Roads (Scotland) Act 1984; Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) (Scotland) Act 1947 M74 Special Road (Fullerton Road to West of Kingston Bridge) Orders - Report of Public Local Inquiry Into Objections

ROADS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1984; ACQUISITION OF LAND (AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE)(SCOTLAND) ACT 1947
M74 SPECIAL ROAD (FULLARTON ROAD TO WEST OF KINGSTON BRIDGE) ORDERS
REPORT OF PUBLIC LOCAL INQUIRY INTO OBJECTIONS
VOLUME 1 : MAIN REPORT

CHAPTER 11 : CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

11.1 As will be evident to anybody who has looked at the previous chapters of this report, the M74C Fullarton to Kingston project would be likely to have complex and far ranging implications if it is built. It would be the largest urban motorway built in Scotland since the M77, and one of the most complicated and expensive engineering projects currently contemplated, comparable in general cost to the new building for the Scottish Parliament.

11.2 This public local inquiry has taken place because of the number of general and specific objections to the various line and side roads orders, and the objections by affected proprietors to the proposed compulsory purchase order.

11.3 The Reporters' remit has been to consider the objections, to report upon them, and to make a recommendation based on that material. To consider these objections, we have had the benefit of information from a number of sources, notably :

The Environmental Assessment prepared for the scheme, as required under the appropriate regulations.
The considerable number of inquiry documents lodged by the trunk road authority (TRA) and the objectors.
The statements of case and witness precognitions supplied by those who participated in the inquiry.
The evidence and cross examination that took place at the inquiry.
The objections, letters of support, and further written statements from those who wished to make representations but who did not wish to take part in the public inquiry.
A series of accompanied and unaccompanied visits to the locality, including conducted tours of a number of affected business premises along the route.

We have already expressed our appreciation (in the preamble to this report) for the helpful cooperation and clear information that we have received from all of those involved in the matter, including from those who did not take part in the inquiry.

11.4 As a result of all this effort by so many people on both sides, and our immersion in the subject for several months, we have been able to bring together a great deal of information which has greatly clarified the issues and implications of the scheme. This has been set out in the preceding topic oriented chapters, leading to extensive findings on each topic, compiled for convenience in chapter 10. Inevitably there are some areas of uncertainty, and conflicts of view where different parties will put different weight or interpretation on the same material.

11.5 The provisions of the inquiries procedure rules preclude the questioning of Government witnesses on the merits of Government policy. However that rule does not prevent objectors from presenting arguments about the expected disadvantages of the road, the cumulative effect of which could be to suggest that the public interest would be served better if the road was not built.

11.6 The discussion that follows starts with the material from chapters 3-9 which cover the probable impacts and implications of carrying out this project. The conclusions flowing from this discussion are then assessed in the context of the policy background described in chapter 2.

11.7 It comes as no surprise to find that a major motorway inserted through a 5 mile corridor of dense urban development would be likely to have some significant adverse local impacts, both during the long construction period and then due to the volume of attracted traffic once the road is in use. The new road would have widespread effects on traffic patterns - some positive and some negative - as well as important implications for transport strategy, largely but not wholly negative. The benefits of the project would occur largely in traffic relief and improvement of vehicle journey times, and the benefits to the economy of the west of Scotland in terms of more efficient road communications and an enhanced perception of the qualities of the area as a location for successful business, both for existing and new enterprises. It is this general framework that provides the structure for this chapter.

Chapter 3 : Transport : strategic issues and mode share

11.8 The first issue to be addressed under this heading is the effect of the overall cost of the project on the Executive's transport strategy. It is not within the inquiry remit to consider whether the proposal represents good value for money. That is ultimately a political decision based on objectives and competing priorities. However those opposed to the project have challenged the cost of the project on the basis that expenditure of some £375-500 million during a period of some 3-4 years, or a much larger sum (in the order of £800 million) spread over a longer period if the scheme becomes part of a public/private joint venture, would prevent the Executive from achieving its stated high level commitment of allocating 70% of all transport spending to public transport by the end of 2006.

11.9 As noted in finding C4, the projected transport spend in the west of Scotland during the period 2004-2008, which embraces the above target date and also the intended construction period for the new road, would be split approximately two thirds to roads and one third to public transport. This would virtually reverse the balance that is intended. The distortion of the intended policy would be even greater if the M74C goes ahead and there is then a cut back in the transport budget, or the cost of the road increases due to the use of a public/private project, as this would be likely to deplete the funds available for public transport even further. No TRA witness attempted to dispute this evidence.

11.10 Similarly, given that the west of Scotland accounts for such a large proportion of the Scottish population and such a large share of public investment, it would be unrealistic to expect the overall balance of 70/30 in favour of public transport to be restored by a much higher proportion of spending on public transport in the rest of Scotland.

11.11 On this basis, it must be concluded that the large cost of the M74C proposal would be in fundamental conflict with the stated high level commitment of the Executive to give a 70/30 priority to spending on public transport rather than roads by the year 2006. In addition, as the underlying purpose of the intended split is to give a disproportionate improvement to public transport, in order to provide an alternative to increasing traffic congestion, to curb greenhouse gas emissions, and to assist the social inclusion of the majority of households who do not have cars, the shift in the balance of transport expenditure would also have potentially serious effects on the achievement of other important policies and commitments.

11.12 One of these important transport commitments is to curb traffic growth, so as to stabilise vehicle use and then reduce it so that by 2021, traffic levels are back to the position in 2001 (finding C11). In this context, objectors have criticised the basis of the traffic modelling, which assumes a high growth scenario increase of some 25% by 2010. The new motorway has been designed to accommodate this level of growth. It would provide a large increase in capacity, affording relief to the congested urban section of the M8. The extra capacity thus created is predicted to lead to an increase in vehicle trips, and to longer trips, representing an increase in vehicle trips of some 1.5-2.5% in the Glasgow conurbation, and a rather larger increase (perhaps about 5%) in the number of vehicle kilometres in that area. It is the latter measure that forms the basis of the government commitment. It appears that traffic levels within Glasgow are stabilising, and that the main component of increase is flows into and out of the city, due largely to flows on motorways. Thus the addition of more radial motorway capacity would be likely to exacerbate this element. This would include the M74C, where about a quarter of the traffic at the western end of the new road would be expected to leave or join at the Kingston ramps. Additional traffic would also enter the city surface network at other motorway junctions.

11.13 It is therefore evident that the completion of the M74 would be in fundamental conflict with the policy commitment to reduce vehicle use, as it would add to traffic growth which would then have to be clawed back to return to 2001 traffic levels, making achievement of the commitment even more challenging. Again no TRA witness attempted to dispute this position, accepting that it was a very challenging task, and pointing instead to the Executive's policies to complete the M74 to improve motorway links to England and Europe, to overcome key blockages in the trunk road network, and to have free flowing traffic on the motorway network.

11.14 The merit of these objectives is recognised. However the M74C proposal is rather more than a local improvement to ease a key blockage. It would provide a new major radial motorway from the edge of Glasgow to the centre, inducing traffic growth and reducing congestion on the M8 which in turn is predicted to attract more local trips onto that part of the M8. There is already a continuous motorway route to England via the M8, M73, and existing M74. While the completion of the M74 would provide a more direct route for trips to and from locations on the south side of the Clyde, and would reduce congestion to some extent, it would not provide free flowing conditions on the Glasgow motorway network. Some congestion would remain on the M8, and there would be morning peak congestion on the westbound approach to the new section of the M74 motorway from the year of opening. Conditions would deteriorate if traffic continues to grow as anticipated. As suggested by the SAPT, it is perhaps unrealistic to seek to provide free flow conditions on major urban radial motorways during peak periods, as that simply encourages more drivers to choose to use these roads for commuting, whereas a degree of peak hour congestion appears to be an important element in encouraging the use of public transport.

