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Transferability of Best Practice in Transport Policy Delivery : Final Report

3. Comparison of cities and regions

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 This chapter attempts to bring together the results of the literature review, the questionnaire survey and (where relevant) the interviews, to consider the factors that have combined to bring about what might be considered to be "better practice" in transport policy implementation in a number of European and one North American regions. Each case study is structured around the points listed in paragraph 1.3.4 and also related to the barriers to Scottish transport policy implementation listed in paragraph 1.1.3. A summary table at the end of this chapter compares the factors that have contributed to success in each case study region. These are then taken forward to the next chapter, where the "ideal" of transport policy implementation is discussed.

3.1.2 Much of the literature reviewed for this study refers more to the transport governance structure of each EU member state than to the success of the implementation of transport policy in each. There is however a small number of comparative reviews of cities and regions and their success, or otherwise, in implementing their transport policies. These include van der Maas (1998, 2000); ECMT/OECD (2002); the as yet unpublished Deliverable 5 of the MARETOPE project (CEC, 2002, forthcoming); and the European Sustainable Cities Network Benchmarking Study (CEC, 2000). These studies tend to point to a number of cities and regions which, more than most, have attained better practice in transport policy delivery. A list of these cities and regions was presented in Chapter 1, so is not repeated here. However, there are a number of key themes which emerge from studies of these cities and of their implementation of transport policy.

3.2 Pre-conditions for effective implementation

3.2.1 In 2000 and 2001, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) undertook a large scale survey of towns and cities around the world, to understand in greater detail the challenges of transport policy implementation. The results are summarised in their 2002 publication, "Implementing Sustainable Urban Travel Policies".

3.2.2 They identify a consensus among the 154 cities surveyed about the nature of transport policy objectives: managing car use, increasing public transport use, and minimising sprawl so as to reduce congestion and air pollution - all objectives that would not be out of place in a Scottish local authority's LTS - at least in the more urban areas.

3.2.3 The lack of policy integration between different levels of government, and between different units of the same level of government, was seen as a barrier to the implementation of these policies. Land-use, parking and public transport integration are all cited in the ECMT's report as potential areas where there is sometimes not enough co-operation between administrative units. They state, therefore, that:

"One of the biggest challenges to implementing sustainable urban travel strategies is that of overcoming institutional and organisational barriers… Creation of a single [regional] entity may go a long way to furthering institutional co-operation, not only among planning agencies, but also with other municipal institutions such as local police for enforcement of, for example, parking and traffic policies. A number of urban areas around the world are looking to co-coordinated structures for solutions to tackle their travel problems, among them, Atlanta and Dublin." (ECMT, 2002:36.)

3.2.4 But it is also instructive that the ECMT identify many other barriers to potential lack of implementation of sustainable urban travel policies. Thus creation of a regional structure of itself will not necessarily make transport policy implementation more effective, unless some other conditions are realised, including:

• Ministerial co-ordination at the national level.
• The right level of central government involvement.
• Supportive legal and regulatory frameworks.
• Correctly structured pricing and fiscal frameworks.
• Sufficient financing of public transport.
• Government funds for transport in provincial as well as capital cities.
• Good data quality and quantity - so the effects of policies can be monitored.
• Consistent political commitment.

3.2.5 Van der Maas (1998) also identifies a number of factors that, in her view, combine to bring about successful transport policy implementation in European cities. Her research was aimed particularly at a review of public transport; nonetheless, it is relevant insofar as all the cities/regions that she reviewed were aiming to increase the usage and mode share for public transport. Key factors in achieving this objective were:

• High quality public transport is a key factor - and this is frequently delivered by moving from an entirely nationalised public transport system, to one based on a purchaser-provider model.
• National government can use its financial power to give incentives to transport operators to behave in particular ways - for example, by setting a maximum level of subsidy that it is prepared to pay.
• Supportive land-use and traffic restraint policies are vital.
• Often, implementing public transport improvements as part of wider economic regeneration policies, or to open up new areas for development, can pay dividends.
• A regional body to integrate services and tariffs is very important. "The regional organisation must have the power to implement things, and autonomy" (p 64).
• Perhaps the most important conclusion of van der Maas' work was that it is a combination of factors that work together - rather than a single factor - that bring about success.

