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Transferability of Best Practice in Transport Policy Delivery : Final Report

3.9 Helsinki, Finland

3.9.1 The facts and figures in this section come from both the Maretope research, the report on subvention levels by Reynolds-Fieghan, Durkan, and Durkan (2000), the YTV annual report, van de Maas (2000), the YTV Metropolitan Area Vision 2020, and the YTV website, www.ytv.fi.

3.9.2 The Helsinki region has a population of around 1.2 million, while the metropolitan area covered by the metropolitan council, YTV, has a population of around 956,000, and is rapidly increasing, by about 12,500 people per year over the last decade. Demand for public transport has been increasing alongside this, with 316 million passenger trips in 2000.

3.9.3 The key development objectives of the metropolitan area, as defined in its Vision for 2020, are:

• An "ecologically, socially and economically sustainable urban region".
• High quality knowledge based industries, supported by good services and accessibility by all modes of transport.
• Equality and social responsibility.

3.9.4 The land-use and transport elements of this vision are to direct growth to public transport corridors, particularly to rail lines, in order to maximise the use of public transport for work trips. Interestingly, however, increasing the total proportion of regional jobs in Helsinki itself is not a goal: employment is forecast to grow more strongly in Espoo and Vantaa. This is in order to reduce the need to travel, and balance jobs and housing in these more suburban areas.

Administration of transport

3.9.5 The Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council (YTV) was brought into being by a 1984 law; but it is also an example of co-operation between municipalities. It covers the four communities of Espoo, Vantaa, Kauniainen, and Helsinki. Outside this area, but within the Helsinki region, are eight further communities, known as the "Framemaking municipalities", which have a total population of around 250,000.

3.9.6 The Regional Assembly's functions are specified in law; these include regional public transport, waste management, air quality and structure planning (but not development control, which remains a municipal function). This inter-municipality working is considered a success in Helsinki for a variety of reasons. It has led to cost-effective services, though use of economies of scale, reducing duplication of services, and increased management efficiency. The original municipalities are still responsible for their internal planning and public transport, while YTV is responsible for inter-municipality services. The wider range of their services mean they are more holistic, can be better planned, with increases to services, and greater efficiency.

3.9.7 Before 1984, Helsinki's public transport was run by each municipality, with national roads and the regional railways run by national organisations. This worked until the municipalities grew to become one region.

3.9.8 There are 22 members on the regional assembly and half of these are from Helsinki and the rest from other cities. YTV Executive Board has 14 members, 7 from Helsinki, 3 from Espoo and rest distributed amongst the other cities. According to the interviewee for this research, there are sometimes disputes between councillors of different political persuasions but rarely between the constituent YTV municipalities. One rare example is some current disagreement between Helsinki and Espoo about whether or not to extend the metro to Espoo - but the latter argues that this will cost too much, and does not want to increase levels of local taxes.

3.9.9 Every four years, YTV - in collaboration with the municipalities - produces a transport system plan for all forms of transport. This works towards the objectives of the Metropolitan Area Vision, a 20 year plan. Generally, these voluntary plans have worked - mainly because the National Ministry has strongly implied that if there is not unanimity then all municipalities will get less money from central Government.

3.9.10 The latest transport system plan includes an implementation plan for projects covering all modes of transport; the total investment envisaged is about 48 million per year, or nearly 1 billion over 20 years - this is the same rate of transport investment that has been achieved over the past ten years or so in the region. The bulk of the money will be spent on rail. Responsibility for implementation is shared, with municipalities covering the more local schemes, and YTV and the national government and rail administration the more regional schemes.

3.9.11 Operationally, YTV has the following responsibilities:

• Approving and organising the fares structure for the region, and revenue allocation.
• Procuring inter-municipality bus services (through competitive tender), and contracting regional rail services, tram and metro through Finnish Railways and through its own tram and metro operating subsidiaries, respectively.
• Fares enforcement.
• Information.
• On an agency basis YTV also procures local bus services within Vantaa and Espoo.
• Allocating subsidies between the constituent municipalities, who pay according to the trips made regionally by the inhabitants of that municipality.

Funding

3.9.12 The right to raise money for transport in Helsinki is limited to the state and the cities, not to YTV. But by law the cities must (and do) give YTV money to fund its operating loss. There is a 30% contribution from the national state (relatively low) for roads-based public transport projects; but 60% to 70% for roads and 60% for national railways. Consequently, PPP has been studied, but there are as yet no PPP projects in the YTV area. The interviewee for this research felt that YTV are receiving more central government funding now than they used to, because they have drawn up the common transport system plan.