11.15 These strategic transport choices are intended to be guided by multi-modal transport corridor studies. Such studies were carried out for central Scotland, the final report on the M74 corridor study being produced for the Scottish Executive in May 2002. Objectors lodged part of the report as an inquiry document (document JAG/7) and the TRA subsequently lodged the whole document.

11.16 For the purpose of the corridor studies, the M74 completion project was accepted as a commitment, rather than as an option to be considered alongside others. Objectors have criticised this approach, noting that the Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (document TRA/C/16) makes it clear that a full range of options should be considered, and that simply retro-fitting the analysis to existing proposals or those with a long planning history, might be tempting, but is clearly not the way to proceed.

11.17 It is evident that the M74C route into Glasgow has a long planning history, having been included in various road and development plans for many years. However this criterion alone should not justify acceptance, as long standing proposals are less likely to be fit for purpose in a changing situation than those that are in line with current policies. At the time of the multi-modal study, the final section of the M74 had planning permission. Given the strong political commitment in central and local government to complete the road, it is understandable why the decision to accept the road at that time was made. However, given the massive scale of the project; its wide implications for transport policy; and the important changes in transport policy that have emerged in recent years, it is not surprising that it would be likely to be potentially in conflict with some more recent transport policies.

11.18 The multi-modal study report on the M74 corridor contains a number of revealing insights as to the predicted effects of completing the M74. Among other things, the report notes that the motorway would facilitate increased long distance commuting. The report also seeks ways to "lock in" the benefits of the new road, to avoid cumulative congestion due to continuing traffic growth. The possible options are noted in paragraph 2.29 and finding C20 above, and include control of development in the vicinity of trunk road junctions, congestion charging, ramp metering, priorities for high occupancy vehicles, and tolls for selected trunk road entry points. The authors of the report recognise the political difficulties in introducing measures of this kind. Instead, they accept that road widening and traffic management would have to be used to reduce congestion. The TRA witnesses at the inquiry confirmed that there are no plans to introduce congestion charging in Glasgow, or to introduce ramp metering or tolls to enter trunk roads.

11.19 In the absence of such measures, it appears likely that traffic growth will continue, with drivers seeking to use all main road space up to and beyond capacity at peak periods. Maintaining and improving public transport for the general public will therefore depend on promoting dedicated mass transit facilities such as railways and bus lanes, where general traffic will not obstruct the movement of public transport. This again emphasises the importance of the policy to give financial priority to public transport improvements.

11.20 The M74C would facilitate such bus lane improvements along the parallel surface radial routes in the east of the city that would be relieved of through traffic, such as Rutherglen Main Street, Cambuslang Road, and Dalmarnock Road. However there are already extensive proposals and a financial programme for such facilities, and a bus lane is already in place on Rutherglen Main Street. These bus corridor proposals are generally not dependent on reducing general traffic to acceptable levels, although that gives increased opportunities for pedestrians and cyclists.

Chapter 4 : Traffic implications

11.21 Findings on traffic matters are set out at D1-D26 in chapter 10 above. Some of the transport strategy issues discussed above touch upon traffic volumes and changes.

11.22 The most important positive traffic benefits of the M74C scheme would be :

Easing congestion on the M8 on the north and west side of the city centre.
Reducing journey times across the city centre by 5-10 minutes.
Easing congestion on the southwest approach to the Kingston Bridge, where the eastbound M77 merges with the M8.
Providing two motorway options on the east side of the city, as alternatives when one is disrupted by roadworks, vehicle breakdowns, or traffic accidents.
Reducing traffic flows on various surface streets.
Reducing the number of traffic accidents.
Easing future congestion on existing motorways caused by continuing traffic growth.

11.23 The most notable negative traffic effects of the proposal would be :

Accommodating additional traffic that would add to traffic growth, contrary to the Government commitment to reduce traffic to 2001 levels (see above).
Some congestion would probably remain on the M8 and in various other locations.
Some peak hour congestion would be transferred to the westbound approach to the new section of the M74C at Fullarton. This would cause 3 lane queues potentially up to about one mile in length from the year of opening, becoming progressively worse as traffic increases, although some drivers would take evasive action.
Congestion would remain on surface streets at the southwest approach to the new section of motorway (Dumbreck).
Potential disruption of the motorways in the Kingston area due to the removal of hard shoulders to accommodate additional running lanes to cope with additional traffic, including M74C traffic.
Some surface streets serving new motorway junctions would carry increased traffic flows.

11.24 In evaluating these pros and cons for traffic, it is noted that although traffic is expected to flow freely on the new section of motorway, congestion would remain on some other parts of the network, and would be introduced westbound at Fullarton under some conditions. The benefit to the M8 is the removal of about 20,000 vehicles per day, and a reduction in cross centre journey times in the order of 5-10 minutes at peak times.

11.25 It is difficult to assess the real benefit of these changes. There is no screen line prediction on the M8 between junction 13 (the M80 junction) and the Kingston Bridge, and thus no explicit traffic figures to show how the sections of the M8 along the north and west sides of the city centre would perform in the years to come. These are the critical areas for congestion, as there are effectively only 2 through lanes, in contrast to the much wider sections to the east and southwest.

11.26 Existing peak hour congestion on the M8 is described by the TRA as occurring regularly for periods of 2-3 hours with traffic queues tailing back along the motorway for some 2-3 miles. The predicted traffic figures to east and west appear to indicate a probable continuing overload in the city centre section, while the congestion predictions contained in the corridor study indicate continuing severe congestion on parts of the M8, including the Kingston Bridge. Accordingly a reduction in journey times of 5-10 minutes may be scarcely discernible to drivers involved in delays lasting much longer, or may be negated by a perception that there is still severe congestion on a regular basis. The same may hold for those businesses to the west of Kingston who rely on the motorways for business journeys, and are expecting the M74C to result in a radical improvement. Furthermore the position will continue to deteriorate unless traffic growth is curbed. For these reasons, it is considered that little weight can be attached to the relief of traffic from the M8, especially as those diverting to the new section of the M74C may well encounter peak period congestion on the westbound approach to Fullarton from the opening year or soon afterwards.

11.27 These traffic aspects can be distinguished from real or perceived benefits to the economy, especially for the area to the west of Kingston, which are covered in chapter 8 (economic impact) and related findings. However the motorway is also calculated to yield important financial benefits in its own right, in terms of reduced accidents and time savings for users. The great benefits of accident reductions are acknowledged. Financial benefits for road users are more problematic. Objectors have called into question the basis of the time valuations, and the benefit to society of providing a road that would allow people to make more and longer car journeys faster, contrary to other public policies.

11.28 The SACTRA report (see above) recognised the difficulties of attributing differential values to different types of journey. The contradiction of the valuation methodology is illustrated by the fact that the new road has been planned to provide capacity for more vehicle journeys to be made. If the traffic restraint objective were to be achieved, there would be fewer vehicle trips, so even more vehicle time would be saved. But some of the journeys might then be made by public transport instead. While these journeys might take more time, the policy commitment to giving priority to public transport suggests that this is held to be in the public interest.