3.3 Key points emerging from literature review

3.3.1 The literature shows that the attainment of better/best practice appears to depend on three factors in particular. This is developed further in the rest of the report, but is summarised here.

3.3.2 The most important and inescapable factor is a willingness to spend money, and a ready source of this money, be it local income tax (Sweden) or employers' tax (France), or the national government for infrastructure investment (as in Spanish suburban rail lines). The money is spent on both infrastructure investment and fares subsidies. On its own, such a policy can achieve increases in public transport ridership, but rarely modal shift from car.

3.3.3 The second factor, which is particularly helpful in the attainment of mode shift objectives, is the existence of policies - such as traffic calming, pedestrianisation and car park charging - that restrain car use; and land-use planning that complements public transport use. For these policies, regional bodies are usually dependent on municipalities - rarely do they have control over these policies directly. Thus in only a relatively few cases is mode shift away from car achieved.

3.3.4 The third is the existence of some kind of regional structure - but these can be voluntary (as in Berlin, for example), and are normally limited to controlling public transport. The most important functions of the regional structure are to deliver integrated ticketing, service integration, franchising of bus and other services, and to lead and promote regional transport investment - especially investment in public transport. There is no region that has achieved better practice in transport delivery in Europe that is without a regional body; but there are regions that have a regional body but that have, for other reasons, not achieved better practice. This suggests that the regional body will not on its own lead to success - but success is unlikely to be obtained without it.

3.3.5 There are other factors, but these three are the most important, as the rest of the report reflects.

3.3.6 The Chapter now goes on to consider different case study cities and regions.

3.4 Madrid, Spain

3.4.1 The region of Madrid covers 8,028km ², has a population of 5.1 million inhabitants, and is composed of 179 municipalities. It is therefore one of the largest regions considered for this research, covering as it does the dense core of the City of Madrid, along with most of its fast-expanding suburbs. Over the past 25 years, the regional population has increased from a 1975 base of 4.3 million, but this masks a reduction in the Madrid City population from 3.2 million to 2.9 million (1975-1996). Consequently, Madrid's public transport system is wrestling with the same de-centralisation trends with which the majority of Scottish cities must contend. Madrid is an instructive case since, in spite of these land-use and population dispersal trends, it has significantly increased its public transport ridership - both rail (as might be expected in a situation where population decentralises but jobs do not) - and bus.

3.4.2 The key transport policy objectives of the Madrid region are to improve the quality and usage of public transport; reduce urban sprawl; and to reduce the use of cars in congested conditions. Air quality is also an important transport policy consideration. These are reflected in the Urban Plan for Madrid, which has focused on increasing car occupancy and developing a better public transport network. One of the major advances that has been made through the CRT, through the Urban Plan, is the introduction of an integrated ticketing system. Other measures that have been proposed include the introduction of a bus/HOV lane along a main urban corridor, car pooling schemes, trip reduction plans, alternative mobility plans, car parking restrictions, and pedestrian zones.

The regional transport consortium

3.4.3 A Regional Government Law passed in 1985 established a consortium for the delivery of transport in 176 of the municipalities of the Madrid region, the 'Consorcio Regional Transportes de Madrid' (CRTM). This public body was set up in 1986 with the aim of integrating public transport provision; it has competency for all passenger transport run by the Region of Madrid and the municipal governments who have chosen to join it, and therefore removes the separation between urban transport and inter-urban transport within its area. It is important to note that municipalities within the region are not obliged to join CRTM, but only 3 out of the total of 179 have not joined: this is because they recognise the benefits that some integration of transport across the region brings to their citizens.