Measures implemented

3.9.13 Many measures have been implemented. These include upgrades of bus routes to tram or metro; completion of the third ring motorway around Helsinki; installation of high quality orbital bus services on reserved rights of way; new rail lines; and installation of 4,500 park and ride spaces, and 5,000 bike and ride spaces, at interchange rail stations.

Fares

3.9.14 In 2000, a single ticket for travel within one of the constituent YTV cities cost about 1, and for a trip within the region, 1.50. The corresponding prices for monthly passes valid on all modes were 20 and 30. Eighty percent of trips are made using a monthly or annual pass.

Costs

3.9.15 Operating costs for the entire public transport system total 190 million per year (2000); revenues total 104 million (55% of costs), with the difference funded through subsidy from the constituent municipalities.

Achievements

3.9.16 The modal share of trips for all public transport is 26% in the YTV area, with that for buses being 16%, the rest shared roughly equally between metro, tram and rail. The share for cycling and pedestrian traffic is 29%, while the modal share for car users is 43%. Of motorised trips, public transport has a 70% share in the peak, and a 40% share over the day as a whole. There is no data available in the sources used for this work as to whether the mode share for public transport is falling, rising or constant; the interviewee from YTV was also unable to provide figures on this. The only guide is that, 30 years ago, public transport's overall mode share in the region was 30%.

3.9.17 It can also be argued that the introduction of (gross cost) competitive tendering in bus services in the region has led to significant improvements in service quality (e.g. average bus age is 4_ years) whilst costs have been reduced, by up to 30%. Average operating speeds of buses are about 26 km/h and the proportion of departures that run as scheduled is over 99%. Tendering is not yet lawful for regional rail services, or the metro, but YTV plans to do this (for rail) as soon as the law is changed.

Barriers, and success factors

3.9.18 Of the barriers identified to Scottish transport policy implementation in paragraph 1.1.3 of this report, none of these appear to apply in the Helsinki context. The regional transport plan is dependent in part for its delivery on voluntary co-operation between municipalities, working with a regional body. However, this voluntary co-operation appears to work quite well, for two reasons:

• Significant benefits in terms of the integration of public transport are delivered by the regional body to the residents of the municipalities; and
• The national government has to an extent linked transport funding overall for the region to the achievement of regional consensus.

3.9.19 Other success factors appear to include a supportive parking policy, especially in central Helsinki; and the competitive tendering of bus services (although, as in Copenhagen, tender prices are now beginning to rise as there are relatively few contractors competing for tenders).

3.10 Stockholm, Sweden

3.10.1The Stockholm conurbation has 1.5 million people, of whom 704,000 live in the City of Stockholm. It has grown by 250,000 since 1990, and is forecast to grow by a further 20,000 people each year for the next decade.

3.10.2 There are 24 other municipalities, but one regional authority, the County of Stockholm, that has responsibility for public transport; the municipalities retain power over roads (except national roads) and land use planning.

3.10.3 In the 1970s, there was a large amount of road building in Stockholm in order to accommodate the car. By the late 1970s, this was resulting in increased noise and air pollution, and consequent negative public reaction. In 1977, the first of several transport plans was put together; all were implemented to a greater or less extent but, more importantly, they established a consistent set of transport objectives that have lasted to this day. These include:

• Reducing air and noise pollution from traffic.
• Improving accessibility by public transport and for goods traffic, with an implication that this may require restraint of private car traffic.
• Improvements in road safety.

3.10.4 The current, and most ambitious traffic plan was brokered in 1991 and envisaged that, from then until 2005, some 2.5 billions should be invested in Stockholm's regional transport system - primarily in public transport.

Transport governance and funding

3.10.5 Stockholm County Council is an elected body with 149 members elected once every 4 years. It has income tax raising powers; this is levied at about 10% on the average income earner, raising some 28 billion SKr per year for the Council. Slightly more than 10% of this is used to fund the regional public transport body, SL. Thus SL receives about 212 million per year to fund its services, on top of which it gets about the same amount through the farebox.

3.10.6 SL is governed by a board of 17, made up of selected County Councillors. This board is responsible for translating the County's broader transport objectives into detailed operational plans for SL.

3.10.7 SL was founded in 1967. Prior to this, individual municipalities were responsible for public transport, apart from regional rail services, which were directly supplied by the national rail company. Given the growth in the region, there became a pressing need for an organisation that could deal with transport on a conurbation-wide basis, integrating services and tariffs. Thus there are good grounds for considering that the creation of SL was important in securing improvements in public transport in the region, and hence helping to achieve its wider transport policy objectives.