11.29 The benefits of the option to use one of two motorways on the eastern side of the city would be very significant, although that would not avoid congestion if there is a severe temporary capacity restriction. Accident reductions and traffic reductions on some surface streets would also provide important benefits. There would be an improvement in congestion on the southwest approach to the Kingston Bridge compared with the present situation, due to the more balanced split in traffic flows between the inner and outer braids and the provision of extra running lanes in place of the hard shoulders. However the proposed interventions west of Kingston would be a mixed blessing, as the absence of hard shoulders, and the provision of only a limited number of emergency laybys, would be likely to lead to severe disruption in this critical area if there are roadworks, road accidents, or vehicle breakdowns. This locality (including the local approach roads) is likely to continue to be a heavily used focal point of the motorway network vulnerable to delays. There would also be considerable disruption here during construction of the new link roads to the M74 extension.

11.30 In the absence of traffic predictions, it is difficult to assess the implications of providing direct links between the M74C and the Kingston Bridge, as argued by one objector. The concept has a superficial attraction, as it would accommodate longer distance trips between the north and south sides of the river, with a corresponding reduction on the surface network and other Clyde bridges. But it seems likely that such links would increase the traffic volumes on the Kingston Bridge, as most of the drivers with destinations on the other side of the Clyde would probably prefer to stay on the motorway/expressway system than to use the other Clyde bridges and become involved in the circuitous circulation system on the surface streets in the Kingston area. The better accessibility between the M74C and the north side of the river would be likely to attract more traffic to use the M74C, including commuter traffic with destinations in the city centre and west end. Thus the concept has traffic and environmental advantages, but would be likely to be undesirable from a transport strategy point of view, and in terms of safeguarding the capacity of the Kingston Bridge.

Chapter 5 : Physical, environmental, and community impact

11.31 The comprehensive and thorough environmental assessment has provided a great deal of information on these topics, reported extensively in chapter 5 and leading to many detailed findings. Some of the key adverse impacts identified in the Environmental Statement are summarised in the table at page 10-12 of the findings on environmental matters. Considerable professional expertise has been applied to assessing the probable impacts of the new motorway, and in refining the proposed design and remedial measures to minimise the adverse effects.

11.32 The direct destruction of physical property, recorded in paragraph 5.21 above, is relatively modest for a project of this size, especially residential property where less than 10 dwellings remain on the route. This partly reflects the long period of gestation of the proposal, which will have deterred most new development for a considerable period, and the prior acquisition and clearance of some buildings by mutual agreement. The exception proves the rule, as perhaps the most significant single property to be affected is the Morris furniture factory at Polmadie (about 500,000 square feet and employing around 500 people), which was developed on the expectation that the motorway would follow the 1995 approved route, but is now affected because of the decision to re-align this section to avoid having to relocate the Polmadie railway depot. The new road would involve the destruction of properties, discussed in more detail below, and would pass close to densely populated residential areas.

11.33 The main adverse environmental and community effects that would be expected (as noted in more detail in the corresponding findings in chapter 10, and not in order of importance) would be as follows :

Loss of about 9ha of natural and semi-natural habitats along the route.
Intrusion into the relatively quiet and semi-natural landscape at Auchenshuggle, where the pedestrian and cycle route follows the bank of the Clyde, but would have to pass below a new motorway bridge over the river.
Adverse effects on cultural heritage sites : 3 severe; 9 major; and 49 moderate.
Substantial community severance at the 3 motorway junctions, and moderate severance at other places, due to the combined width of the railway line and the motorway (in the order of 200-300m); the necessity for pedestrians and cyclists to pass beneath the motorway and to cross slip roads at the 3 junctions; and the elevation of much of the motorway on embankments and high structures.
Visual intrusion at various locations : 8 substantial; 13 moderate; and 11 slight; reduced somewhat after 15 years due to screen planting becoming established.
Noise intrusion at about a dozen sensitive locations, after allowance for noise barriers : these impacts are judged to be major at Toryglen and Dalbeth, affecting about 110 low rise dwellings, a 20 storey tower block, an adult education centre, and a homeless peoples' shelter; and moderate on the northern and eastern perimeter of Rutherglen (approximately 180 dwellings and a primary school) and at Farme Cross (about 22 dwellings).
Localised increases in air pollution within about 100m of the motorway.
Construction disruption, involving work for 11 hours a day, 5.5 days a week, for 4-9 months at each location; piling work for 1-3 months at various locations; road closures and diversions, causing community severance and traffic difficulties; very large numbers of HGV movements for construction work (over 200,000 and perhaps double that); very severe noise due to night time work on major structures, lasting for about one night a week for 3 months at various locations; and building vibration due to piling work (within 100m) causing concern although probably not new damage.

11.34 As shown in the summary table on page 10-12, the majority of the adverse effects relating to cultural heritage sites, community severance, visual intrusion, noise, air pollution, and construction disruption would be mainly concentrated in 4 locations where there are residential uses: Eglinton/Pollokshaws; Toryglen; north and east Rutherglen; and Farme Cross. Each of these areas would suffer from a combination of several of these negative impacts. In addition, Farme Cross and North Rutherglen are conservation areas. It is these communities that would be most affected by the severe and prolonged impact of construction work (including very noisy piling work and night time work), construction traffic, and community severance.

11.35 The combined and cumulative effect of these various adverse impacts on these communities and their residents would be likely to be very severe, particularly during construction, and then permanently after the road opens due to continuing community severance, traffic noise, visual intrusion, and air pollution. These impacts would be highly undesirable, and the concerns expressed by and on behalf of local residents are understandable.

11.36 A limited number of environmental improvements would result from the construction of the new motorway, where the outlook from nearby properties would be improved due to landscape treatments on land currently in a derelict condition. (This excludes benefits from treatment of contaminated sites and regeneration issues which are covered below.)

Chapter 6 : Airborne emissions

11.37 It is noted that the levels of air pollution resulting from road traffic are generally improving, thanks to better emission control technology. These improvements are generally sufficient to offset the assumed increases in traffic, although this appears to be a further reason why traffic growth should be curbed.

11.38 Within this improving situation, changes in the distribution of air pollution resulting from traffic will (obviously) reflect the changing distribution of traffic. The traffic changes predicted to result from the construction of the M74 extension, as described in chapter 4, are thus a proxy for the predicted changes in traffic air pollution. The principal pollutants are NO2 and PM10.

11.39 As the new road would attract a considerable volume of traffic, and would free up space on other motorways for more traffic, it would result in a shift of some traffic from the main surface roads (eg Rutherglen Main Street) and local streets to motorways. It would thus reduce the traffic, and hence the air pollution, in many local surface streets, but increase it along a limited number of main routes, including motorways and the surface roads serving motorway junctions. The overall effect on air pollution would therefore be to redistribute it from many local streets to a limited number of main roads and motorways. That is why a majority of residential properties (about 46%) would benefit from lower air pollution levels if the new road is built, and only a minority (25%) would suffer.

11.40 Pollution arising from road traffic decays rapidly with distance from the road and impact on air quality is only effective within 200m of the road. For those properties within 100m of the new road, the predicted effects are slight increases in concentrations of NO2 and PM10 and minor impacts from construction dust (TAK38). There are 119 residential properties, 87 industrial, 15 retail, 5 office, 4 community, and 1 recreational property within 100m of the new road.

11.41 An overall improvement of air quality in the city centre and the AQMA is predicted, while in the Wider Study Area there should be a reduction in the number of properties exceeding NO2 and PM10 objectives. NO2 concentrations in the vicinity of the Kingston Bridge may exceed objectives but this is not attributable to the M74C but to the M8 and the generally high pollution levels in the city centre.