3.4.4 The Madrid Region and the City of Madrid each have 5 members on the Board of CRTM; other municipalities have 3 members (in total); national Government, trades unions and operators each have a further 2 members; and the consumers' associations jointly select one member.

3.4.5 Prior to the creation of CRTM, there was no similar body, and it can be argued that part of the success of the body is down to the fact that it was a new organisation, to whom constituent municipalities were perhaps more willing to give up power, than had it been an existing organisation.

3.4.6 The CRTM has been delegated powers by the Madrid Regional Government, Madrid City Council, the other municipal governments, the Users Associations, Trade Unions, Central Governments and Industrial Associations. It therefore has the following responsibilities:Public transport infrastructure planning.

• Plans for the integration of different transport modes.
• Integration of fare structures and ticketing systems, between operators and between modes.
• Developing the image of the public transport system and a single, integrated unit.
• Some indirect influence over structure planning and the direction of major land-use developments.
• No powers over roads.

3.4.7 The service providers are now private bodies, but the administration that provides concessions for the service is integrated into this body. The Spanish Railways (RENFE) have special arrangements with CRTM, that enable integration of services and fares with other parts of the network.

3.4.8 CRTM is financed from fares and subsidies from the constituent administrators, and in 2000, total subsidies reached 449 million Euro. This was funded as follows: 42% from the Madrid Regional Government, 36% from National Government, 20% from the City of Madrid, and the remaining 3% from the other local municipalities.

3.4.9 In 1997 the cost coverage level from bus fares was 71.6%, with a further 24.7% coming from subsidies, and the final 2.4% coming from commercial sources. Information is not available for the cost coverage of the rail network, and therefore for the Consortium as a whole.

3.4.10 Prior to the introduction of CRTM, public transport was in the hands of the national rail operator, the Madrid Metro (responsible to the national Government), and various municipal bus operations, most of them directly controlled by the individual municipality. There was a chronic lack of co-ordination between public transport services.

Measures implemented

3.4.11 In 1987 an integrated multi-modal travel card was introduced, based on a ten zone system. A monthly ticket for the Madrid City zone (zone A) costs just 32.50; an all zone pass, 78.10. Single tickets within Zone A cost 0.95, or 0.50 if bought in a carnet of 10. A combined metro-bus carnet giving access from the middle suburbs to the City zone costs 19.10 for ten trips. Most tickets are available off-vehicle, principally at tobacconists. Fares for multiple-journey tickets have increased in line with the regional RPI, but single fares have increased more steeply.

3.4.12 Further measures implemented include:

• Franchising of many suburban bus services, particularly the inter-urban services - these are run by some 33 operators. This has led to considerable efficiency gains.
• Extension of the metro system from 102 km in 1983 to 171 km today, with further extensions continuing.
• Multi-modal integration through construction of new interchanges, including those that permit orbital trips.
• Almost complete refurbishment of the suburban train network and rolling stock, such that the average age of the vehicles is now eight years, and all lines are electrified.
• A 22% increase in bus km operated between 1992 and 2000.

3.4.13 The costs of the investments are not known; major rail investments are financed largely by the Spanish state. It is, however, clear that the move to contracting out of interurban bus services has led to cost efficiencies, which have been reinvested in service enhancements, and without which such low fares might not have been possible.

Achievements

3.4.14 Public transport ridership was falling consistently up until 1986. Thereafter, it has risen consistently, by 56% since 1986, to just short of 1.5 billion trips per year in 2000. As noted above, there has also been considerable improvement in the quantity and quality of public transport. In terms of implementation of traffic management measures, DG TREN (2002) figures indicate that only 0.5% of the total bus network length in the Madrid region is covered by any kind of bus lane or other priority - low in comparison to many other cities, but a figure perhaps exaggerated because the Madrid region is so large.

3.4.15 The mode share for car in Madrid in 1996 (the last year for which data are available) was 28% - very low in comparison to many other European regions, and surprisingly so, given its very high rate of motorisation (521 cars per 1000 population, compared to around 350 in typical British conurbations). The comparable mode share for public transport was 31%.

