« Previous | Contents | Next »
Listen
Effective Interventions Unit: Reducing the impact of local drug markets: A research review
Chapter 6 A Provisional Picture Of Experiences In Scotland
The EIU visits to Scottish forces highlighted a range of issues that were common to local police attempting to tackle low level markets. We describe and discuss these issues in this chapter. The visits were short and exploratory so the information collected does not allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of police approaches. We refer to the evidence reviewed in previous chapters where there are direct links.
The chapter covers the following issues:
Local drug markets
Our initial visits to Scottish forces provide a provisional picture of some low-level drug markets. This description presents the problem as experienced by the police. It is likely that we would have formed a more comprehensive view of the markets if we had talked to a wider range of people, such as drug workers, drug users and / or drug dealers themselves.
58
The police in all the areas we visited reported heroin dealing as the primary problem they were facing. Dealing of crack was identified as a developing problem in a couple of areas, cocaine in another. Diazepam was also identified in an inner city market. The most commonly dealt quantity of drug was, for heroin, for example, the 'tenner bag', under a tenth of a gram of heroin sold for about ten pounds. Such a quantity would usually provide only one or two 'hits' for the user.
All areas visited reported that markets were located predominantly in residential areas, usually small housing estates or blocks of flats. Dealing activity took place inside specific properties or, far less frequently, in stairwells. Small scale, ad-hoc street dealing, for example from phone boxes or cars, was also described as occurring in the residential areas. We encountered only one current example of significant street dealing. This was based in an inner city, commercial location. Dealing in pubs and clubs was also mentioned.
In many of the areas we visited, the police were clear that the local markets could draw people in to buy drugs from quite some distance. Nonetheless, these markets were described in the main as closed markets.
The characteristics of these markets made enforcement operations difficult because police officers were easily spotted. They became 'known faces' quite quickly and so this limited their ability to do observational or surveillance work in the area in which the drug market was located.
We did not visit small villages in rural areas but some police did report the existence of drug markets here. They were likely to be far smaller, tightly knit closed markets where dealing activity was less visible.
The experience of the police officers we spoke to was that most, though not all, low level drug dealers are drug users, dealing to fund their drug addiction. Their involvement in dealing activity was described as generally ad-hoc, inconsistent and unpredictable; they might deal one week but not the next. It was thus often difficult for the police to make a clear distinction between drug users and drug dealers at this level. The most commonly dealt quantity of drug tended to be that required for one or two 'hits' at most.
The police did also identify some drug dealers whose dealing activity was longer-term, better established and more organised. Although some of them used drugs, others did not. Their dealing was aimed at profit. These dealers were far fewer in number.
Resourcing and resource allocation
Perhaps the central issue facing all local policing areas was how to resource a response to the problems posed by low-level markets. There are limited staff resources available in any local area and most of these are dedicated to uniformed response, community beat patrol and dedicated criminal investigation officers (i.e. CID). Providing a sufficient patrol response is often difficult due to staff vacancies, sickness, training and other abstractions (officers reallocated to other tasks - for example to staff a major inquiry should a murder occur). So there is rarely any readily available 'slack' from which to draw.
Tasking and allocation of resources are undertaken in Scottish forces according to the National Intelligence Model, which is described below:
National Intelligence Model The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a framework for intelligence-led policing currently being implemented across all police forces in the UK. The model sets out the tasking and co-ordination of resources and how intelligence should be analysed and used in this process. The NIM stipulates that analysis of intelligence should include crime pattern analysis, and the creation of profiles on both 'problems' and 'targets'. Intelligence analysis should inform the tasking and co-ordination process. Tasking and co-ordinating group meetings should be the forum in which such decisions, by making informed judgements on force priorities, identifying resources, and commissioning actions. It is recommended that these meetings are held quarterly to six monthly as a strategic group and weekly to fortnightly as a tactical group. |
All forces we visited had a central drugs squad, but their remit was to focus on what might be termed the middle-market or level 2 dealer. Local areas could bid for resources from the drugs squad to assist with their work on low-level markets but squads' ability to respond was limited by their other demands. Decisions to deploy officers would be based on assessment of current operational priorities. Their involvement was perhaps most likely where low-level dealers were known to have links to the higher level dealers of interest to the drugs squad.
It was clear that there are no easy answers to this problem. Force and local area managers are constantly juggling their limited resources to best meet current priorities. The areas we visited had identified a variety of resourcing responses to try and solve this problem.
Two areas we visited relied on existing resources to deal with problems as they arose: response patrol teams, community beat officers, CID. Primary responsibility tended to rest with community beat officers covering the areas in which dealing took place. There were indications that suggested that this resulted in a rather inconsistent and ad hoc response.