11.42 The health concerns expressed by Dr Hersh and her witnesses are noted. It is accepted that, in the absence of traffic reduction measures, traffic on the surface road network will increase, adding to the volume of pollution. Broader issues of contemporary lifestyle are outwith our remit.

11.43 With regard to greenhouse gases, the M74C is predicted to lead to increases in CO2, PM10 and NOx by 2010, with decreases in CO and THC. By 2020, there will be increases in all pollutants assessed (TA pages K58-61). For CO2 emissions, the predictions in the ES (page 208) are that the new road would be likely to result in an annual increase of about 86,600 tonnes (3.8%) in 2010 compared with the do minimum situation, and an increase of 134,800 tonnes by 2020 (5.7%). Given the Government policy commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the increased emissions resulting from the extra traffic that would be generated by the new road would be a significant step in the wrong direction, requiring an even greater effort to be made if international accords such as the Kyoto protocol are to be achieved.

11.44 With the exception of the CO2 emissions noted above, the proposed motorway would be unlikely to result in unacceptable air pollution problems.

Chapter 7 : Geo-technical, mining and contaminated land

11.45 There appear to be no particular problems along the route corridor from a geological, hydro-geological and mining viewpoint. The main issue is ground contamination.

11.46 Objectors are very concerned about the potential impact of motorway construction work on existing ground contamination, and the potential risks to health and watercourses. The investigations carried out for the M74C have provided a great deal of information on these matters.

11.47 The main contamination problems relate to chromium waste, chemical waste, and slag which are present in large sections of the route and show the highest levels of contamination.

11.48 The detailed studies have resulted in remedial proposals for each site, designed on the basis of the specific conditions at each site. The broad remediation strategy is to bury contaminated materials beneath the embankments and elevated structures, with a range of other options where contamination cannot be treated by this method. The total cost of remedial work is expected to be in the order of £51.8 million.

11.49 It is evident that there are extensive ground contamination problems along the motorway route, with further problems on adjoining land and elsewhere in the area. The motorway investigations and (if approved) construction work would provide best practice treatment to deal with the sites directly affected. The importation of considerable quantities of fill for embankment construction would provide the means to contain and insulate polluted ground.

11.50 It is accepted that this treatment of contaminated land, as an ancillary feature of motorway construction, would be a desirable benefit. There is no reason to expect the remedial work to be any better or any worse if it is carried out in connection with motorway works or as part of a general programme. However it would leave other nearby land not affected by the motorway still requiring treatment.

11.51 If the motorway is not built, the information resulting from the ground investigations would no doubt be useful to others seeking to improve ground conditions in this area. However the probability is that considerable funding would have to be found to commence the remedial works, and also to continue the investigations on land outwith the motorway route. The motorway funding would probably not be available for this purpose, as it would form part of the transport budget, and (if preceding arguments are accepted) should be re-assigned to public transport improvements. If fill material is required for ground treatment, it would have to be brought in specifically for that purpose, so that doing this work as part of the motorway construction would be likely to be more cost effective.

11.52 If this extra funding is not forthcoming, the likelihood is that many of these sites would remain in their current neglected condition. It is not part of the Reporters' remit to assess the potential risks arising at these sites. However any such risks would remain, with the possibility of adverse impacts on the local environment and those living or working nearby.

11.53 For these reasons, it is concluded that the proposed motorway construction would deliver useful spin off benefits for the treatment of contaminated land, and that there is no evidence to suggest that the motorway works would increase the contamination risks to local residents and the local environment. In contrast, in the absence of a substantial programme of dedicated remedial works, any current risks arising from ground contamination on the motorway route would be likely to remain, with the potential to become more serious unless treatment occurs.

Chapter 8 : Economic impact and regeneration

11.54 The proposed road scheme would represent a significant investment which would be likely to lead to considerable local benefit through short term job opportunities in the construction and supply industries. The route corridor has effectively been blighted for many years, with many industries closing and people leaving the area.

11.55 Proponents of the M74C claim that the road would be a catalyst for economic growth and regeneration at various major development locations along the route and further to the west. It is argued that improved journey times, reliability of the network, and better accessibility should bring substantial benefit in terms of new investment and job creation. Better accessibility would open up job opportunities for people over a wide area, to the possible disadvantage of local people.

11.56 Long term economic forecasting is notoriously difficult, and the SACTRA report findings recorded in chapter 8 warn of the need for a thorough economic impact study, and a cautionary approach when seeking to forecast the economic benefits of transport improvements.

11.57 In this case, 2 reports have been provided by the TRA which seek to forecast the economic benefits of the proposal. The EKOS report predicts that the new road would act as a catalyst leading to developments that would provide about 25,000 jobs (see paragraph 8.26 above). The Simmonds report predicts that the new road would give certain areas (notably Glasgow, Renfrewshire, East Renfrewshire, and North and South Lanarkshire) a more competitive position in attracting new economic development, in comparison with other locations such as the Forth valley, the north of Scotland, Ayrshire, West Dunbartonshire, and Inverclyde. This would be expected to lead to about 20,000 jobs locating in the favoured parts of the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley area, at the expense of the less favoured areas (see paragraphs 8.8-8.10 above).

11.58 There is no suggestion that the jobs attributable to the construction of the M74C in these two forecasts are mutually exclusive, and should be added together. It is the potential development sites identified in the EKOS report that would be expected to benefit most from the construction of the new road, and to which the jobs forecast in the Simmonds report would be most likely to migrate. Thus it would seem that the most optimistic conclusion that can be drawn from these two reports in relation to the economic benefit of the M74C is that 20,000 jobs would be drawn to the area at the expense of other parts of Scotland, and that 5,000 jobs (at the most) might be genuinely new jobs for Scotland. However the forecasts have to be treated with considerable caution, for the reasons given in the SACTRA report and by objectors, such as the weak link between transport improvements and economic growth when dealing with a mature economy with well developed transport systems (which clearly applies to Glasgow) and the 2 way road effect; and then offset by job losses along the route.

11.59 The TRA has estimated that the businesses along the route that would be directly affected by the new motorway have about 2,800 employees. This estimate was based on indirect sources and without seeking information from the companies concerned.

11.60 Some businesses no doubt will have relocated elsewhere in advance of the long awaited road and some new businesses may have chosen to relocate close to the M74C in anticipation of its construction, relying on the development plan and transport planning. However the re-alignment at Polmadie has come as a surprise to the businesses now affected by the altered line. Some businesses, particularly those subject to heavy regulatory controls, are likely to require more time to relocate than the TRA timetable allows (see findings 10.38-10.40, Albion 12 and 13, and Polmadie 14 and 15, all within chapter 10 above). Thus there is a risk that a significant number of jobs (possibly about 750) would be permanently lost to the Glasgow area, and possibly to Scotland, if the scheme proceeds. As noted in finding Polmadie 15 above, the loss of so many existing jobs in such a disadvantaged area would be likely to have devastating results on the local economy, as well as the personal problems for the households directly affected. In addition, interruption in the provision of supplies and services from these firms to other businesses could result in closures elsewhere, thus affecting the wider Scottish economy. These potential job losses should perhaps carry more weight (job for job) than the uncertain prospect of attracting new jobs to the Glasgow area from other parts of Scotland.

11.61 Regarding the potential redistribution of job prospects from one part of Scotland to another, the Simmonds report notes that some of the jobs attracted to the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley area will come to locations that have Assisted Area status; and that some will be drawn from locations that have Assisted Area status. The largest draw (approximately 8,000 jobs) would be expected to be from the Forth area. Although this includes Lothian, where only West Lothian has assisted area status, it also includes Fife where part of the area has assisted area status. Around 2,000 jobs are expected to be drawn from the north area. Stirling (and perhaps Clackmannan) is included in this category, both of them having assisted area status. Within the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley area, the new road would have a small negative effect on the competitiveness of Inverclyde and West Dunbartonshire, due to the differential impact of the changes in accessibility and traffic effects.