3.4.16 Car mode share has been increasing at a rate of 0.6% per annum, and public transport mode share at a rate of 0.2% per annum, both at the expense of walk trips, due to the conurbation becoming more geographically dispersed. Overall, therefore, the regional trend is very gradually away from the use of sustainable transport modes.

Barriers to Implementation

3.4.17 While Madrid has been more successful than most Spanish cities at implementing its projects, several of them have never come to fruition. The Leda research identified several reasons for this:

• while these plans are legally binding, the municipalities and the CRTM do not always have the powers necessary to implement them; for example road schemes require separate legislation which must be drawn up by the Directorate General.
• plans are used as negotiating tools, rather than being the result of negotiations, with the result that "minor" proposals are overlooked, and negotiations focus on more high profile projects.
• there is also a lack of systematic analysis and assessment of the various alternatives, prior to the development of the Urban Plan.

3.4.18 In addition, the interviewee from the Madrid Region identified lack of adequate on-street parking enforcement as a major threat to the successful operation of the bus system, and saw this as partly an institutional problem. Local political interests were not, however, a major barrier to the implementation of regional public transport policies, he felt.

3.4.19 Of the barriers to Scottish transport delivery identified in paragraph 1.1.3, the majority are not of significant concern to public transport delivery in Madrid. The creation of a single body for public transport has enormously improved the situation when compared to much of Scotland, and to the situation that previously prevailed in the Spanish capital region.

3.4.20 However, there is still some degree of local decision making that influences, in particular, decisions over land-use, parking and allocation of road space in Madrid that perhaps reduces the effectiveness of wider transport policy implementation, and there is still a multiplicity of organisations responsible for roads, which may also work against consistent policy implementation.

3.4.21 The success factors in this region appear to have been:

• Relatively high levels of funding, especially for investment.
• Efficiency gains due to tendering of interurban bus services.
• Integrated ticketing.
• Low fares - especially for season tickets.
• Public transport service integration.
• An emphasis on easy interchange.
• Clear definition of the responsibilities of the regional public transport body.
• Some influence by the regional public transport body on the strategic land use decisions made in the region.

3.5.1 Facts and figures for this section come from the study by the Commission for Integrated Transport on 'European Best Practice in the Delivery of Integrated Transport', and also from van de Maas (2001).

3.5.2 The City of Barcelona has a population of 1.5 million, and an area of 99km ². In total, the metropolitan area has a population of 4,228,000, covers an area of 3,240km ², and has an average density of 1,307 persons/km ². Car ownership is 410 cars/1000 population. While this indicates a highly centralised city, there has been depopulation from the city centre in recent years, and has been countered by the growth of the secondary ring of cities which extend beyond the urban area. There are 164 municipalities, 7 districts, and the Catalan Government (Generalitat de Catalunya), and in addition there are two regional organisations charged with the co-ordination of public transport. In common with Madrid, there is a general trend towards decentralisation of population which does not support public transport use.

3.5.3 Key transport (related) policy objectives for the region are:

• Improvements in air quality.
• Mode shift from car to other modes, especially public transport.
• Within public transport, an improvement in the farebox ratio to a minimum of 60%.

Regional transport governance

3.5.4 In 1987 the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona was abolished, and responsibility for transport, planning and urban services were split between separate authorities. The autonomous region of the Generalitat de Catalunya has given considerable autonomy to the individual municipalities.

3.5.5 A Territorial Metropolitan Plan for Barcelona, and an Intermodal Transport Plan have both been drafted, but have not been approved.

