report). Most of these relate to the perceived benefits for business, which are covered in the chapter on economic benefits.

3.57 In relation to transport issues, the Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive has expressed support for the proposal. The Executive explains that their interest has been principally concerned with safeguarding public transport aims, and that their initial objections have been overcome. They are now keen that the project progresses with all speed, and that the benefits are realised at the earliest possible date. The Executive believes that the M74C is an essential link in the strategic motorway network, which will be of benefit to the economy and communities in west Scotland. It will support the use of public transport by permitting bus priority measures, such as Rutherglen Main Street, and by reducing traffic congestion at road junctions. The motorway project would complement other public transport projects such as the Shields Road park and ride and the Larkhall-Milngavie rail project, that now have government support. The Executive welcomes the provision that has been made for the Crossrail Strathbungo project, and involvement in meeting the requirements of the Glasgow subway.

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