11.62 Thus the overall economic impact of the proposed road in terms of employment appears to be largely a redistribution of jobs from other parts of central Scotland to the areas in closest proximity to the corridor of the new road, primarily Glasgow and South Lanarkshire, with benefits extending northeast to North Lanarkshire and westwards to East Renfrewshire and Renfrewshire, but not as far west as Inverclyde and West Dunbartonshire, and with only a marginal benefit for East Dunbartonshire.

11.63 Despite these doubts about the overall benefit of the new road to the Scottish economy as a whole, and the negative effects on other areas (which the SACTRA report states should be taken into account), it is evident that the new motorway would increase accessibility and economic competitiveness in a corridor extending from Cambuslang to Renfrew. It is therefore understandable that the new road should have widespread support among the local authority and economic development organisations responsible for those areas.

11.64 The construction of the new motorway may well lead to an early uptake of readily developed sites, with the result that there may be more jobs created in the early years than later. Given the amount of contamination in the route corridor itself, sites to the west of Kingston Bridge may be developed ahead of others. The links to the M8 and M77 may well make sites adjacent to these routes more attractive, leaving the more difficult sites to develop until later. Travel to and from Glasgow Airport for areas to the east of Glasgow would benefit from the road, as well as from the proposed rail access. Thus, despite the doubts about the overall employment prospects, it seems likely that the M74C would be of some economic benefit to Glasgow and the Clyde valley. But these perceived benefits would be progressively eroded if the motorway becomes congested through traffic growth, and takes on the characteristics of the city centre section of the M8 and other congested parts of the strategic network. In this context, the TRA's prediction that traffic around the Fullarton junction will be at or near capacity of the motorway from the early years is likely to undermine the favourable perception that the new road currently enjoys among supporters.

11.65 In relation to regeneration proposals and projects, these are in the main at an early stage of development and are heavily dependent on external funding from agencies such as SE. That organisation has indicated that funding will only be made available for the Flagship Initiatives if the M74C proceeds. In the absence of SE funding, these initiatives may be delayed, reduced, or abandoned. SLC has undertaken site restoration works at Clydesmill but expects restoration of much of the contaminated land in the Rutherglen/Cambuslang area to be carried out by developers themselves, funded by the resultant increase in land values which sites readily accessible to the network would be expected to attract. Local authorities are under considerable financial constraint. Thus it is likely that much of the site restoration that is needed will largely be left to developers. The land regeneration process would be likely to greatly assisted by the perceived improvement in accessibility that would be afforded by the new motorway, and if SE gives assistance to restoration. If the new motorway does not proceed, regeneration prospects in the corridor would be likely to be harmed by the poorer perception of road accessibility, and the reduced enthusiasm of SE for projects in this area. On the other hand, if the road is judged not to be in the overall public interest, it must be assumed that SE would continue to give as much assistance as possible to the important regeneration projects in the locality.

Chapter 9 : Formal objections to the proposed compulsory purchase order

11.66 The inquiry has also considered the objections to the proposed compulsory purchase order lodged by those with an interest in the land where acquisition is proposed. Although the property impact of the new road (and especially the direct impact on homes) would be surprisingly small for a project of this scale, due largely to the safeguarding of the proposed route for many years, a substantial number of properties (around 190) would be affected. Many of these plots have been acquired by voluntary agreement, and the number of objections to the CPO has progressively reduced, to the extent that (at the time of writing) only 25 objections to the order have been maintained. These are listed in the table on pages 9-2 and 9-3. These all relate to business premises or vacant land; none relates to residential property. Further details are given in chapter 9, and the corresponding findings in chapter 10.

11.67 These objections are different in procedure and nature from the vast majority of objections to the principle of the new section of motorway and its impact on the environment. Here, the main concern is about the impact of removal and possible relocation of existing businesses directly affected by construction works, or by related wayleave matters. The test to be applied is whether acquisition is necessary in the public interest, in the context of the counter arguments put forward by or on behalf of the various objectors.

11.68 Each of these objections requires to be considered individually on its merits, on the basis of the relevant material reported in chapter 9 and the corresponding findings in chapter 10. In addition, given that the proposed road would affect all these properties if it is approved and proceeds, or none of them if it is rejected, it is also desirable to consider the collective impact on all affected properties where objections have been maintained.

11.69 In assessing the significance of the impacts on these businesses, the following considerations are noted:

Each business contributes to a greater or lesser extent to the local and wider Scottish economy, in providing employment; providing services to other businesses or customers; and in bringing income from other areas by the "export" of goods and services.
The extent of the contribution will vary according to the size and nature of the firm. A small firm supplying a standard service to the local market (eg vehicle maintenance) would be likely to contribute much less than a large specialist firm employing many people locally, and serving a wide market.
The TRA hopes that if the road is authorised, construction work would commence towards the end of 2005 or early in 2006, around 18 months after the submission of this report. This window of opportunity to move would reduce further up to the time that a decision on the road is published, leaving little time for firms to relocate if the decision is to go ahead.
Small firms with standard building requirements would probably be able to find alternative premises and commence operations at the new site within a matter of months. However a large firm, or one with specialised building and site requirements, or requiring specialist authorisations from licensing bodies, would probably require a much longer period (probably around 2 years) to identify a suitable site, obtain the necessary authorisations, build and equip the new facility, and shift operations from the existing site. The relevant TRA representative at the inquiry stated that, if the CPO is confirmed, the acquiring authority would not be prepared to delay entry to acquired sites to allow this period for relocation.
The objective of the compulsory purchase compensation arrangements is to leave affected parties no worse off than if acquisition had not occurred, as far as practicable.
Thus in principle, it would be desirable for all affected businesses to relocate successfully within the local area, so that all existing jobs are preserved for existing employees, and the contribution to the local economy is continued.
Some of the affected firms provide specialist products and services, where it would be more difficult or more expensive to source the service from another supplier. The disruption or increased cost of the service could have a wider impact on the Scottish economy.
Another issue is that some of the firms are operating in older premises, where capital costs have long since been written off, and which (in some cases) do not meet modern standards or requirements in terms of access arrangements, safety zones, equipment, etc. For these firms, the compensation payable for the loss of the existing facilities may fall well short of what is needed to build and equip a new facility meeting current requirements. They would probably require assistance from the local enterprise organisations, but each case and business plan would have to be considered on its merits.
Finally, some of the firms may be in a financially precarious position and would not survive upheaval, while others might well decide that a location well removed from the current site would suit them much better. In either event, these jobs and services would be lost to the local economy.

11.70 Having reviewed the evidence and the results of the site inspections for each objection and the corresponding plot(s), it is concluded that each of the various sites falls into one of 3 categories.

11.71 In the first category are those sites where the evidence and our site inspections indicate that the land could be appropriated for motorway construction or ancillary purposes without significant hardship to the owner/occupiers. Some of these plots are vacant or little used. In others, acquisition of only part of the land is proposed, but we consider that the usefulness of the remaining land would not be compromised. Further sites in this category are occupied by fairly small users with straightforward site and building requirements, easily available or replicated elsewhere, such as vehicle maintenance workshops and small scale storage and distribution. For these, relocation should present no serious difficulties.