3.5.6 Transport planning, infrastructure and service delivery are split between several organisations:

• ATM, Autoritat de Transport Metropolitana, the public transport authority for the greater metropolitan region (164 local authorities) is a voluntary consortium between the Catalan government (51%), the City of Barcelona (25%) and EMT (24%). Geographically, it extends about 15 miles from the city centre. ATM was formed in 1997 to co-ordinate public transport and to integrate fares, services, marketing and interchange. It also specifies the longer-distance interurban bus services provided by TMB, and invests in the related infrastructure. Its responsibilities are increasing; although the major cities look after their own public transport, it is likely that that ATM will take over these responsibilities in the near future. They could provide this service either with private or public operators, running under contract. Its main aim is to articulate the co-operation between the public administration bodies of the services, and its remit covers service provision, infrastructure upgrading, fares and ticketing, setting and monitoring of standards for participating companies, controlling income, costs and investment, and general management of metropolitan public transport.
• EMT, Entitat Metropolitana de Transports, is a public transport authority on which 18 local authorities including Barcelona are represented. There are 32 people on the board in total, each local authority having representation in accordance with its population. EMT is the owner of TMB, the largest public transport operator (buses) in the region. The EMT area extends about 10 miles from the city centre, and is covered largely by a flat public transport fare.
• Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB): This is the main public transport managing company in the metropolitan area, as it is the management unit of the companies that own and operate the metro and bus services centred on the City of Barcelona, Ferrocarril Metropolita de Barcelona, S. A. (the metro), and Transports de Barcelona, S. A. (the buses). The TMB has three priority objectives: to meet public transport needs through an economically effective service; to combine economic viability with performance; and to improve quality of life in the metropolitan area by contributing to the fulfilment of citizen's travel needs.
• Municipal Authorities (including the City of Barcelona): As mentioned above, the municipalities are responsible for parking policies, local road administration, and cycle and pedestrian ways.
• Societat Municipal D'Apartment 1 Serveis SA (SMASSA): This company was formed by the City of Barcelona in 1982, to implement parking policies in the urban area.
• Generalitat de Catalunya: This regional authority has responsibility for much of the regional transport networks, including the inter-urban motorway network, the Catalan regional railways (Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya, FGC), and a number of inter-urban bus services within the Metropolitan Region.

3.5.7 As mentioned above, the Spanish Government has responsibility for the national rail services (RENFE), including the commuter and inter-regional services, and the inter-regional motorway services.Transport Operators

• TMB runs buses and the metro in the urban area of Barcelona. TMB is a public company, owned by EMT. TMB carries 434 million passengers per year, 60% on the metro, in the urban area of Barcelona. This represents 87% of the public transport market; a further 5% is carried by private bus operators, running under contract to EMT.
• RENFE is the national rail operator; its Cercanias (local trains) carry about 6% of the total public transport traffic in the flat fare area. In addition, the Generalitat runs regional trains (Catalan Express) on RENFE lines; the national government does not always see eye to eye with the (Catalan) nationalist government about all policies, including transport.
• Ferrocarril de Generalitat de Catalunya (the Catalan narrow gauge local trains) carry about 2.5% of the total traffic in the flat fare area.
• Outwith the urban area, FGC and RENFE play a significant role, together with private bus operators, running under contract to ATM.

3.5.8 The relationship between and respective roles of EMT and ATM continue to be defined. This is because the Generalitat Catalunya and ATM are conservative, but EMT is socialist. These differences manifest themselves as an argument about the level at which regional public transport should be better organised. At the present time, more powers are being transferred from EMT to ATM, which may lead to more emphasis within the public transport system on cost-coverage, and less on affordable fares.

Achievements

Integration of public transport

3.5.9 Following the creation of EMT (in 1987) and ATM (in 1997) the public transport system has become more integrated and accessible, and the study on European Best Practice in the Delivery of Integrated Transport has identified these achievements as:

• introduction of an integrated fares and ticketing system.
• improved public transport interchanges.
• improved accessibility of infrastructure and new rolling stock.
• high frequencies on suburban rail services.
• park and ride facilities at outlying FGC and RENFE stations.
• global promotion and marketing of all public transport services provided by TMB, EMT, and ATM.

