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Transferability of Best Practice in Transport Policy Delivery : Final Report

2.3 Questionnaire analysis

Size of region

2.3.1 The regions surveyed varied in size from 764 km2 to 13,000 km2, and population varied from 11 million (Ile de France region, around Paris) to 200,000 (Trondheim).

Trends in usage and mode share

2.3.2 Almost universally there is a fall in mode share for PT, regardless of structure, reported by our respondents, the only exceptions being Jonkoping and Stockholm. Of our questionnaire respondents, the majority had objectives that stressed a desire to reduce or at least to stabilise car use; of the minority that were able to supply data, only Jonkoping appeared to have actually stabilised car use, whilst most others reported car use rising. In Norwegian cities, car use is rising faster than in places like Helsinki and Madrid, where the growth is of the order of 0.2% per year in car mode share. On the other hand there are examples from elsewhere that show an increase in public transport, cycling and walking mode share (Freiburg, Munich and Basel (van der Maas, 1998)).

Numbers of level of government

2.3.3 None of the questionnaire respondents was from an area with just two levels of government as in Scotland; all mentioned at least three levels of government. This is not wholly surprising, given that the majority of respondents are representatives of regional organisations. However, the review of European transport governance in Technical Appendix 1 also confirms that there are few other European countries without a level of government between national and local. In a few countries, such as Belgium, Italy and France, there are four levels of government, often with imprecisely-defined divisions of responsibilities (especially in Italy).

2.3.4 All the questionnaire respondents, with the exception of those from Bern, Copenhagen, Hanover, and Athens, reported that the regional organisations were specifically set up to deal with transport. In Copenhagen, there is a regional government which now incorporates transport responsibilities; formerly, there was a separate regional transport organisation. The other three cases cited above reported no regional body at all.

2.3.5 In most cases, the regional transport bodies have control only of public transport - those in Copenhagen and Helsinki are unusual in that the regional body has some (limited) influence over roads planning, as well as much more control over public transport. In Belgium, the regional level of government (i.e. Wallonia or Flanders) has control over public transport and regional roads.

2.3.6 The questionnaire did not ask respondents to describe the transport governance structure that had preceded the existing framework, as this would have made the questionnaire length prohibitive; the issue was, however, explored in the interviews.

Relative distribution of control over planning of infrastructure

2.3.7 There was a pattern observed in the way in which the control of planning of infrastructure and services is shared between different organisations within a region. This was as follows:

• National government has the main role in planning and providing national roads, and at least long-distance rail services, and all rail infrastructure, except narrow gauge rail, where this exists.
• Local roads (and hence most pedestrian and cycle facilities), and land-use planning are primarily the responsibility of municipalities - although a regional organisation may have some input into the latter issue. Parking policy and enforcement appear to be almost exclusively a municipal matter.
• Public transport ticketing, fares policy and service integration policy are primarily the responsibility of a regional public transport organisation, as are regional rail services.
• There are two clear models for the control of bus services, trams and metros. In one model, such as Copenhagen, they are all controlled by the regional body. In the other model, such as Helsinki, the services that run within municipal boundaries are run by that municipality, whilst the regional body runs inter-municipality services.

2.3.8 The structure outlined above is a simplification of the information that was obtained from the questionnaires. In many cases, respondents indicated that different levels of government were involved in many different areas of transport policy and that, in this sense, responsibility was shared. However, the questionnaire design did permit the respondent to indicate which organisations had relatively more and less influence in a policy area, and the model outlined above is based on these responses. It is of course the case that statutory responsibility for policy is deliberately shared between different levels of government: for example, in Scotland, the municipal level is most important in most land use policy and implementation decisions, but national government also has a role, by producing planning policy guidelines, and by adjudicating on particularly large or controversial planning decisions. Thus the power-sharing revealed in the questionnaires is more likely to be deliberate than the result of an on-going power struggle.

2.3.9 The questionnaire also revealed that the respondents believed that, at times, there are conflicts between these levels of government, and in particular between different local interests. (It should of course be borne in mind that, as representatives of regional organisations, the respondents would tend to view such conflicts particularly negatively.) Other than in the case of the few respondents who added their own comments, it was not possible to gain an understanding of how serious such conflicts are, nor of how they are resolved - although many respondents indicated that such problems were not as great as they had been in the past, presumably prior to the creation of the regional body. The respondent from Jonkoping, in Sweden, was one of the few who added considerable comment on this issue. The view presented was that, while there was still considerable dependence on negotiated solutions in local and regional transport planning this process was helped along by "an open planning process", involving both regional and local government; "positive co-operation with local interest and pressure groups, and an open attitude towards the media". While this particular respondent unfortunately declined to be interviewed, the issue was nonetheless explored at greater length in interviews with other respondents.