11.72 In the second category are plots where the dislocation of existing uses would be likely to cause some hardship to the businesses concerned, and some potential loss of business activity and employment to the local economy, but where the scale of individual hardship is not sufficient to outweigh a compelling case for acquisition in the public interest for motorway construction.

11.73 Finally, in the third category, are plots where the scale or specialised requirements of the current users would be likely to result in serious relocation difficulties. The scale and/or specialised site and authorisation requirements of these businesses are such that successful relocation is likely to take around two years (see findings above). If the CPO is confirmed, the TRA has made it clear that it intends to take possession of the land at the end of 2005 or early in 2006, and that it is not prepared to countenance some delay to the intended timetable to allow time for businesses to relocate. The period between the announcement of the decision on whether the M74C project is to proceed (and hence that the compulsory purchase order is to be confirmed) and the end of 2005 is likely to be well under the two years required for the successful relocation of these larger and more complex businesses. Thus there is a serious risk that these businesses will be extinguished, and the services that they provide to the wider Scottish economy would be interrupted or lost; that significant local employment would be lost; and that important business activities would be threatened. These potential disadvantages must be considered in the context of the degree of public interest in securing the construction of this section of motorway.

11.74 The objectors/plots that are considered to fall into the first category (no significant hardship) are as follows :

Noble Imports Wholesale : Plot 30 : The building is partly derelict; no evidence has been supplied to justify the objection; there is no evidence of any probable difficulty in relocating the cash and carry and vehicle repair businesses.

BRB Residuary Ltd : Plot 76 : Part of a large vacant site; there is no evidence that the remaining land would become incapable of suitable redevelopment.

Guthrie Scottish Nominees (No 3) Ltd : Plots 80 and 81 : A large vacant site; no evidence has been supplied to justify the objection; there is no evidence that any remaining land would become incapable of suitable redevelopment.

David B Dobie (Accountants) : Plot 94 : Objector is the tenant of a small rented office space. No evidence has been supplied to show that relocation would be difficult. There should be no difficulty in securing replacement office accommodation.

Glasgow Rowing Club : Plots 100-102 : This site is on the bank of the River Clyde, well removed from the motorway route. The land to be acquired in connection with the M74C is open ground to the southeast of the clubhouse, to be used for in connection with surface water drainage arrangements. The rowing club clearly has a specific locational need for the existing facilities on the riverbank. Relocation would be problematic. However most of the club property, including the parking area and the clubhouse, would not be affected. It is accepted that the club will have to retain access for long rowing craft to be taken in and out of the clubhouse, using the storage area door on the southeast elevation. There should be no difficulty in setting up an arrangement that allows the acquiring authority to install the facilities that are required for the motorway in a manner that leaves unimpeded access to the boat store for the use of the club.

Scotbeef Ltd : Plot 110 : Plot to be acquired is a small part (843 sq m) of a larger site, accommodating a single storey extension of an adjacent office building. The office building and the other activities on the remainder of site can continue in use. There is no evidence that the loss of this small area would cause significant difficulty to the overall operation.

Philip C Smith (Commercials) Ltd : Plot 121 : There is no evidence to suggest that it would be difficult to secure an alternative site for the parking/storage of these commercial vehicles awaiting hire.

Millside Properties Ltd/McConechy's Tyre Service Ltd : Plot 164 : No evidence has been supplied to justify the objection. There is no evidence to suggest that it would be difficult to secure an alternative site for this use.

James Boyle : Plot 179 : The objector wishes to be re-housed. The property has already been demolished.

Mr B Millen : Plot 221 : It is accepted that the proposed acquisition would cause some difficulty to the objector. However the greater part of the premises would remain available to him, and it seems likely that a workable rearrangement of the access can be implemented.

Corus plc : Plots 193-195 : This is a very large site, mainly unused scrubland. Acquisition of the strip of land through the scrubland for the motorway would not prevent continuing use of the large shed for steel plate fabrication.

Hillview Developments Ltd : Plot 198 : Open unused land. No evidence has been supplied to justify objection. No evidence that acquisition of land would hinder activities on the remainder of holding.

H Meanen Electrical Services (Ltd) : Plot 207 : At present, this small business premises has the benefit of ample on street parking because it is located at the end of the cul de sac where the south end of Polmadie Road has been blocked off. The proposed re-opening of this road as a main through route will lead to traffic passing the premises, and reduced opportunities for on street parking. It is accepted that the loss of part of the site combined with the reduction in on street parking would be likely to cause difficulties for the business, especially if expansion takes place. However there should be no difficulty in finding suitable replacement premises elsewhere, with adequate parking

11.75 The plots in the second category, where there would be likely to be some hardship, are as follows :

First Engineering Ltd : Plots 40 and 41 : This is little used land but adjacent to large premises used for rail maintenance supplies. Operator would require access to rail network but this is currently not available at this site. Relocation could cause some difficulties, and could hinder important railway maintenance activities.

Land Securities Trillium : Plot 73 : Part of a site occupied by a modern office building. Proposed acquisition would affect part of the office building and most of the associated car park. Clearly very problematic as to how the remainder of the building would be retained, and what parking facilities it would have.

Allscot Plastics Ltd : Plots 94 and 96 : A mid sized industrial and office premises. There should be little difficulty in finding suitable replacement premises, but the hazardous nature of materials in use may delay the process.

Ingram Brothers (Glasgow) Ltd : Plot 103 : This is a mid sized industrial and office premises producing and distributing specialist baking supplies throughout the UK. It employs about 40 people. The relocation of the industrial process facilities site should not be difficult, but may not be possible in the limited period available. It would be undesirable for this specialist business service to be lost.

MRC Pension Trust Ltd : Plots 184-189, 191, 220. The acquisition proposed by the TRA would require the vehicular access to the objector's industrial estate to be provided by a less obvious and more circuitous route, approaching from the side/rear of the estate. It is understandable that the objector wishes to preserve the more direct and obvious access from the front, by adjusting the layout of the proposed road junction abutting the site. Various alternative arrangements have been devised and debated. It is evident that each of these suffers from difficulties and deficiencies, in that they would require access to be taken on or close to the new motorway eastbound on ramp or the traffic light controlled junction, where the additional industrial estate access would be likely to lead to confusion, hesitation, and incorrect manoeuvres by vehicle drivers, with a potential hazard to road safety. To minimise these problems, it would be necessary to acquire further land belonging to another objector to the proposed compulsory purchase order, leading to a fresh set of problems to be solved. Thus, although undesirable from the objector's point of view, the arrangement proposed by the TRA is workable and reasonable.

11.76 The plots in the third category, where there would be likely to be serious relocation difficulties, are as follows :

Albion Chemicals Ltd : Plot 31 : This is a long established chemical supply business, forming the Scottish distribution depot as part of a nationwide operation. It produces and supplies a very wide range of specialist products to a large number of business customers. There are numerous chemical process facilities on the site. About 60 staff are employed. The site is cramped, and any comparable replacement would have to be larger. It would take about 2 years to procure a replacement site. The loss of this service would be damaging to the wider Scottish economy, as well as the loss of jobs locally.

BOC Ltd : Plot 107 : This is an extensive facility which supplies gas to about 18,000 outlets throughout Scotland, including numerous business, medical, and leisure establishments. About 100 people are employed at the site. The procurement of a comparable suitable replacement site would take about 2 years. Any dislocation of supplies would have adverse implications for a considerable number of customers, as well as for the local economy.