3.5.10 However, there are still aspects of public transport services that show a lack of integration between modes:

• lack of integration of timetables across modes.
• opportunities to link metro and railway lines that run close to each other have not been exploited.
• accessibility of many metro and train stations is still problematic for those with mobility difficulties.
• The longer distance suburban buses are not of high quality, but ATM is trying to improve them through the franchising process.

3.5.11 The City of Barcelona has implemented measures supportive of sustainable land use and transport policies: more pedestrianisation, greater length of bus lanes, and shifting parking from the street to underground parking garages. Outwith the City of Barcelona area, policy is less supportive and, due to this and to urban decentralisation, EMT's aim of increasing the public transport mode share is currently difficult to achieve, in spite of the organisational reforms that have taken place. Consequently, public transport ridership in the urban area is constant at about 600 million passengers per year. Figures from DG TREN (2002) suggest that, for the City of Barcelona, the mode share for public transport is 31% and for car 30%, with the balance made up by walking trips, and that there is little change in these figures; but mode share away from public transport is occurring in the wider region.

Investment in transport

3.5.12 The following table provides information about the amount of investment in transport in the Metropolitan Area (excluding RENFE railway lines) between 1996 and 2000, and indicates that much of the investment goes into the highway network. Private investment has also been used in the past to create toll roads, though negotiations are now under way to try to reduce the tolls on these roads, and public funds have been used more recently to fund roads projects, due to political concerns and perceived inefficiencies.

Table 3.1: Investment in Barcelona Transport System (000s Euros) (1996-2000)

3.5.13 All rail and metro investment is funded by Catalunya (66%) and national (33%) governments - there is no private involvement. Bus stations are looked after by ATM in their area, and by the 18 municipalities in the ETM area. Main road investment is also funded by the Catalan and national Governments. Within the urban area, there are few tolls, although within the wider region, tolls on both regional and national motorways are commonly used to defray construction costs - the new, heavily tunnelled road from Castelldefells to Sitges (to the south west of Barcelona Le Prat Airport) is an example of this.

Costs, subsidies and fares

3.5.14 TMB recovers about 75%-80% of its costs through the farebox - the total costs are about 160 million per year (1999 costs). FGC costs a further 35 million. Subsidy to make up the gap comes from national Government (45%); Catalunya (28%); City of Barcelona (13.75%); and the rest from the other 17 municipalities in the ETM area.

3.5.15 A single trip costs one Euro within the flat fare area; multiple trips are much cheaper. A monthly ticket within the flat fare area (bus, metro, rail) is 32.50 Euros.

Plans for the future

Barriers to implementation

3.5.17 The barriers to implementation of transport policy and achievement of objectives in the Barcelona region are similar to those of Madrid, perhaps amplified in the Catalan city by the greater number of parties that are responsible for public transport, and some degree of institutional rivalry between them. Once again it is instructive that many municipalities in the region have voluntarily given up some power over their own public transport services to a regional body, in exchange for improved services and an integrated fares system. Lack of money has not been cited as a major barrier to further implementation of transport improvements in the Barcelona region; and neither has (very) local politics. The greatest barrier to achievement of a more sustainable transport system in the region appears to be on-going decentralisation of population, as in Scotland.

3.6 Jonkoping, and Sundsvall, Sweden (considered together)

3.6.1 These two areas are considered together because there is relatively little information available about them, but there are nonetheless grounds for considering that they have achieved better practice, particularly in the delivery of public transport. They are also highly relevant to the Scottish situation because they are predominantly rural and, especially in the case of Sundsvall, very sparsely populated.

3.6.2 Sundsvall's transport objectives are not known, but in Jonkoping they include reducing car use; increasing public transport use, walking and cycling; reducing journey times for all modes; increasing the accessibility of the public transport system; and increasing economic development. Some progress has been made towards increased public transport use, and the accessibility objective.

3.6.3 Both Jonkoping and Sundsvall are the major centres of population (about 100,000 people) within much larger rural areas, the first in south central Sweden, and the second in the north central part of the country. Each of the two towns is situated within a county of the same name, but each is then part of a wider region of several counties, covered by a regional public transport body. In the case of Sundsvall, the region is 150 km wide and 200 km long; Jonkoping region covers 110,000 square kilometres.