Funding

2.3.10 The questionnaires asked respondents for information on the level of capital and revenue funding, and on the sources of that funding. Funding comes from a mixture of central and local government, in the main - in most cases, regional government (or the regional transport organisation) is not itself competent to raise money from taxes or other sources. The main exception to this rule is Stockholm, where the county is the transport authority, and able to levy a local income tax. Few cities and regions were able to supply data on actual levels of funding; the exceptions were:

• Oslo - total annual capital funding of 350 million, and revenue funding of 114 million.
• Trondheim - total annual capital funding of 58.7 million, and revenue funding of 48.4 million.
• Rogaland - total annual capital funding of 7.6 million, and revenue funding of 3.1 million.
• Vancouver (regional funding only) - 80.8 million annual capital funding.
• Bern (regional funding only) - total annual capital funding of 75.4 million, and revenue funding of 159.3 million.
• Helsinki (regional funding only) - total annual revenue funding of 1.8 billion, and capital funding of 94.5 million.

2.3.11 The above figures refer to the most recent year for which the organisation was able to obtain data - thus within the last 3 years, in all cases.

2.3.12 There was not enough information on levels of funding from either interviews or questionnaires to see if there is a relationship between funding and achievement of objectives. This does not mean that there is not; the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 does demonstrate a relationship between the amount spent and the achievement of objectives, particularly where no traffic restraint measures are introduced; that is, large revenue and capital resources are required to maintain public transport mode share, if there are no measures to discourage car use.

2.3.13 The Norwegian responses to the questionnaire also show that they have spent significant funds (raised from road user charging) but, in general, this has been accompanied by a rise in car use. No explanation for this was offered in the questionnaires, but it could be inferred that it is because more money has been spent on roads (e.g. in Trondheim, where about 80% of the capital budget is spent on roads) than on public transport.

Improvements - what has been delivered - and which regions are most successful?

2.3.14 Respondents were asked what types of transport scheme were planned to be implemented during the past 5 years, and which have actually been delivered, either partially or completely. Many respondents said that a considerable number of projects had been implemented, although it was not possible to judge the scale of the implementation from the questionnaire (since it asked only about the delivery of bus priority in general, rather than for the precise number of km of bus lane installed, for example).

2.3.15 The trend in most of the cities and regions that responded was for the larger scale projects to have been delivered: major roads, regional rail schemes, metros and trams (or extensions to existing systems). For example, in the past 5 years, Norwegian cities have had great success in delivering new roads. The Swiss respondents have had success in improving their regional rail systems (in partnership with the national rail company), as has Madrid. The Scandinavian EU states have implemented metro and tram extensions.

2.3.16 In contrast, it was those issues that were more the preserve of municipalities - cycling and pedestrian policy, bus priority and especially parking policy - that, in the view of the (largely regional) respondents, had not been implemented well. This was not the case for every respondent: Swedish and Norwegian regions in particular said that pedestrian and cycle policy had been implemented in their area. Hanover also reported the implementation of parking policy. But the general pattern appeared to be a tendency to implement major projects more than smaller scale local projects - but this may have been because the respondents, who were mainly from regional bodies, were not as aware of smaller scale local implementation.

Objectives

2.3.17 Common transport objectives shared by many of the respondents included:

• Reducing car use.
• Increasing public transport use.
• Reducing air pollution.
• Reducing accidents.
• Increasing levels of cycling and walking.
• Increasing the accessibility of the transport system to people with mobility problems.
• Making transport more affordable.

2.2.18 No respondents reported a reduction in total person kilometres as an objective although, arguably, this is an objective of UK transport and land use policy (e.g. NPPG17).

2.3.19 Progress is slow in working towards almost all of these objectives. Those in which success has been most marked across the cities and regions surveyed include the reduction in accidents; reduction in pollution; and increasing the accessibility of the transport system. The objective of increasing public transport use (as opposed to mode share) has also been achieved in the majority of cities surveyed that provided an answer to this question. Only Hanover, Graz and Madrid said that they had made some small progress towards reducing car use (although, in the case of Madrid, this response is in contradiction of other evidence from the literature review).

Success factors or barriers and their relative importance

2.3.20 Funding is a major success factor if present, or barrier if it is not. It was identified by all respondents as a success factor and is undoubtedly the most important. It also appears, from the Norwegian examples, that what the money is spent on will influence the achievement of objectives - spending more on roads will, perhaps unsurprisingly, make it less likely that objectives relating to the reduction in car use are achieved. That is, an investment programme should match objectives and not work against them.

2.3.21 Parking policies were identified by many respondents as a barrier to the achievement of sustainable transport policies - although again they will be perceived as more of a barrier by organisations whose remit is public transport, and who see municipalities as undermining public transport by maintaining demand-led parking policies, even though these policies may meet other objectives for the local authorities. The questionnaire also revealed similar but less strong feelings that public transport objectives are often undermined by land use planning, which is generally controlled at the municipal level.