3.10.8 For large investment projects, SL may ask the County for an increase in its budget or for County Council loans - this was the case to fund the metro, for example. Increasingly, investments in new or refurbished vehicles are being financed through leasing. For the largest, particularly rail projects, the national government plays a role. The interviewee from SL pointed out that political control of SL rarely influences its strategic direction - there is general consensus among the parties that public transport should continue to be improved.

Implementation and achievements

3.10.9 Stockholm's public transport system consists of bus, metro, ferry and regional rail, all of which is procured by SL.

3.10.10 Since SL's creation in 1967 there have been many new projects implemented. The average amount invested in public transport between 1996 and 2001 was 150 millions per year. Recent projects include:

• Metro extensions;
• Replacement of 50% of the metro fleet;
• Refurbishment of regional rail services;
• Implementation and then extension of a light rapid transit.

3.10.11 Key achievements include the increase in passenger travel from about 3.7 billion passenger km in 1991 to 4.4 billion in 2001, only very slightly increasing car use, and significant improvements in the farebox ratio, once again brought about by competitive tendering. Nonetheless, a monthly season ticket remains very cheap, at about 35 per month.

Barriers, and success factors

3.10.12 Van der Maas (1998) summarises the success factors in Stockholm's transport policy as follows:

• A high quality, high frequency, fast and reliable public transport network;
• Supportive parking policy.
• The high costs of car ownership in Sweden (SL's market research shows that, among the Stockholm population as a whole, almost 50% think that using public transport is cheaper than using a car, with only 20% disagreeing.)
• Linking land use planning and transport - in particular, concentrating development along rail lines. This has been achieved in spite of responsibility for land use planning lying with municipalities, not with the County.
• Political pressure for good quality public transport because of a very environmentally-aware population.
• Strong political leadership to broker consensus as to which measures should be implemented.
• The implementation of competitive tendering to increase quality and drive down costs.

3.10.13 The interview with SL confirmed that there is also a general political consensus on the direction in which public transport in the region should go, which is in part due to the generally high environmental awareness of the population as a whole. He did note that, occasionally, local political concerns may stymie the implementation of regionally-important transport measures - he cited the increase in capacity of the main railway line in Stockholm city centre (which is the key to increasing capacity in the whole system) as one example of this, where local residents have held up the scheme. Another example was the municipality of Stockholm's refusal to allocate more road space to a key bus route. However, he felt that these disagreements are relatively rare.

3.10.14 Of the barriers to transport policy implementation listed in paragraph 1.1.3, the majority are not significant in the Stockholm case, although the division of transport responsibilities between national roads administration, the county, and local municipalities can sometimes make consensus more difficult to reach. It is instructive that Sweden has created its own Railtrack (but publicly owned), over whose infrastructure the Stockholm regional railway services (contracted to SL) have to run. In spite of the fact that SL's regional services carry more passengers than the rest of Sweden's railways put together, the priorities of SL and the infrastructure owner are not always coincident - yet SL has relatively little influence over the national body. This can cause delays in delivering rail capacity enhancements, and also sometimes leads to arguments over the relative priority for train paths.

3.10 .15 Overall, however, political consensus, adequate funding and intelligent contracting of services have allowed Stockholm to move towards best practice in transport policy implementation than have many other European cities.

3.11 London, England

3.11.1 Greater London has a population of 7 million people and an area of about 1500 km2. Its public transport system consists of heavy rail, underground, light rail, tram and bus; heavy rail and underground focus predominantly on serving flows into the central business area, whilst bus is the main suburb to suburb mode of public transport. Central and inner London - home to about 3 million people - has transport characteristics that are unique in Britain, due to heavy traffic congestion, lower car ownership and a great reliance on public transport. Outer London is much more typical (in transport terms) of other British conurbations.

3.11.2 Transport policies for London are set out in the Mayor's Transport Strategy (available at www.london.gov.uk) and these policies are supposed to be implemented through the business plan produced by Transport for London (TfL), the executive regional transport agency, which controls strategic roads, buses and LRT. Boroughs must produce local Transport Delivery Plans, whose objectives and programmes - for local roads - must be consistent with those of the Mayor's Transport Strategy and the TfL Business Plan; if they are not, TfL does not give the Borough in question very much money to implement their plans. Buses are run under franchise to TfL. The Underground is still in the control of central Government through London Transport. Central Government is concluding public-private partnership (PPP) contracts for the upgrade and maintenance of the tube and, once these are completed, control will pass to the Mayor - at present this is anticipated to be in about April 2003.

3.11.3 The objectives of the Mayor's strategy are:

(a) Reducing traffic congestion.