3.6.4 In each case, the counties have responsibility for procuring their own bus services and for most roads within their areas. However, a voluntary regional public transport body runs the fares system for each region, procures regional rail services, and procures regional bus services and also internal bus services for counties who wish this to be done on their behalf, on an agency basis. Fares cover about 60% of operating costs on regional services, with the remainder coming from national government (for rail services) and the counties (for buses).

3.6.5 The existence of a regional public transport body has ensured the integration of services and of fares. Unfortunately, there is little data available on the effects of this on ridership.

3.6.6 Jonkoping itself provides a further example of best practice: the restructuring of its bus network in 1996 around two key high frequency (6 buses per hour), high capacity routes using modern low floor vehicles, linked to traffic signal priority and easy access to the town centre. Some 5 million was also spent on bus priority measures on-street. This had the effect of reversing the long-term decline in bus patronage in the town, and also helped to revitalise its town centre, which had been suffering competition from a major out of town centre.

3.6.7 Although brief, this section has been included because the example of public transport in Sweden's smaller towns and rural areas appears to be pertinent to the Scottish context.

3.7 Berlin-Brandenburg, Germany

3.7.1 There is a restricted amount of information regarding this region and its transport, but it is considered worthy of inclusion in the report because it has made some significant achievements within a short, and recent, time span, and because it also covers some very rural areas.

3.7.2 The Berlin-Brandenburg region is about 300 km from north to south, and 150 km from east to west, covering much of the former East Germany, as far as the Baltic Sea in the north and the Polish border in the east. Approximately 6 million people live in the region; the bulk of these are in the capital region of Berlin and Potsdam, such that in other parts of the area, population densities fall to below 20 persons per square km. The total area of the region is 30,368 km ², of which Berlin accounts for 892 km ², and Brandenburg 29,476 km ².

3.7.4 VBB was formed only in 1996; prior to that, the municipalities ran their own public transport systems, many contracting out bus services to private companies.

3.75 The overall transport policy objectives of the cities are to reduce car use and related pollution, and to widen the choice of modes available. Within the rural area, transport policy objectives are less clearly set out, and there is a strong economic development imperative. Increasing limits on public spending in Germany are putting increased budgetary pressure on public transport and therefore cost-effectiveness is another goal, especially for the public transport system.

3.7.6 The split of responsibility for the promotion of new projects between different Kreisen and the Laender can, especially for cross-boundary projects, lead to some confusion in the distribution of responsibilities for implementation. VBB has only an advisory role on new public transport investment.

Funding

3.7.7 Funding for VBB comes from the constituent Laender (provinces), cities and counties, who join the VBB voluntarily. The precise share of funding per constituent is not known. However, it is instructive that all eligible counties and cities have joined. This is because they are not paying any more for public transport than they did prior to the introduction of the VBB. However, because VBB has been able to co-ordinate both fares and services at a regional level, the constituent bodies are effectively getting more for their money. In addition, public transport patronage is rising, and cost-recovery is also improving. For example, prior to the introduction of the VBB, there was no integrated ticketing which would allow someone boarding a bus in one of the rural counties surrounding Potsdam to travel into Potsdam City Centre on one ticket. Now (since 1999) such a ticket exists, and has led to ridership increases.

Barriers to implementation in Berlin-Brandenburg

3.7.8 A voluntary regional public transport body has secured the support of its constituent local and regional governments in this very large region because it has been able to deliver significant improvements to public transport at no, or little, extra cost. In common with Madrid's CRTM, VBB was a new organisation and so faced relatively little resentment from its constituent bodies. This shows that the barrier of lack of co-operation between municipalities at the local level can be overcome - for public transport, at least - if all parties perceive greater benefits for themselves by participating than remaining out of the system.