Mr & Mrs Philip C Smith; Clearwater DC Ltd; and Shanks Chemical Services : Plots 119 and 121. The activities at these sites, like the BOC site, provide specialist services to business customers. About 70 people are employed. The procurement of comparable and suitable replacement sites would be likely to take at least two years because of the need to obtain various specialist authorisations, and to install specialist process facilities. The dislocation of these services would have adverse implications for numerous business customers, as well as for the local economy.

H Morris & Co Ltd : Plots 123-124 and 210-213 : This is the largest business affected by the proposed motorway, both in the size of the premises (approximately 500,000 square feet) and the number of employees (about 500). It is a major furniture manufacturing operation, exporting to many areas, with a distribution fleet of some 70 vehicles. The firm occupies a large complex of buildings at the Polmadie Industrial Estate. Virtually all of the manufacturing and storage buildings would be acquired, leaving it impossible to operate the business at this location. To procure alternative premises would be a major operation, involving major upheaval of the business and requiring a long lead time, all due to the scale of the operations. The disruption and potential loss of this business would be a devastating blow to the local economy.

Somerville and Morrison Ltd : Plot 178 : This is a small but very specialised firm manufacturing waterproof paper for packaging, the only one of its kind in Scotland. It has a substantial order book, and successfully exports to home and overseas markets. The firm was established in 1873, and some of the buildings on the site are of historic interest. Although only a handful of jobs would be lost, it would be very undesirable for this long established and successful firm to cease operations. There should be no difficulty in finding suitable alternative premises, but a package of business and financial assistance is likely to be required. This may take some time to arrange.

11.77 For several of the above businesses, inclusion in the proposed CPO has resulted from the decision to divert the motorway northwards to avoid the Polmadie rail facilities. Those affected by the diversion are BOC Ltd (much more significant land take); Scotbeef Ltd; Mr & Mrs Philip C Smith and Philip C Smith (Commercials) Ltd; Clearwater DC Ltd; Shanks Chemical Services; and H Morris & Co Ltd. The first line of objection for these firms is that the motorway route should revert to the original alignment approved in 1995. The findings on this matter are set out at Polmadie 1-13 above.

11.78 It is evident that the removal of these businesses would affect a large number of jobs; would create major disruption for most of the firms involved; would threaten the continuity of important business services that are used by many customers; and that the most important of the businesses probably cannot relocate within the timescale intended by the acquiring authority. Collectively, the potential disruption and loss of these businesses would be severely damaging to the local and Scottish economy. On the other hand, it is also evident that there would be very severe cost, operational, and environmental problems in reverting to the 1995 alignment.

11.79 The inescapable conclusion is that both of these scenarios would be very undesirable. But if a decision has to be made, then the additional cost of the rail alterations (estimated at some £75 million) would be likely to be considerably more expensive than providing the displaced businesses with new premises.

Performance against Scottish Executive and local government commitments, objectives, and policies

11.80 A project of this size and cost should be expected to make an important contribution towards the achievement of public objectives. Relevant central and local government policies have been described in chapter 2. The results of the assessment of the various probable implications of the proposal, culminating in the findings contained in chapter 10, now allow an assessment to be made of how the proposal would perform in relation to central and local government commitments, objectives, and policies.

11.81 Construction of this road forms part of the Scottish Executive transport policy and roads programme, within the context of the broad strategic policies set out in Working Together for Scotland - A Programme for Government and A Partnership for a Better Scotland. The completion of the M74 motorway is a long standing component of the development plan for the area (the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Joint Structure Plan (2000), its predecessor Strathclyde Structure Plan, and the two adopted local plans covering the route (the Glasgow City Local Plan and the Cambuslang/Rutherglen Local Plan).

11.82 Construction of the new road would implement these policy commitments.

11.83 The new road would contribute to the policy on easing congestion on Scotland's trunk road network to some extent, but there is a strong risk that congestion would exist from the opening year on the westbound approach to the new section of road, and elsewhere on the network. The benefits of the new road would be progressively eroded by the continuing traffic growth which would be facilitated and induced by the new road.

11.84 A Partnership for a Better Scotland also contains the high level commitment that 70% of the Scottish transport budget should be spent on public transport projects by the year 2006. The expenditure of about £375-£500 million on building the M74C to the intended timescale would prevent this commitment being met in the west of Scotland, as proposed public transport projects in that area would amount to only 35% of total projected transport spending in the area during the period 2004-2008.

11.85 Similarly, the objective to reduce traffic levels to 2001 levels by 2021 expressed in Scotland's Transport : Delivering Improvements would be breached by the proposal, as it makes provision for considerable traffic growth (about 25% for the high growth scenario). The new road itself is expected to increase vehicle trips in the Glasgow area by a further 1.5-2.5%, and vehicle kilometres (which form the basis for assessing progress towards the target) by about 5%. This major contribution to traffic growth, and the corresponding failure to contribute to traffic reduction, would also be at variance with the executive's policies for a sustainable approach to transport and planning (as set out in NPPG 17 : Transport and Planning), where the intention is to discourage the use of cars, and the use of trunk roads for short local journeys.

11.86 Regarding the numerous public policies in support of economic development, despite the doubts about the probable level of employment increase that can be reliably attributed to the existence of the new road, the proposal can be expected to make a positive contribution to the economy, and would thus be supportive of those policies. It would improve access to the area to the west of Glasgow south of the Clyde, and the perception of the business competitiveness of that area, although access benefits would be progressively lost through traffic growth, in the absence of measures for traffic restraint. Most of the jobs that the new motorway would be expected to attract to the area would be drawn away from other locations in Scotland, at the expense of those areas.

11.87 Regarding the various policies in support of social inclusion, as noted above the proposed road would be likely to assist the local economy, and thus provide more job opportunities in an area where participation rates are low. However car ownership is also low, so that the new road would be of little assistance to those suffering exclusion, and would be likely to worsen travel opportunities for this section of the population by undermining progress towards major public transport improvements. The presence of the new road, largely elevated on embankments and viaducts, would increase community severance for those living along the route.

11.88 Policies for environmental protection and improvement would be breached along various sections of the route, where some adjacent and nearby areas would be affected by increased noise, visual intrusion, and airborne emissions, and severe noise and disruption during construction, as described in chapter 5 and summarised in the table on page 10-12. There would be some offsetting benefits elsewhere, due to reduced traffic levels, although these would be thinly spread and generally not discernible.

11.89 The new road would reduce traffic levels on various main roads in the locality. This would result in some environmental benefits, and would facilitate improvements for pedestrians and cyclists. There would be greater opportunities for the provision of bus lanes and corridors, although these are already in place in some cases.

11.90 The policy in support of environmental justice would be breached by the proposed road, as those living along the route would suffer from the adverse environmental impacts, with little benefit, while the main advantages of the new road would accrue to non-resident vehicle users passing along the new motorway, and to businesses located mainly outwith the area.

11.91 Public policies on curbing airborne emissions are described in chapter 6. The new road would be expected to have little adverse impact, as emissions would be largely within the recommended thresholds, except for a limited area at Kingston which is not mainly attributable to the M74C. However the one exception is CO2 emissions, which are an important component of greenhouse gas emissions. For this pollutant, the new road is predicted to increase emissions by about 135,000 tonnes a year (an increase of 5.7% in the study area), compared with the Do Minimum case, for the year 2020. This would be a significant setback to the achievement of the Government's commitment to reduce greenhouse gases.

11.92 Objectors have cited the following quotations from various publications produced by the Scottish Executive. The implications of the proposed road described above call into question whether it would be consistent with these aspirations.