(b) Overcoming the backlog of investment on the Underground so as to safely increase capacity, reduce overcrowding, and increase both reliability and frequency of services.

(c) Making radical improvements to bus services across London, including increasing the bus system's capacity, improving reliability and increasing frequency of services.

(d) Better integration of the National Rail system with London's other transport systems to facilitate commuting, reduce overcrowding, increase safety and move towards a London-wide, high frequency 'turn up and go' Metro service.

(e) Increasing the overall capacity of London's transport system by promoting: major new cross-London rail links including improving access to international transport facilities, improved orbital rail links in inner London; and new Thames river crossings in east London.

(f) Improving journey time reliability for car users, which will particularly benefit outer London where car use dominates, whilst reducing car dependency by increasing travel choice.

(g) Supporting local transport initiatives, including improved access to town centres and regeneration areas, walking and cycling schemes, Safer Routes to School, road safety improvements, better maintenance of roads and bridges, and improved co-ordination of streetworks.

(h) Making the distribution of goods and services in London more reliable, sustainable and efficient, whilst minimising negative environmental impacts.

(i) Improving the accessibility of London's transport system so that everyone, regardless of disability, can enjoy the benefits of living in, working in and visiting the Capital, thus improving social inclusion.

(j) Bringing forward new integration initiatives to: provide integrated, simple and affordable public transport fares; improve key interchanges; enhance safety and security across all means of travel; ensure that taxis and private hire vehicles are improved and fully incorporated into London's transport system; and provide much better information and waiting environments.

3.11.4 The London Government Act (1999), which came into effect that year, set up a new structure of transport governance in the capital. Effectively, Greater London - which stretches from Heathrow in the west to Upminster in the east, and Enfield in the north to Croydon in the south - is the only region in Great Britain with its own tier of statutory, directly elected regional government with responsibilities for transport and land use. The government in question is the Mayor, whose Executive powers are scrutinised by the Greater London Assembly. However, the powers of the Assembly are limited to scrutiny, requiring changes in the Mayor's budget, and a power of impeachment. All other regional powers rest directly with the Mayor.

3.11.5 This system replaced the previous region which was the Government Office for London - effectively a branch office of (for transport purposes) what was, at the time, the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) - governing roads functions; and London Transport, with its board selected directly by central Government, managing buses and underground. Both old and new systems keep/kept control of rail largely in the hands of central government, through the SRA, although the Mayor now has powers to issue "instructions and guidance" to the SRA, which it is obliged to note - but not necessarily to act upon.

3.11.6 The lower tier of Government - the 32 Borough Councils (e.g. Croydon) and the Corporation of the City of London - has not changed in extent, but its autonomy has been slightly further restricted compared to the previous system, where implementation of cross-boundary transport projects was much more dependent on voluntary co-operation between authorities (and consequently varied considerably depending on how well the Boroughs in question related with one another).

Schemes and funding

3.11.7 The Mayor has the power to raise revenue to fund transport operations and investment in London, through an additional precept on the council tax levied in each Borough. In this year's budget, the precept rose by 16%. S/he also has the power to raise revenue through congestion charging schemes, and one is planned to be introduced around the central area of London in March 2003.

3.11.8 Key schemes are as follows:

• Road user charging (to be implemented 2003).
• Improved and cheaper bus services (being implemented).
• Improved bus priority on key routes, through the London Bus Initiative (in process of implementation - NB this is dependent on co-operation of Boroughs where the routes run on non-TfL roads).
• Pedestrianisation of major areas e.g. Trafalgar Square north side.
• Public transport interchange strategy - in implementation.
• Vauxhall Cross re-modelling - 25% reduction in vehicle capacity to bring about improved pedestrian and cyclist environment and better interchange.
• CrossRail (at planning stage - 180 million planning costs) - joint SRA/TfL scheme to allow east-west running of heavy rail trains under central London.
• Thameslink - still in planning stages (SRA/train operator scheme) - to allow increased north-south heavy rail running across central London.

3.119 TfL's budget, which comes from Central Government block grant and the council tax precept is, for 2002/03, in m

• Surface transport (mainly buses) 428
• Rail services 21
• Docklands Light Railway 73
• Roads (of which a portion is passed to Boroughs) 430
• Central Directorates (management) 111

3.11.10 Estimated road user charging revenue will be 130 million per annum, from next financial year.

3.11.11 Under the previous administrative system, regional measures were implemented, but the quality of their delivery varied greatly from Borough to Borough, since they were delivered by voluntary co-operation between Boroughs, under the watchful eye of the Government Office for London. Thus the London Bus Priority Network (LBPN), which was born in 1992, was a regional programme of route-length bus priority on all roads with more than 10 buses per hour one way. Implementation was much more enthusiastic by some Boroughs than others - long lengths of bus lane on a route might stop at a Borough boundary, after which the only evidence of the LBPN might be the occasional bus stop clearway. The London Cycle Network is similarly varied in its quality from Borough to Borough. TfL now has a much more direct mandate to ensure a consistency of implementation throughout the capital.

