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Partners in Crime - Solving and Reassuring
A Thematic Inspection of Crime Management in Scotland

chapter 3: investigation

3.1 Attendance Policy

On receiving a report of a crime, the appropriate police force has a number of decisions to make. These include whether police officers should attend the crime scene and, if so, how many and how quickly. A number of factors relevant to investigating the crime and also reassuring the victim may influence these decisions.

Currently force policies vary, with one force sustaining the policy of dispatching an officer to attend every scene as soon as possible. Another force, having introduced a Problem Solving Policing model, has established that almost half of the calls received for police attendance can be fully dealt with by telephone or by making an appointment for the appropriate community officer to meet with the victim or reporter in a programmed manner.

It may be reasonable to consider that the former, traditionalist approach, more fully meets customer expectations and is more likely to secure any physical or other evidence available from the crime scene. It may also be suggested however that such a policy is not fully harnessing modern policing methods including effective targeting of resources and logical prioritisation of workloads.

While it may be suggested that the more successful method is that which yields the higher detection rate, this does not factor other relevant variables into the equation. In general rural areas of Scotland continue to receive traditional policing responses with a more flexible attendance criteria applying in urban areas. Is this simply a factor of supply and demand in the availability of police resources? Is the 'urban' response more about making-do than adopting systematic resource deployment decisions?

There is little doubt that customers of any organisation are more comfortable receiving a consistent level of service on each occasion they call on that organisation's services. It is for that reason that HMIC considers a formal attendance policy, whatever the contents may be, should exist within each force.

An effective attendance criteria would include guidelines on call grading to ensure the necessary standard of response is achieved. HMIC notes that a decision not to despatch someone to a crime scene is not a decision that the crime does not warrant investigation. It may be a decision that the crime can be effectively initially investigated by comprehensive and professional interview of the victim over the telephone. This process needs to be supported by an auditable trail of decisions that ensure no legitimate investigative lines are ignored or overlooked. Any attendance policy must take cognisance of the benefits to be achieved by securing physical evidence at a crime scene.

Irrespective of what policy is implemented an acceptable balance has to be achieved and this must be understood and accepted by communities. This aspect of community engagement and the generation of realistic expectations on the part of the public is an important element in the crime management process.

As with many issues examined in this report, consistent application of policy can be supported by effective IT systems that prompt operators as to the apparently appropriate decision to take with regard to attendance decisions. HMIC considers the development of contact centres/call handling strategies within forces to be a positive step towards achieving such consistency and notes emerging benefits as IT is used to highlight such issues as repeat victims and callers and emerging problems which will feed into the problem solving process. In 'Narrowing the Gap' ¹² HMIC included a case study on NHS24 where resource deployment decisions are assisted by a "rules based" software programme which helps trained operators to make consistent and appropriate decisions in prioritising or grading calls.

HMIC recommends that forces should publish a clear and concise attendance policy which retains an element of flexibility but details the level of service victims of crime can expect to receive on reporting a crime to the Police (recommendation 1).

3.2 Progression of Enquiries

Throughout the Scottish Police Service there are a number of different approaches as to how the enquiry officer for a particular crime is selected. In the majority of cases the officer who initially attends the report of a crime (other than specified serious crimes) will retain 'ownership' of that crime and will be responsible for the subsequent investigation. From the perspective of the victim, and also for general accountability, it is important there is clarity about who 'owns' a crime and has responsibility for conducting subsequent enquiries.

In some forces an early and calculated decision is made regarding who should continue with enquiries. This is generally based on such issues as the crime type or the officer's or complainer's circumstances. What is important is that those tasked with investigating crimes are provided with the necessary support and assistance to ensure that the investigation is competently managed. It is therefore important that:

• a clear line of supervision should be provided to ensure that an appropriate individual is selected and that the required level of investigation is carried out.
• the progress of enquiries is competently monitored to ensure that the requisite investigation takes place, and to a specified standard.

In the majority of forces the officer's line manager is ultimately responsible for the supervision of such enquiries, however, it is apparent that in practice, many line managers see this as an administrative function rather than the conducting of an audit of the quality of the investigation. They seemed in some instances to be more preoccupied with the record keeping than the quality control.