All other areas had, in one form or another, a small proactive enforcement team with a remit for tackling low-level drug dealing. In most areas this team had a remit for crime generally, including drugs. This meant that a focus on drug dealing had to be juggled with other priorities, such as car crime or housebreaking. Consequently, there would always be periods of time when the team was not concentrating on local dealing. In two areas there was a small unit of officers dedicated to tackling low-level dealing full-time. This role was made explicit in the name given to one of the teams, as the local area's Drugs Unit.
In some more rural areas, it was clear that community constables took on the responsibility for tackling dealing activity in small villages. They could draw on some support from specialist teams if necessary.
There was also some variation in crime/drug proactive teams between whether they were a local or a force resource. Some crime teams were a force resource with a remit for the entire force area. The inevitable danger was that this diluted the focus that the team could give to any particular area. Local management had to bid to receive the team's assistance and if another area had a crime problem regarded at force level as being of greater priority then the resource would be lost. Teams linked to one particular area were also able to build up their knowledge of that area to a degree not possible by force teams.
The crime / drug teams were all proactive plain clothes units staffed by a mixture of detectives and uniformed officers. The team would be led by a detective sergeant and invariably reported to a CID manager.
The set of tasks undertaken by these teams obviously varied but tended to include a mix of proactive intelligence and enforcement work. This would include:
Drugs policing is to some degree a specialist job requiring particular knowledge and expertise, such as:
Officers working in teams with a drug focus were able to develop this expertise and the necessary confidence to allow them to do their jobs more effectively. Some local areas had recognised the need to spread that expertise and confidence more widely. In at least one area, a couple of members of the team were attachments from patrol teams. These attachments were rotated at six monthly intervals to broaden levels of expertise and confidence in drug work in response patrol teams. Other areas encouraged patrol officers to develop their own drug packages, sometimes with support from the crime / drugs team, and undertake the operational enforcement to gain experience.
Collection, collation and use of intelligence
Information on drug dealing and the operation of low-level markets comes from a number of sources, including:
The quality of this information will vary greatly and may not all be regarded as 'intelligence'. Local Intelligence Officers (LIOs) collate, sift and grade this information before it enters police intelligence systems. These systems are constructed to anonymise the intelligence sources from those who may want to make use of it.
High quality 'packages' - profiles of suspects based on intelligence, including recommendations for future enforcement- tend to take quite some time to develop. This is an important task for some of the crime/drugs teams, and a crucial part of the National Intelligence Model. Their dedicated remit provides them with the resources and the time to do proactive drug intelligence gathering work that response and community patrol teams cannot. However, there is understandable press from local communities and within forces themselves to get results in the short-term. This can require some management of expectations and a degree of judgement about the 'best' time to use the intelligence operationally.
Drugs teams we visited were also able to build up contacts within the drug using / dealing network and this could provide a useful source of intelligence on who was currently active and their methods of dealing operation. In some areas, community beat officers links to the wider community provided a source of complementary intelligence on the timing, location and characteristics of dealing activity observed by community members.
Policing strategies
The police areas we visited were focused almost entirely on tackling drug markets in residential properties in housing estates. There was a large degree of similarity across areas in the problems they faced and the strategies and tactics they used.
All areas highlighted the importance of intelligence in directing their activity against markets. They all reported that they were working under the National Intelligence Model. As most areas were dealing with markets based in residential properties, intelligence was crucial for securing warrants to enter and search these properties. Observations and formal surveillance operations were sometimes used but were highly resource intensive. As a result, they tended only to be used where a dealer was suspected to be dealing significant quantities, often employing 'runners' to conduct street deals.
Formal surveillance operations are regulated under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 (RIPSA) which requires prior authorisation for intrusive or directed surveillance. Officers must be specifically trained to undertake such work and the number of officers with this training in any local area was limited. Members of the crime and drug units tended to have this training though they would also have to draw on support from the force drug squad for expertise and equipment.
Such operations were often difficult to set up because of the characteristics of the residential areas in which markets were located. Sites allowing covert observation were difficult to find and few residents were willing to allow their property to be used for fear of the possible consequences. It could be difficult for the police to enter estates to set up operations without being spotted.
The primary enforcement method used in local areas were operational strikes against properties from which dealing was taking place. It was frequently reported that it was difficult to gain entry to such properties quickly. This is important if the police are to secure evidence necessary for a successful prosecution. Reinforced doors were one method used by dealers to prevent rapid entry by the police. As a result, dealers had time to dispose of the drugs before they were arrested. This limited the evidence the police had for dealing activity, restricting the severity of the charges dealers could be reported for.