3.11.12 One of the London interviewees also made the point that, when public transport in London was directly controlled by national government, London Transport was much more cautious in the improvements that it might seek than it is now, when it is backed up by the direct political mandate of the Mayor. Thus he felt that the significant expansion of the bus service in the capital, and measures to speed up boarding times and cut fares would have been unlikely under London Transport.

3.11.13 In spite of the new system, however, the implementation of major underground and rail projects in London remains very slow. The Jubilee Line Extension, the last major underground project that opened in late 1999, was 25 years in planning. Heavy rail projects such as Thameslink "2000" are almost as slow. The most pertinent factor here appears to be the UK Treasury's reluctance to grant the necessary funding, or borrowing consent. The privatisation of the rail network and the dependence on the former Railtrack for rail projects has also undoubtedly increased the cost and time involved in these schemes' delivery, as it has fragmented decision making and increased reliance on many different actors, each with their own priorities.

Barriers and success factors

3.11.14 London is unusual in Europe in that the regional government has direct control of most public transport and major roads, and can exert a significant influence on local transport policy through funding. It also has considerable autonomy in the way that it can raise funds. Early indications suggest that the new London system has improved the speed and effectiveness of delivery of large cross-boundary schemes, perhaps at the expense of some autonomy for the Boroughs, and (arguably) a bias towards central/inner London.

3.11.15 The success factors in helping London towards better transport policy implementation appear to be:

• The creation of a regional body with a clear political mandate and a clearly identified "champion" politician.
• Availability of new funding sources to the regional body - especially road pricing, but also increased tax raising powers.
• Public acceptance that there is a serious transport problem and, in inner London at least, a general consensus on the ways to solve this problem.

3.11.16 Nonetheless, it shares some of the same barriers found in Scotland: a division of responsibility between many organisations with differing priorities, especially in the rail industry; uncertainty of funding, again especially for rail projects; and also a severe skills shortage in the transport planning sector which has led to a "brain drain" from the Boroughs to TfL.

3.12 Munich, Germany

3.12.1 Facts and figures for this section come from the study by the Commission for Integrated Transport on 'European Best Practice in the Delivery of Integrated Transport'.

3.12.2 The population of Munich's metropolitan area is 2.9 million, while the city population is 1.3 million. Population densities range from 16,000 inhabitants /km ² in the centre to 2,000 inhabitants /km ² on the outskirts. The metropolitan area covers 5,500km ². Car ownership levels are 530 cars/1000 inhabitants, i.e. around 50%. The extent of the built up area has expanded greatly since the 1970s (such that the bulk of the population now lives outwith the city of Munich - the reverse of the situation 20 years ago). This has resulted in significantly increased commuter times, and traffic flows crossing the municipal boundary that doubled between 1972 and 1992 (though they have since declined by 10% due to modal shift to public transport).

3.12.3 In 1997 there were 533 million passenger trips on the public transport network as a whole, and the cost coverage from fares was 59%, with the other 41% coming directly from subsidies. By 2001 this had risen to a total of 561 million trips. Between 1982 and 2001, car ownership in the region rose by 30%, population by only 8%, but public transport trips by 20%. (The MVV annual report does not give comparable data on car use.)

Transport objectives

3.12.4 The City of Munich has the following transport objectives:

• making the service more appealing, though improved information, fare systems and station design.
• expanding and improving the network, through increasing bus and tram speeds, and increasing park-and-ride capacities.
• pressing for improvements to long-distance rail services.
• Despite this pro-public transport stance, a number of road building projects are also being implemented, mostly aimed at tackling congestion hotspots and reducing traffic in residential areas.

3.12.5 Other policies that have fostered modal shift include stringent parking policies and high quality cycling facilities. It is not known whether these supportive policies are also followed by the municipalities outwith the City but within the metropolitan area.

3.12.6 A new city transport development plan is being developed, and there are a number of investment programmes proposed. The plan anticipates a 2% reduction in city centre traffic, and a 10% increase in suburban traffic. The target is to reduce car modal share from 40% to 35%, though it does not specify how this will be achieved.