"We want to see new roads built only where it makes sense to do so: that is, after a thorough appraisal of the costs and benefits associated with any proposed scheme and any possible alternative modes which might serve the same route." (Scottish Transport White Paper 1998)

"Our transport system should be sustainable, minimising impacts on our environment, particularly by greater use of public transport." (Scottish Executive Partnership Agreement)

"Before including major [road] schemes in their strategy, local authorities should be able to demonstrate that they have looked at alternative or complementary solutions……..and that the road scheme is consistent with an integrated transport strategy." (Scottish Executive guidance on Local Transport Strategies, 2000)

Where a transport project is to be justified on economic development grounds "..it needs to be demonstrated that devoting resources to the transport project would represent a more cost effective means of developing the local economy than the use of other existing strategy instruments." (Scottish Executive guidance on Local Transport Strategies, 2000)

"We want a Scotland that delivers sustainable development; that puts environmental concerns at the heart of public policy and secures environmental justice for all of Scotland's communities." (Scottish Executive Partnership Agreement)

11.93 Drawing these elements together, it is evident that the proposal would be supportive of some central and local government commitments, objectives, and policies, such as the completion of the M74 and the promotion of economic development, but would be likely to be in serious conflict with others, such as traffic restraint, the priority to improve public transport, CO2 emissions, and some local environmental protection policies. Thus it is inevitable that the recommendation contained in this report will be at variance with some public objectives and policies, whether it is for or against the proposal.

Synthesis

11.94 This brings this report to the crucial question of considering where the balance of advantage lies in this matter. This is principally a matter for the public interest, but also for those who would be directly affected by the result, for better or for worse, be they local residents along the route of the new road, persons with an interest in businesses that would be displaced by the new road, freight operators, users of public transport in the Glasgow area, business and employment interests in Renfrewshire and other areas that would benefit from the new road, or drivers of vehicles who would be able to pass through the city centre 5-10 minutes quicker. This is a no win situation, as the new motorway has the potential to bring both significant advantages and major disadvantages.

11.95 Some of these impacts (both positive and negative) would be immediate or in the early future, and can be predicted with a reasonable degree of confidence, while others would be some years hence, where it is more difficult to be confident about the outcomes.

11.96 Drawing these numerous elements together, the evidence has shown that the proposal would be likely to :

seriously hinder the achievement of important Scottish Executive commitments and objectives for traffic reduction, public transport improvements, and CO2 emissions;
have very serious adverse impacts on the environment of communities along the route, both during construction and in operation;
be at variance with policies to promote social inclusion and environmental justice;
temporarily ease traffic congestion, to the benefit of car commuters and road freight transport, but that these benefits would be progressively lost due to continuing traffic increases, in the absence of measures to restrain and reduce traffic; and
make a positive contribution to the local economy in Glasgow, South and North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, and East Renfrewshire, at the expense of the Forth valley, the Stirling area, Ayrshire, Inverclyde, and West Dunbartonshire.

11.97 Drawing these various strands together, and looking at all the policy, transport, environmental, business, and community disadvantages of the proposal as a whole, it must be concluded that the proposal would be very likely to have very serious undesirable results; and that (in the context of the advice in the SACTRA report, the transfer of jobs from other parts of Scotland, and the potential harm to existing businesses along the route) the economic and traffic benefits of the project would be much more limited, more uncertain, and (in the case of the congestion benefits) probably ephemeral.

11.98 In this context, it cannot be concluded that the public benefits of the proposal would be sufficient to outweigh the considerable disadvantages that can be expected, nor that it is necessary in the public interest to acquire compulsorily all of the properties where objections to the CPO have been maintained.

11.99 Accordingly, on the basis of the consideration of the material put forward by objectors, the TRA, and those who support the project, the conclusion is that this proposal should not be authorised, and that the compulsory purchase order should not be confirmed.

11.100 Inevitably this recommendation will be subject to considerable criticism by those who support the road. The opposite recommendation has been considered with equal care. It is concluded that a recommendation to approve the construction of the road and the compulsory purchase of the affected properties would depend on setting aside the very serious disadvantages of the proposal in terms of objectives for the improvement of public transport and traffic reduction, CO2 emissions, the very serious environmental impacts along the route, and disregarding the potentially devastating effects on the local and wider economy due to the dislocation of existing businesses and services; and placing an unreasonable degree of confidence in employment forecasts that have not been demonstrated to be robust, and which at best would bring a relatively small number of new jobs to Scotland, the vast majority of the prospective new employment being transferred from other areas of Scotland, including other parts of the Clyde valley area. Even if a more positive view of the economic benefits were to be accepted, it would still be doubtful if this aspirational and uncertain prospect would justify the acceptance of so many negative effects.

11.101 If the recommendation against the new road is not accepted, it is considered essential to minimise the adverse effects of the road and maximise the benefits by ensuring that the responsible public authorities take all possible steps to :

institute measures to control and reduce traffic volumes using the motorway/trunk road system in the area, in order to preserve the traffic benefits and to assist in the objective of reducing traffic to 2001 levels;
provide additional funding for public transport improvements during the period of construction of the new road, so that the high level commitment to a 70/30 balance of transport expenditure in favour of public transport is maintained;
adopt of all the remedial measures covered in the environmental assessment and inquiry evidence;
adhere to most (if not all) of the conditions imposed on the 1995 planning permissions;
assure the owners of all properties to be acquired compulsorily that a minimum period of 2 years will be available between confirmation of the order and entry into any plot, except where those with an interest in the property to be acquired compulsorily agree to a shorter period;
assist affected businesses to relocate in the Glasgow/South Lanarkshire area through professional and financial assistance, even on a "new for old" basis where this is necessary to meet current statutory requirements; and
give special assistance to residents of properties that are shown by the environmental assessment to be seriously adversely affected by the construction or operation of the new road, to reduce or avoid the impacts, in the interests of environmental justice.

11.102 It is recognised that these recommended safeguards are onerous, but it is considered that they are the minimum that is necessary to avoid or remedy the serious policy and environmental implications of this proposal, and to maintain progress towards the various aspirations and commitments that have been expressed.

11.103 In addition, attention is drawn to 7 requests included in their closing submissions by Friends of the Earth Scotland and JAM74. These are that the Scottish Executive should :

Put the project into abeyance until a full and independent multi-modal study has been carried out, covering the full range of road traffic demand management measures available as well as interventions aimed at improving the range, price, and quality of public transport services. The study should include a detailed accessibility planning exercise.
Submit alternative proposals as part of a coherent package for policy delivery following conclusion of the multi-modal study.
Review the M74 road proposal under Strategic Environment Assessment.
Carry out new traffic modelling of the M74 proposal in the light of new cost estimates and increased traffic and environmental impacts revealed during the inquiry.
Carry out new economic modelling of the M74 proposal in the light of flaws revealed during the inquiry in the work carried out for the current proposal.
Make routine the carrying out of post construction "after studies" of all new road projects in order to assess whether the traffic, environment, and economic justifications given are met once construction is complete.

11.104 It should be noted that the findings and conclusions in this report concerning HGV movements for the construction of the road are based on the evidence available to the inquiry. No account has been taken of the possibility that the number of HGV trips occurring during the construction phase may be double those forecast in the environmental assessment. If Scottish Ministers are minded to authorise the road, it would be necessary to clarify the position on the probable numbers of HGV construction trips, and to consider the implications of any increase in the forecasts.

Recommendation

For these reasons, it is recommended that this proposal should not be authorised, and that the various orders should not be confirmed; and that if this recommendation is not accepted, that the steps suggested in paragraph 11.101 above should be pursued to minimise the adverse effects and maximise the beneficial effects of the proposal.

R M Hickman
Inquiry Reporter

July 2004

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