Some forces operate a concept known as Crime Desk or Crime Management Units where dedicated staff have responsibility for the allocation and monitoring of investigations into crimes and offences. Within some forces the Crime Desk/Crime Management staff also monitor the quality of submitted crime reports and subsequently task the investigating officer to undertake further enquiries if required. This system is effective, but dependant on those deployed to crime desks/ crime management units having the appropriate skills, experience and authority to undertake
their role.

The 1995 HMIC crime management thematic ¹³ recommended the appointment of crime managers in divisions or command areas. The arguments giving rise to this recommendation remain valid today.

HMIC recommends that all forces (where they have not already done so) should establish a Crime Management Unit either at divisional or force level staffed by the properly trained and equipped staff to facilitate the proper and professional investigation of crime founded on a consistent allocation policy (recommendation 2).

3.3 Dealing with and Supporting Victims

Every officer receives significant training in communicating with victims, particularly vulnerable ones, and some receive specialist training in this field. Officers are also provided with access to information about the services and support available to the victim.

The roles of Victim Support and the Voluntary Sector support organisations are discussed in 'Relatively Speaking' ¹⁴ as are the results of specific research carried out for HMIC into the needs of victims and their families. While this study focussed on the most extreme types of crime, those necessitating formal Family Liaison arrangements, the underlying theme was that officers who are dealing directly with victims and/or their families need to be sensitive to their emotional and information needs. That report highlights training needs for officers in dealing with victims, and these will become even more important as the victim focus increases as do public expectations.

3.4 Investigatory Skills

This takes us to the question of how well equipped officers are to conduct the investigations allocated to them. All officers receive basic guidance during their initial two-year probationary period. Thereafter unless an officer undertakes a specialist role such as CID or Family Protection duties, little additional formal training is provided in interviewing or investigative techniques.

Most volume crimes in Scotland are investigated by uniform or community officers, and the continuous process of recruitment to replace retired or promoted officers makes it likely that a significant proportion of these front-line officers will be comparatively inexperienced. As highlighted earlier, unless there is a mechanism which not only allocates, but provides advice on how the investigation should be carried out, and a quality control check prior to the crime report being 'filed', there is a danger that detection opportunities will be missed and the quality of service to the public may be less than it should be. There should be clear guidance on minimum standards of investigation.

It is somewhat ironic that the least experienced investigators (ie those dealing with volume crime at patrol level) can be those provided with least guidance. When a team of highly experienced detectives is drawn together to investigate a murder or other serious crime, the investigation is co-ordinated using a Major Crime Administration process. Among other things this means that every enquiry or 'action' is allocated by way of a detailed and unequivocal written instruction.

If detailed guidance is provided to the most experienced detective officers during the most serious types of investigation, it is open to question why similar guidance is not routinely provided to less experienced officers investigating much less serious crimes, but crimes which none-the-less impact on quality of life.

It is apparent that some officers are more likely to solve crimes than others. HMIC explored the possibility that such officers were responding intuitively to criminality, however analysis suggests otherwise. The 'natural thief-catcher' is in fact an officer who (whether consciously or unconsciously) makes best use of the information available, analyses the contents of briefings, is aware of ongoing crime trends, possesses high quality communication skills and has the ability to draw these elements together and produce positive and consistent outcomes. It is apparent that most of these elements can be supported/undertaken by IT processes therefore, once again, a potential IT mechanism can be developed which would improve the management of crime.

This inspection established that, in practice, many officers from different departments could be involved in one investigation. If everything that each person did was fully recorded, and co-ordinated by a Crime Manager (or equivalent) and the victim had a single available point of contact throughout the entire investigative process, then this would be a very effective process. The reality is that, on occasion, not everything is recorded in a retrievable way. This can lead to, amongst other things, duplication of effort, things being overlooked or incomplete information being imparted to victims. These overlaps or omissions may not be apparent to the various officers having a role in the enquiry, but they are patently obvious to the victim.

Some forces do use a system supporting the investigative process to good effort. An example of maximising the experience of Scenes of Crime Officers is referred to in Paragraph 3.11.

3.5 Linked/Series Volume Crime

There was little evidence in, or between, forces of any formal policy on the investigation of linked or series volume crime. It was acknowledged that an identified individual officer should collate all the available information and should thereafter either take ownership of the crimes or at least co-ordinate the subsequent investigations.