3.12.7 The main proposals are:

• improvements to the public transport network
• tighter traffic management and parking controls
• increase the modal share attributable to cycling
• reduce through traffic by extending Munich's orbital motorway.

3.12.8 The City has also developed an urban development strategy known as the 'Munich Perspective' which has two principle transport objectives:

• improved mobility, with the aim of maintaining Munich as an attractive site for businesses
• reducing consumption of land and energy, and reducing emissions, to improve quality of life.

3.12.9 The result is the concentration of new developments on brownfield sites, at high densities, using mixed developments, and at locations close to good public transport services - again, within the City.

Transport Responsibilities

3.12.10 The responsibilities for transport are divided between the different levels of government, according to:

• Free State of Bavaria: Regional trains and LRT
• City of Munich: U-Bahn, trams, and buses
• Landkreise / districts: Buses in their areas.

3.12.11 The Munich Planning and Tariff Union (MVV) set up a common tariff system, through ticketing and integrated timetables for the three city transport providers in 1972. In 1995 the three different levels of government became stakeholders in MVV. In turn, MVV has taken on several other responsibilities, including planning, research, budgeting, tariffing, marketing, and promotion. This recent re-organisation has contributed to improved communication between public and private sector transport organisations, and more focused investment. MVV covers the city region - that is, the metropolitan area of 2.9 million people.

3.12.12 Park-and-ride has become an important aspect of recent public transport investment, and a new P&R authority has been established to plan, finance and build the new facilities, particularly at peripheral S-bahn stations.

3.12.13 Cycle infrastructure is usually the responsibility of the city and districts (i.e. local level of government), though at stations, they are the responsibility of the transport operator.

Funding

3.12.14 The MVV annual running costs coverage from fares is 51%, with the other 49% (or 180 million per year) coming from the city, the region and surrounding districts. This amounts to over 60 subsidy per year for every inhabitant of the region.

3.12.15 Infrastructure costs on the U-bahn and S-bahn have amounted to 3 billion over the last 15 years. Again, this amounts to about 69 per inhabitant per year. This expenditure has been focused on improving the integration of travel modes, and has resulted in significant increases in ridership (from 474million in 1983 to 540 million in 1998), despite considerable increases in car ownership (from 540,000 cars in the city in 1983 to 780,000 in 1998). The policies that are being pursued at present involve considerable further investment (estimated to be 250 million over the next five years), though MVV do not feel that this will increase patronage by more than 5% over the next five years.

3.12.16 Over the same 15 year period 230 million has been spent on new road infrastructure, and a further 55 million on road maintenance and repair.

3.12.17 Thus, in addition to a supportive regional structure and policies, Munich has also devoted very significant resources to its public transport.

Public transport fares

3.12.18 There is a multimodal zonal fares system and a variety of tickets, including monthly seasons, multi-trip strip tickets, and single fares. A one zone cash single (on any mode, allowing interchange) costs about 1.20; a dayticket for the whole network is 6 for one person or 8.50 for up to 5 people travelling together; and monthly cards vary from about 19 for one zone up to 80 for the whole region.

Achievements

3.12.19 Public transport within the Greater Munich area is highly integrated. This is backed by high frequency services, priority to public transport at junctions, and real-time passenger information at major stations, and some bus and tram lines have real-time coverage on the internet. There is also an integrated tariff and ticketing system.

3.12.20 There is also modal integration through a cycle rental scheme; 2,000 bikes are available to rent at stations, which has recently been taken on by the German Railways.

3.12.21 Integration of services has also been one of the aims of the extensive telematics system which was introduced in the late 1980s. This has been half funded by the national government, and half funded by the city, region, and industrial partners. The measures include the use of a single database, used to provide better information, to enable people to make more informed decisions about modal choice, and to encourage interchange by displaying parking availability at nearby park-and-ride sites. It has also been used in company travel plans and in improving access to alternative travel to school.

3.12.22 The successes of the efforts at integration can be seen from the use of public transport: 25% of all trips across the metropolitan area, and 50% of all trips in the city. MVV suggest that this popularity is due to the high quality and good coverage of the network, and is helped by good marketing and fare initiatives. As noted above, there has also been mode shift from car to public transport over the past 15 years, resulting from quality and cheap public transport, coupled with supporting traffic restraint policies.

Munich's Successes

3.12.23 The public transport system in Munich is highly effective and efficient, to such an extent that MVV is finding it increasingly difficult to devise new initiatives and improvements, though significant investment is still being made into the network. MVV's marketing and market-orientation have assisted in drawing people away from their cars, and have resulted in a very positive image of public transport, and in a high proportion of trips made by bicycle (10%), which has increased due to improvements in cycle infrastructure and reduced speed limits. This reduction in speed limits has also contributed to a large reduction in accidents since the early 1980s, particularly those involving cyclists. Car modal share has remained steady, at about 40%, despite the considerable increase in car ownership.