More detailed intelligence on, for example, dates when drugs are delivered to the property may help such operations. But such intelligence can be both difficult and time-consuming to acquire. It seems certain that the police could not rely on always having such intelligence before proceeding. The contribution of good fortune to enforcement successes was recognised by many officers we spoke to.
To counter the problems of entry, most areas had used other tactics to gather evidence of dealing. Securing formal statements from drug users about dealing activity was one example. On this basis, the police would simply go to the dealing address and arrest the occupant without the need to rely on seizing drugs.
We encountered only two examples of policing open street markets, one current and one historical. The current example was an inner city commercial location where significant dealing activity was reported. A small team of officers focused on policing this market relied on stop and search as their primary method of enforcement. This was reported as producing regular arrests primarily for supply of small 'tenner bag' deals. There was no obvious impact on the market's activity overall.
There was a historical example of significant street dealing in a town centre serving a largely rural area. Despite CCTV and the use of high visibility patrols, there had been a lot of dealing activity which had become increasingly obvious. Dealing took place in alleyways, public toilets, bus shelters and phone boxes. Shops and businesses in the area had complained to the police about the problem. An increased use of stop and search had become ineffective because dealers could recognise officers and discard drugs before they were stopped.
Police decided to employ undercover operations to build up evidence and intelligence on the market. This informed enforcement strikes against addresses and locations identified as being used by dealers. Over twenty people were reported for drug dealing. Since the operation the police report only sporadic occasional street dealing in the town centre. Local officers perceive that it has in the main been displaced back to housing schemes surrounding the town centre.
Conventional enforcement approaches by the police acting alone were the most common response to local markets in the areas we visited.
Formalised, regular, multi-agency involvement with enforcement was limited.
There was one innovative example of the police attempting to make links between enforcement and the work of other agencies. This involved the police conducting a brief survey of other local agencies tackling drugs, such as treatment providers, to assess the impact of a significant enforcement operation. The results were perhaps rather inconclusive but suggest the potential for further such developments in multi-agency links.
Many areas did report good working relationships with the local authority Housing department but similar examples with other agencies were rare. Housing departments were reported as useful providers of information to the police. There were also a couple of examples of the police and housing working together to secure evictions of local authority tenants for drug dealing. This was not a common or regular action. Officers regarded this as a difficult and time consuming process.
None of the local areas we visited made routine, formalised use of problem solving approaches as part of a strategy against drug markets. One case reported to us provides an illuminating example of how simple but effective such an approach can be.
In this example, local police had received reports about discarded syringes in a stream. An officer with responsibility for maintaining links with drugs agencies was aware that some drug users lived upstream from where the syringes had been found. He contacted a local drug treatment provider to suggest that an outreach worker visit the users to explain the problem. Although the officer did not hear back from the provider, there were no further reports of problems.
Harm reduction principles are clearly embedded in the ACPOS Drug Strategy. It commits to supporting harm reduction measures by doing the following:
promote public health
not stigmatise or exclude drug users, carers and workers
promote the benefits of treatment for drug users
create the appropriate environment for harm reduction measures to succeed
promote and protect human rights
maintain an equitable, needs led and person centred approach to service delivery.
60
Little investigation has been made during the course of this review into the ways in which this commitment has been pursued by police forces. However one example of a harm reduction approach in some Scottish forces is the establishment of needle exchange schemes in police custody suites. Needle exchange schemes are currently run in three force areas (in eight custody suites in total). In two of the forces, schemes are operated by custody suite police officers and support staff. In the third, an arrest referral worker also provides support. The remaining forces have no plans at this time to develop such schemes.
Summary The police areas visited by the EIU were focused almost entirely on tackling drug markets operating in residential properties in housing estates. There was a large degree of similarity in the problems local police faced and the strategies and tactics they used. All highlighted the importance of intelligence in directing police activity, according to the National Intelligence Model. High quality intelligence profiles of suspected dealers tend to take quite some time to develop. Local police managers may have to sustain pressure from the community, or sometimes senior force managers, for obvious action in the shorter-term. This requires some management of expectations and a degree of judgement about when best to use intelligence operationally. Most of the local areas had, in one form or another, a small proactive team with a remit for tackling low-level dealing. Tasks varied but tended to include a mix of proactive intelligence and enforcement work. Drugs policing is to some degree a specialist job. Officers working in dedicated teams were able to develop a greater degree of confidence and expertise in this work. Conventional enforcement approaches by the police acting alone were the most common response to local markets. Formalised, regular, multi-agency involvement with enforcement was limited. |
« Previous | Contents | Next »