However, in practice it was often seen that trends were not identified or where they were, enquiries were not appropriately re-allocated resulting in individual officers conducting separate enquiries.

It was also found that there was little use being made of such resources as Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS ie informants), ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology) and the facilities, particularly database search capabilities, available through the SCRO/PNC (Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Police National Computer) in the investigation of volume crime. A variety of reasons were given for this mainly involving resourcing difficulties. It is felt that there should be a more pro-active and co-ordinated deployment of ANPR to assist with the investigation and prevention of volume crime. With regards the use of CHIS forces must ensure that there is sufficient investment in dedicated CHIS handlers and controllers to assist in the success of the National Intelligence Model.

It would be appropriate for Crime Reports to specifically seek progress reports, for the extent to which CHIS, ANPR, SCRO/PNC and CCTV etc., were utilised in investigations with a decision not to employ these facilities requiring to be justified, or their absence explained. Officers should be encouraged to capitalise on the available investigative tools when dealing with volume crime.

HMIC recommends that forces review their current volume crime management policies and, if necessary, include guidance on minimum standards expected in the investigation of all crimes, and confirm that every activity undertaken in respect of a crime investigation is formally recorded on the associated crime report (recommendation 3).

3.6 Scientific Support

The examination of scenes of crimes has become significantly more complex over recent years, mainly due to the continuing development of DNA technology and the increased awareness of cross contamination issues. This has resulted in Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) spending more time at the scenes they attend. It is not unusual in a serious case for SOCO to be in attendance at the scene for several days and then be tied up for a further period involved in the case preparation. With many high profile cases now totally dependant on the evidence obtained by SOCO, it is apparent why this area of an investigation cannot be rushed and uses a significant amount of forensic resources.

The ultimate result of this protracted examination of serious crime scenes is that volume crime scenes do not get the attention that they would otherwise receive. Despite the additional workload undertaken by SOCO, there has been no significant rise in their numbers over recent years.

The result of this is that in most cases when a fully qualified SOCO is not available to carry out a scene examination, then such an examination will probably be conducted by a Police officer who will have received basic on the job training. Research has shown that comparing crime scenes examined by a Police officer to those done by a SOCO, then the latter has a higher success rate in obtaining evidence valuable to the enquiry. This should not come as a surprise considering the level of training that SOCO now undergo at a National level.

3.7 The Value of SOCO Attending Crime Scenes

The chart shown below is a representative example supplied by one force:

As can be seen from the above figures the attendance of a SOCO at a crime scene can significantly increase the tracing of forensic evidence, especially DNA, which ultimately means that crucial evidence could be missed and a subsequent detection opportunity lost if such personnel are not deployed.

The current forensic staffing levels amongst forces throughout Scotland means that not every volume crime scene can be examined and as such forces have to prioritise their attendance at such scenes. It was noted that some forces had indicated that they would have a SOCO attend all housebreaking scenes, however it was seen that it was impossible to fully adhere to this policy due purely to resourcing implications. It was also noted that whilst most stolen cars which are recovered are the subject of an examination those cars which are broken into are not so frequently examined.

Forces are encouraged to look at a way of increasing the extent of forensic examination at such scenes. This could be achieved by either increasing the number of fully qualified SOCO or by the recruitment of Volume Crime Examiners. Volume Crime Examiners are regularly used by forces in England and Wales and are generally employed at a lower grade than SOCO and usually receive basic in-house training. They are mainly utilised to examine vehicles and lower level housebreakings such as those to garages and garden sheds. It has been reported that forces who employ such examiners have seen the number of scenes examined increased, as have the corresponding forensic hits, with no increase on the SOCO workload.

It was highlighted in the HMIC England and Wales report 'Under the Microscope' ¹⁵, which looked into the provision of forensic services that there was a direct correlation between the number of crime scenes examined and the number of forensic hits achieved. The research carried out on behalf of the HMIC for the current study clearly showed that the forces which carried out the most scene examinations achieved the highest number of hits. As such the force that carried out the highest percentage of scene examinations achieved the highest number of hits by far.

HMIC acknowledges that no additional general funding is currently available to forces but Chief Constables will wish to ensure that SOCO/Vehicle Examiner levels are commensurate with the benefits available from such staff.