3.12.24 The key success factors appear to have been:

• Supportive traffic restraint, speed, pedestrianisation and parking policies in the City of Munich itself.
• Careful land use planning.
• Relatively slow drift of population to the suburbs.
• Huge investment in public transport.
• Cheap integrated tickets.
• A regional body which secures support from its constituents by virtue of delivering benefit to all.

Threats and barriers

3.12.25 The draft EU Directive on Competition in the provision of local public transport is seen as the greatest threat to the continued success of the transport system, with investment in buses already seeing the effects of this, due to uncertainty over who will operate the services.

3.12.26 There is also a certain amount of discrepancy between the City's policies and those of central government, which may undermine the progress made in Munich. For example, the city's policy of constraining development does not sit well with the national policy of income tax allowances for longer journeys to work.

3.12.27 There is little evidence that many of the barriers to Scottish transport policy implementation identified in paragraph 1.1.3 have been experienced in Munich.

3.13 Zurich, Switzerland

3.13.1 The information in this section is mainly drawn from the case study by Veeneman, 2002; and personal communication (Veeneman, 2002).

3.13.2 The canton of Zurich is 1,700 km ² in extent, and has a population of 1.2 million, of which 343,000 people live in 7 municipalities that make up the city of Zurich, with the remaining inhabitants scattered over the 170 other municipalities in the canton. The only other urban centre in the canton is Winterthur, with a population of 87,000; all other urban centres have fewer than 30,000 inhabitants.

3.13.3 There is a high standard of public transport, including the tram, trolley, bus and metropolitan rail (S-Bahn) services. The S-Bahn covers the whole canton, and is complemented by regional bus services in rural areas. There are 20 local operators of train, bus, tram, funicular, and ferry services. These operators may be owned by the national government, by the municipalities, or by a shared municipal (or cantonal) and private stockownership, though ownership patterns have changed significantly over the last few years, as detailed below.

3.13.4 The public transport authority in Zurich is the Zurcher Verkehrsverbund (ZVV), which had a central role in the development of public transport services, and controlled the service operators until the late 1990s. Changes initiated in 1997 mean that its control has now dramatically reduced, and while ZVV still has some influence in the public transport market, it is no longer the public transport authority. The transport board of the ZVV is the controlling body, and the canton government has a central role in this board, and therefore in public transport services. This board also had representatives from each municipality and from the national government. Operators are also represented in the ZVV through specific committees.

3.13.5 The canton develops general policies on strategic changes to public transport services, which the municipalities can have input to. The ZVV also plays a key role in this process.

3.13.6 Until the end of the 1990s, ZVV played a central role in gathering contributions from the canton and each municipality, as well as the fare-box revenues. It then redistributed them across the services and operators. There is also an integrated ticket system, for which operators are reimbursed for losses due to reduction in ticket prices.

3.13.7 Until the late 1990s, rail services operated by SBB (Swiss National Railways) were based on the policies developed by the canton government, and were developed in co-operation with the ZVV.

3.13.8 The division of responsibilities between the operators and the government as they were until the late 1990s are given in the table below:

Table 3.2 - Distribution of tasks in public transport in the Zurich region

3.13.9 Veeneman (personal communication, 2002), explains further:

"In the early 1990s, centralization was undertaken and more control was given to the ZVV. ZVV changed from a clearinghouse reimbursing operators to a service planning authority that outsourced its operations. In 1997 this centralization was changed, as operators were unable to deliver the ZVV planned services and the lack of competition reduced the incentives for efficient production.

The 1997 changes indeed decentralization from a ZVV as a central planning authority (which planned all the services) to the eight largest operators (with specific areas (6 bus and tram) or modes (heavy rail and boats)). For these eight it means a greater deal of autonomy than prior to 1997, as they can plan and tender out services themselves. For the remaining smaller companies less autonomy, as tendering out the services between them they become more dependent on these eight. This has lead to a great deal of consolidation, with many mergers between the smaller companies.

Service delivery has become somewhat more efficient and to some extent more reliable (especially in the outer areas). But no dramatic changes have occurred."

Achievements

3.13.10 Prior to 1997 the centralised nature and organisation of Zurich's public transport system was matched by high quality services, particularly in relation to the speed of services. This included frequent services and rapid interchange between services. Public transport was also considered to be relatively expensive, despite zoning and an integrated ticket system.