2.3.22 A lesser but still significant barrier has been identified as disagreement over priorities between different levels of government - and this can still occur even where there is a regional body.

Conclusions from questionnaires

2.3.23 The questionnaires were not intended to collect detailed information on what has been delivered in each city or region: to do this, it would have been necessary to gather precise details of the number of kilometres of road, tram line, metro etc. opened in a given time period, and how much had been spent on each of these. Since so few respondents were able or willing to provide general financial information, it is reasonable to assume that even fewer would have had such detailed implementation information easily to hand.

2.3.24 However, respondents were asked to rank the level of implementation in their city of region in comparison to other comparable cities and regions of which they were aware. Whilst most were circumspect and did not want to imply that their region was doing either any better or any worse than any other, some five respondents judged that their city or region had done well, implying that it had achieved more than the peer group average. These cities and regions were Stockholm (very well), Bern, Jonkoping, Oslo and Vancouver (the latter judged against other North American regions rather than its European counterparts).

2.3.25 The responses to the questionnaires suggested that the key reasons why these regions perceive themselves to have achieved more than the average are as follows:

• Adequate funding - in Oslo, for example, funding is raised by a toll ring; in Vancouver, by hypothecated fuel taxes.
• A very active national rail investment programme in Switzerland has helped the Canton Bern to its high modal share for public transport.
• Political support over a long period has been important in the Swedish and Norwegian cases.
• The creation of a regional public transport body was seen as important in Stockholm, Jonkoping and Vancouver.

2.3.26 This again supports the thesis that funding is perhaps the most important factor in successful transport policy delivery. However, in addition, it shows that continuous political support - not to say, the more consensual politics found in parts of Scandinavia - can also be very important. A regional public transport body is also seen to be an important factor - but, once again, it must be borne in mind that these responses were almost exclusively from regional public transport organisations; and nor were respondents asked to comment on the question of whether or not as much (or more) would have been delivered, had a regional organisation not been in place.

2.4 Results of interviews

Success factors and implementation mechanisms

2.4.1 Whilst not a factor mentioned by the regional interviewees, the representative of the Commission of the European Communities did state that, in his view, a very important success factor in the delivery of transport policy in the areas that he cited as examples of good practice (Helsinki, Munich, Freiburg, and Bern) was that their transport policy had been in place for at least 20 years in most cases. Thus, a period of prolonged activity and delivery in line with a consistent policy is required before results begin to show. This also requires, therefore, a prolonged period of political stability, or at least consensus among the various regional and local politicians about what transport policies are required. This may indicate that, in the case of Scotland, where transport policy changed only relatively recently with the publication of the Transport White Paper in 1998, it may be too early to expect to see significant results.

2.4.2 The need for political stability is an important issue in transport policy implementation. With the exception of Vancouver, where changes in the provincial administration from Labour to Liberal had led to recent significant shifts in regional transport policy, many of the other interviewees were able to show that their region had had a long period of political consensus on transport policy, often at both regional and local level. This was most marked in Stockholm, where the interviewee felt confident that, although political control of his organisation would change in 2003, its general policies would not.

2.4.3 It was intriguing that, in both Helsinki and Stockholm, both respondents felt that transport policy objectives were generally shared by counties and the regional public transport bodies. The reason for this in Helsinki is because all parties have realised that they will secure more funding from central government if they co-operate than if they disagree. The reason for the consensus in Stockholm was rather more prosaically described: it was because sustainable transport "is part of the soul of the Swedish people".

2.4.4 The actual implementation of projects is carried out by the appropriate level of government; construction is generally contracted out. Thus in Paris, for example, STIF (the regional public transport body) would identify the need for a new metro scheme, and plan and gather funding for it; the project management would be the responsibility of RATP (the operator); and construction would be competitively tendered, prior to the scheme opening and being operated by RATP. In the case of a cost over-run, this would be absorbed by the operator. In Stockholm, a similar pattern would be followed but the operation would then be tendered out. No interview respondents mentioned a need to develop "Special Purpose Delivery Vehicles", or similar, in order to implement projects. The complexity of structures for delivering projects was not mentioned as a significant barrier, with the exception of the national rail administrations in Stockholm and Helsinki (see below).