It is obvious that this powerful detection tool should be fully exploited as not only does it provide clear unequivocal evidence of culpability, hopefully leading to more guilty pleas, but can also drastically save time and resources on investigation. As such all forces should have a clearly defined Forensic Science protocol which should be adhered to for attending volume crime scenes to ensure that no opportunity is lost to gather evidence.

HMIC recommends that forces within the overall resource equation, ensure the fullest possible use of SOCO and Volume Crime Examiners and forensic scientists (recommendation 4).

3.8 Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners

SOCOs are now able to register with the Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners. This process is supported by ACPOS and it is suggested by HMIC that forces participate in the scheme, which provides proof of an individual's continuous professional development in the field of scenes of crime examination (suggestion 2).

3.9 DNA Technology

It is essential that forces capitalise on the advances which continue to be made in DNA technology. The setting up of DNA volume crime units at the various Forensic Science laboratories throughout the country must be a high priority and is of paramount importance if they are to cope with the increase in such submissions. During discussion with the personnel from one such laboratory, it was highlighted that the lack of facilities was hampering their operational ability to provide a fully effective service. It was noted that this included the need for the provision of new premises to allow for the expected improvement of equipment and the proposed automation of some processes which would result in a better turnaround time for results to be returned to the originating agency.

HMIC is pleased to note from ACPOS that a full audit to identify the future equipment and facilities needs of the various Forensic laboratories will be undertaken as part of the ongoing review of Common Police Services.

3.10 Updating of Crime Reports Concerning SOC Examination

It has been established that the results of scene of crime examinations are not always being appended to the relevant crime report. This appears to be particularly prevalent when non SOCO Police officers attend a crime scene and the examination provides a negative result. It is good practice that full details of the examination, irrespective of the outcome, should be recorded on the crime report.

It was noted that several forces are looking at an IT strategy to assist with the accurate and timely recording of crime scene examination data. Although this is seen to be beneficial, it is felt that such a system must be compatible with the particular force's crime management system to allow for easy cross-referencing.

HMIC recommends that all forces have in place a competent and reliable method of recording the results of crime scene examinations (recommendation 5).

3.11 SOCO Input to 'Modus Operandi' Field

A noteworthy practice observed at one force was in relation to the accurate updating of the MO comments field of the crime report. After attending a crime scene SOCOs have direct access to the crime management system, which allows them to provide a comprehensive update for the information of the investigating officer.

However what is also of interest is that the SOCO, who is likely to have built up some expertise in this aspect of crime, is in the position to change the MO comments if they find that the details on the crime report do not agree with their findings at the scene.

3.12 Research into the Principal Means of Detection

As part of the inspection a research project was carried out in an attempt to identify the principal means of detection for specific crime types over a set period.

The expectation was that this would show DNA to have become a more effective tool in the identification of offenders. Surprisingly, this was not borne out by the research. There may be sound reasons why this was the case, mainly the low percentage of volume crime scenes examined, with only two forces showing higher than a 50% attendance rate, and the inability of the laboratories to process DNA cases quickly enough.

It was found that the average turnaround time for the submission of DNA samples was between 6-8 weeks. Improvements would reap significant benefits, given that a small number of individuals are committing crimes of this nature on a very regular (often daily) basis until detected.

Despite the continued improvement of technological advances in the field of DNA it is important that sight is not lost of the assistance that fingerprint technology can bring to an investigation. There have been significant improvements carried out to the system of fingerprint evidence analysis over the past few years. Some forces are now achieving remarkable turnaround times with, in some cases, identifications being made on the same day that a lift is obtained from a scene examination. This is particularly evident in those forces with immediate local access to a Fingerprint Bureau.

It is hoped that once the Scottish Fingerprint Service is fully operational this anomaly between forces will be addressed and turnaround times for all forces will become more consistent.

There has also been a revaluation of the use of 'mark to mark' searching for fingerprints This is an important tool, which links unidentified fingerprints found at more than one crime scene. It assists in building up crime patterns and linking crimes.

HMIC observed in its review of SCRO in January 2003 ¹⁶ the progress made in respect of mark to mark comparison and the procedures set down in the Scottish Fingerprint Service (SFS). It was noted that the procedures laid down represented a sensible utilisation of the available resources. It was observed that a technical solution to the issue was being progressed through the PITO sponsored 'IDENT 1' project which is being considered as a possible UK wide option.