3.13.11 Following the introduction by ZVV of an integrated timetable and ticketing system, along with substantial investment in the network, including the introduction of a new S-Bahn system, and growing congestion on the roads, demand grew by 20% on average, though demand within the city of Zurich fell slightly.

3.13.12 Figures for modal split for 1990 reflect the satisfaction with public transport expressed by many in Veeneman's research, and suggest that the highly centralised structure in place prior to 1996 was effective at ensuring the integration and quality of services. In the city of Zurich public transport accounts for 78% of journeys for commuting to or from work, while 22% are by 'individual motorised transport'. In the canton of Zurich these figures are 62% and 38% respectively, and in Switzerland as a whole they are 21% and 79% respectively. Thus the public transport system in Zurich has been very well used over the last decade.

3.13.13 Passenger numbers have continued to rise strongly since 1997, and the proportion of total operating costs covered by fares has fallen. The ZVV's Strategy Report for 2000-2005 shows that between 1998 and 2001 demand has continued to rise: most strongly on the S-Bahn (regional railway) and regional buses, but also in Zurich and Winterthur's own internal public transport. The percentage increases in person km were 9%, 10% and 2% respectively. ZVV cite frequency enhancements (up to four trains per hour now run on many services) and service restructuring as particular reasons for these increases.

3.13.14 For the next 5 years, ZVV plans capacity enhancements to six S-Bahn lines to permit higher frequencies, and envisages the costs of these to be about 100 million, of which half will be met by national government borrowing, and the rest by cantonal borrowing.

Success factors

3.13.16 At least until 1997, the autonomy of the regional body has meant that it has not faced many of the barriers to Scottish transport policy delivery as set out in paragraph 1.1.3. Nonetheless, a less autonomous structure since 1997 does not, initially at least, appear to have dampened patronage growth on the region's public transport.

3.14 Vancouver, Canada

3.14.1 The Greater Vancouver region on the west coast of Canada is the country's fastest growing area. It has an area of 330,000 square km, a population of 2 million, and an annual population growth rate of 1.5%.

3.14.2 The objectives of the region's Growth Strategy, as it is called, are to direct growth to one of seven town centres within the region, and to take pressure for growth off the overheated south and west of the area, moving it to the north and east. Additionally, the Strategy aims to increase urban densities, in order to reduce the need to travel.

Transport Governance

3.14.4 The Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, also known as "TransLink", was created by the BC Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act (Bill 36) in 1998. It is a separate organisation, and is not part of the provincial government or the Greater Vancouver Regional District ("GVRD").

3.14.5 Its mandate is to plan and finance a regional transportation system that moves people and goods efficiently and supports the regional growth strategy, air quality objectives and economic development of the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD).

3.14.7 Prior to the creation of Translink, there was no regional transport body. Public transport was funded and run by the Province (British Columbia), though on a cost-sharing basis with regional municipalities. The Province also had responsibility for main roads and bridges. Local roads were the responsibility of municipalities, of which there are eleven in the region.

3.14.8 Translink is funded through a number of different mechanisms. Under the Act, it is theoretically able to levy private non-residential parking tax, and also a supplementary vehicle licence. It has intended to do this, but requires Provincial Government support to enforce the measures, and this support was not forthcoming, for political reasons.

3.14.10 Translink has a $600 million operating budget (including debt servicing), of which $240 million is from fares. In spite of its many sources of revenue, the failure to secure the supplementary vehicle licence on the 1.2 million vehicles registered in the region has caused Translink to raise fares.

3.14.11 There have been a number of recent investments in public transport in the region, including a new elevated rapid transit line at a cost of $1.2 billion, and new regional rail services. These were introduced prior to the creation of Translink. Since it was created, the interviewee for this research pointed to new bus services and a new tolled bridge in the east of the region as measures that would not have been implemented without the creation of the regional body. However, he felt that, in the case of Vancouver, the regional body is still very much dependent on the decisions made by the Province about regional transportation. As an example, he cited the latter's interest in a new metro line southwards from Vancouver city centre to the airport - this idea runs counter to the aims of the Growth Strategy but Translink has no choice but to follow the Provincial lead as it does not on its own have the resources to fund major new investment.

3.14.12 Evidence of best practice in Vancouver's transport (and land-use) system is its continuously rising public transport patronage, bucking the trend in other Canadian cities. Furthermore, land-use is densifying, with the majority of the region's population now living in terraced or flatted dwellings. However, there is no evidence of mode shift from car to public transport - the reverse appears to be occurring and, as yet, the creation of a regional body has not had great influence on this trend.

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