3.8 Copenhagen, Denmark

3.8.1 The Greater Copenhagen Region is a metropolitan area of 1.8 million inhabitants on almost 3,000 square kilometers in the North eastern corner of Zealand. Besides the two cities - Copenhagen and Frederiksberg - the region has three counties - Copenhagen, Roskilde, and Frederiksborg - and 46 other municipalities. The five major counties have owned a transport company, known as HT or Copenhagen Transport, for more than 25 years.

Transport objectives

3.8.3 A fundamental aspect of Copenhagen's post-war history is the so-called "finger plan", whereby development has been channelled out along the fingers of regional railways, radiating from the city centre. The gaps between the fingers are, in the main, used for recreation and farming. The mostly densely-developed areas are those around railway stations on the fingers. This plan continues to this day, and is now the responsibility of HUR (see below).

Transport governance

3.8.4 According to the representative of Copenhagen City Council who was interviewed for this research there was, during the mid to late 1990s, considerable debate about whether there should be a directly elected Greater Copenhagen Council to replace the mix of five counties and cities that existed up until then. There was no regional planning or transport body; the five counties and cities attempted to come to some consensus between themselves. They also controlled a regional public transport body, HT, which, up until 1990, was also the operator of buses in the region.

3.8.5 However, in the debate about a wider regional body, the counties and cities were anxious not to lose power, and central government was anxious not to create a "super-authority" that could be an effective challenge to its own powers. Thus HUR, the Greater Copenhagen Authority, was the compromise solution. This took control of HT.

3.8.6 HUR was launched in July 2000, and is directed by a council of 11 regional politicians. The councillors are nominated by Copenhagen, Frederiksborg and Roskilde counties, and the cities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, and each of these authorities also provides capital for the HUR's activities. (Details of HUR's structure and activities are taken from the HUR website: www.hur.dk.)

3.8.8 As the key government authority, the HUR-council has responsibility for solving political difficulties within their competence, and for the HUR budget. The counties raise money for HUR's operating budget through the county income tax, which also funds some investment, with the balance coming from national government.

3.8.9 The HUR-council is made up of four committees, relating to transport, rural zones, the Oresund region task group, and the theatre committee. The Transport Committee regulates the operation of the buses and local railways.

3.8.10 Within the HUR administration there is a Transport Division and a Planning Division. The transport division administers the public buses and the six local railways, while the planning division manages regional planning and general traffic planning. Those rail services which are operated by the Danish State Railway are run under contract from the Ministry of Transport. The Copenhagen Metro is due to open in 2002, and will be administered by HUR. There is also an integrated tariff system for all forms of public transport within the HUR area.

3.8.11 It is crucial to note that while HUR has a traffic planning function, its control over the road network is still effectively limited and most roads are controlled either by the National Roads Administration, or by the counties/cities.

Funding

3.8.12 The farebox ratio for public transport in Greater Copenhagen has sat at a relatively stable 65% for a number of years. The other 35% is funded through subsidies from the counties. Investment is funded by HUR and the counties working together, except for very large projects, such as the new metro to Orestad, a new community of 50,000 people built on reclaimed land to the south east of the City. Here, a joint local/national public company is responsible for building and then operating the line for 5 years after opening; the investment cost of approximately 10.8 billion Krone (940 million) is funded by 30-35 year central government loans, but on the understanding that much of this will be paid off by the operating company as it sells off the (publicly-owned) land along the line for development, and also from ticket revenues.

3.8.13 Copenhagen has been a leader in competitive tendering in bus transport. HT used to be the sole operator of buses but, due to falling ridership and increasing subsidies during the 1980s, in 1990, tendering was introduced and the operations arm of HT privatised. This cut operating costs per bus hour by 24% over ten years, and the emphasis on quality in the contract specifications has helped to increase ridership. However, HUR now believe that tender prices are likely to increase, much as has been experienced with tendered bus services in the UK.

Measures implemented, and achievements

3.8.15 Plans for the near future, set out in HUR's Trafikplan 2003, include:

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