HMIC recommends that all forces should adopt a strictly adhered to protocol in relation to SOCO attendance at volume crime scenes (recommendation 6).

3.13 San Diego - Volunteer Crime Scene Examination

An area of interest is the system adopted in the United States, whereby citizens can become Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS). In the San Diego Police Department some 960 volunteers are utilised to carry out clerical, administrative, technical and professional activities. One such activity involves volunteers being given basic scenes of crime examination training then being deployed to examine low-level volume crime scenes. This is not seen as an alternative to professional crime scene analysis, but an additional feature in circumstances where professional examination cannot be undertaken for quite minor crimes. Information on this and other volunteer programmes in the USA can be found on the VIPs web-site ¹⁷.

3.14 Intelligence - The National Intelligence Model

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) was introduced in the Scottish Police Service in February 2002. The Model introduced standardised processes and products and brought together the best practices in intelligence and policing to aid the development of strategy and tactics.

The Model is designed to impact on the intelligence product on three levels of business:

• Level 1 - Local Issues
• Level 2 - Cross Border Issues
• Level 3 - Serious and Organised Crime

The NIM has continued to develop within the Scottish Police Service and it was seen during this study that the concept of Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating, a fundamental part of the NIM, has developed separately across all the forces and has become an integral part of individual force commitments to intelligence led policing.

It was encouraging to see that forces were fully utilising the defined processes laid out in the NIM to positively target and deal with volume crime issues, with various examples of good practice and achieved objectives highlighted at various Tasking and Co-ordinating Group meetings attended by HMIC.

In addition to the NIM the Scottish Police Service's commitment to the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) is a significant and important step forward for the service and first in UK terms. When fully operational, the system will allow, amongst other things, for the easy access to a Scotland-wide Criminal Intelligence database, with forces sharing common intelligence practices and procedures; providing the Service with the technological means to make an even greater impact on crime at the three levels of the NIM.

The implementation of the NIM into all of the Scottish Police forces has resulted in a more process driven approach to the investigation and prevention of crime. Forces will benefit from ensuring that they continue to be Intelligence driven and that all available resources and equipment are fully and methodically deployed to provide the best return possible. Robust processes and structures must be established to ensure that the ethos of the NIM is fully implemented and the necessary, properly trained resources are put in place for its successful integration into intelligence led policing. This will result in a more focussed view of the crime being committed and subsequently result in the necessary resources being directed to the area in which they will have the most significant impact.

3.15 The Role of the Analyst

With the inception of the NIM forces have appointed Analysts, with some putting in place a distinct career structure incorporating Researchers, Analysts, Senior Analysts and Principal or Strategic Analysts. It is felt that such a structure will assist with the recruiting and retention of such personnel and ultimately provide support for the model. This need was identified in a 1997 Scottish Police College report on the development of analysis. Lack of consistent grading across Scotland may result in differing standards of analytical product being produced. It was seen that some forces have invested heavily in the appointing and training of such personnel and have set up local training courses to allow for on the job training before they are actively deployed. This is invaluable in ensuring that the personnel are sufficiently equipped to handle the rigors of the posts involved.

All Analysts attend the centrally provided training at the Scottish Police College (SPC) and although it provides a sound all round knowledge base, some attendees identified scope for delivering more training in the full range of disciplines available. That being said, the common methodologies being taught at the SPC are advantageous as they allow Analysts throughout the country to have a common language.

It was noted however that other than the SPC based training courses, there is a lack of cross-fertilisation between analysts to allow for the passing of good practice and the dissemination of methodology.

At present there is a yearly Analyst Training Conference held at the Scottish Police College. This is well evaluated and aims to expand analysts' knowledge base and influencing standards and best practice; and there is a willingness at the College to develop a training based Internet/Intranet Analyst Forum for Scotland. However HMIC feels that a more formalised process for development of this role should be developed; both to provide an opportunity for Analysts to share best practice and a reference forum in relation to policy developments or technological advances which might impact on the Analyst's role.

HMIC recommends that the recognition of analytical staff should be enhanced by:

• forces putting in place a career structure to ensure the continued recruitment and retention of properly qualified and trained analytical staff
• the setting up of a National Forum for analytical staff to allow for the sharing of good practice and dissemination of methodology
• the SPC reviewing its training package with respect to the training of Analysts, particularly in relation to using past data to inform future resource deployment (recommendation 7).

The main inhibitor to the work of the analyst appears to be that the current IT systems in place throughout the Scottish Police Service do not allow for the information held to be shared across the various databases and results in multiple re-keying and searches.

It is suggested that forces re-evaluate their IT policy to ensure that come renewal time the required and compatible product is obtained to support Analysts to carry out their duties with the maximum efficiency. Included in this is the requirement to permit analytical staff to influence product purchase (suggestion 3).

HMIC recommends that forces should look at ways of integrating their available IT systems to prevent duplication of work and allow analytical staff to provide maximum returns from the information available (recommendation 8).

3.16 Implementing the National Intelligence Model (NIM)

Although the concept of the NIM has been fully adopted by all forces, not all have put in place the full processes and structure to resource its effective implementation. NIM will be most effective if intelligence offices are adequately staffed with administrative support and investment in dedicated CHIS handlers and controllers.

Forces will benefit from having in place an allocated Intelligence Manager who ultimately is responsible for the monitoring of all intelligence and its associated data standards. The Intelligence Manager would be in a position to ensure that there is a co-ordination of all intelligence functions across their force area. With sufficiently trained resources in place forces will be in a position to fully implement the NIM and reap the information obtained from the process. An integral part of this process is having the relevant structures in place to support the NIM.

HMIC Recommends that sufficient priority is afforded to resourcing the intelligence function within forces to ensure that it is adequately staffed to allow for the effective implementation of the National Intelligence Model and its associated processes (recommendation 9).

HMIC recommends that forces audit their existing training and briefing process to ensure all officers are aware of the ethos of the National Intelligence Model and the part they have to play in its successful implementation (recommendation 10).

All forces have embraced the ethos of the NIM and are utilising the Tasking and Co-ordinating process to enable them to give a more focussed and directed approach to the way in which crime is tackled. Most forces have their Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating meetings on a fortnightly basis, which seems to be a more workable and efficient time span than a weekly meeting. It was seen that a weekly meeting caused analysts problems in servicing the meeting with the required information and data whilst a time span greater than two weeks lost the immediacy to address arising problems and also the ability to adapt tactics. Forces are now supplementing these fortnightly meetings with Daily Tasking and Co-ordinating meetings, which have a clear agenda and purpose and allow for ongoing actions to be monitored more accurately.

The time scale for the Strategic Tasking and Co-ordinating process was seen to vary throughout the forces and appeared to be dependant on the size and logistics of the force concerned.

Incorporated into the Tasking and Co-ordinating process forces should endeavour to embrace the concept of predictive analysis to fuel the NIM with the required information to gain best results from the resources available. It was noted that no force yet has in place a fully comprehensive Management Information System which provides a quality supply of relevant analytical information to assist with the Strategic and Tactical planning process.

HMIC recommends that forces should embrace more fully the concept of predictive analysis and put in place an IT system to provide a management information system which allows the analysis of past and emerging trends as a basis for anticipating likely future trends in crime (recommendation 11).

It was seen that there was a firm understanding of the processes and structures of the NIM among senior officers and intelligence staff throughout the forces, however, it was apparent that some front line officers did not yet recognise the integral part that they have to play in optimising the impact of the model.

One force has been seen to heavily invest in educating the force through a variety of sources and it appears to have paid dividends with obvious signs that all officers are aware of the ethos of the NIM and the part they have to play in its success.

Forces would benefit from ensuring that all staff are kept fully updated on any intelligence developments and full use should be made of the available IT and briefing systems. Consideration should also be given to the implementation of knowledge maps/aide memoirs to provide officers with the relevant assistance, guidance or updates that they may require to provide an effective service.

Taking everything into account it is clear to see that forces need to maintain momentum towards the full implementation of the NIM process to ensure that the concept is fully embraced at, and by all levels, as it underpins the entire approach to the effective and efficient management of crime.

It is apparent that the quality of the infrastructure available to support operational staff will significantly impact upon the success of the investigative function. Increasing resources in the Forensic science and Intelligence fields would clearly have a disproportionately positive effect.

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