Funding mechanisms

2.4.5 Amongst all European interviews, there is considerable commonality in the way in which projects are funded. Essentially, revenue support for public transport comes from local and sometimes national taxation. Smaller new investment projects are also funded through local taxation, whilst major infrastructure (e.g. new metros, rail lines and roads) are majority funded by central government, either as direct grant, or long-term loans. There were some variations, for example:

• In Stockholm, there is a trend away from the outright purchase of new rail, metro and LRT rolling stock towards leasing, thus making capital expenditure a revenue item.
• In Copenhagen, the central government loans for the new metro must be repaid with the profits from the sale of publicly-owned land along the line of the route.
• In Paris, the versement transport (additional hypothecated payroll tax) funds the bulk of the revenue subsidy for metro and bus.
• In Vancouver, there is a wide range of hypothecated taxes which are used, or could be used, to fund public transport. In addition, Vancouver was the only region interviewed to use PPP as a means of funding some of its projects.
• Also, both Helsinki and Stockholm are able to raise more money if they identify projects which their constituent counties are prepared to support through raising local income and property taxes. The theoretical limit on local income tax in Stockholm is 100% - that is, there is no limit set by central government, only by local politicians.

2.4.6 Although these funding mechanisms are available, they are not usually available directly to a regional transport organisation, if one exists. The only exception to this is in Vancouver, where the GVTA has direct funding powers. In the European case studies, all regional bodies were reliant on their constituent member authorities and/or central government for funding, with the exception of London, which has available to it both local taxation, national block grant, and road user charging as potential or actual sources of funding.

Projects implemented, by whom, and time taken to do so

2.4.7 As shown in the analysis of the results of the questionnaires, a wide range of projects has been implemented by respondents, but more particularly the more regional-scale schemes such as new public transport infrastructure. Even where funding is gathered from a number of sources, it appears that a regional body can play a key role in initiating, collecting money for and then project managing strategic regional projects.

2.4.8 For example, in Helsinki, YTV (the regional body) has responsibility for drawing up a five year regional transport plan, in collaboration with its constituent municipalities. This document provides a framework for strategic regional projects (e.g. the extension of the metro to Espoo). In Paris, the regional transport body STIF also plays a fundamental role in identifying the need for new regional bus routes and rail infrastructure - although in the latter case it is more likely to be SNCF, the state rail company, than STIF, that is responsible for actual implementation.

2.4.9 In Vancouver, provincial government still plays a key role in planning and funding new transport infrastructure, in spite of the creation of a regional transport body, the GVTA, that could in theory be financially autonomous. Thus GVTA must follow and work with the transport investment decisions made by the provincial government - this is particularly the case with new rapid transit lines to the east and now south of Vancouver, and also with new ferry services - even where these may run counter to GVTA policies.

2.4.10 In Vancouver the role of central government is thus very clear. In the European cases, central government's role was less obvious, but nonetheless vitally important. Respondents from Helsinki and Copenhagen noted the importance of the very strong direction that regional and local governments in these regions receive from central government about transport. In Madrid, central government investment has been vital in achieving the extensions to and upgrading of both heavy and underground rail in the Spanish capital. In London, central government currently retains control of both heavy and underground rail, and thus the key to much of London's transport strategy. Thus, even where regional government has existed for a considerable time, central government retains a central role in directing regional transport strategy and delivery, and in making local jurisdictions work together.

2.4.11 In the Scandinavian interviews, the importance of competitive tendering, implemented by and on the initiative of the regional authority, was highlighted. This has been introduced during the past ten years. Within regulated public transport regimes, Stockholm and Helsinki have been leaders in the introduction of competitive tendering and its modification to stimulate ridership growth and quality services through careful incentive regimes. Tendering has also brought about improvements in quality and reductions in costs in Madrid's inter-urban bus services. Tendering has thus allowed regional authorities to buy more service with the same amount of money, which has obviously assisted in the achievement of their objectives.

2.4.12 The implementation period for new schemes obviously depends on the project in question. However, interviewees were able to identify major projects that had been implemented during the past five years, such as:

• A metro extension and LRT in Stockholm.
• An orbital LRT line in Paris.
• 40km of segregated bus lane in Paris.
• A guided busway from Amsterdam South to Haarlem.
• An elevated light rapid transit in Vancouver.
• Integrated public transport services and tariffs in and around Berlin.
• Pedestrianisation schemes of national significance in central London.
• Full replacement of the entire suburban rail fleet in Madrid (a ten year project).

2.4.13 It was not clear from the interviews, however, how long these schemes had been in the planning stages. The longer that a scheme is in planning, then the greater the risk that external circumstances may change to render the scheme more difficult to deliver. Several interviewees did express reservations about the additional time that the consultation process can add to project implementation; one of these was the Paris respondent, although he also explained that the range of projects for which statutory consultation is required in France is more limited than in the UK. For example, there was no requirement for consultation for the implementation of the bus lanes noted in the list, above - the Mayor of Paris (who is responsible for on-road infrastructure of this nature) simply implemented them.

Influence of a regional body, and its antecedents

2.4.14 Given that all interviewees are employees of regional transport bodies, then it is perhaps unsurprising that they all said that they thought that the creation of the regional bodies had improved the effectiveness of transport in their regions. All have been working for long enough in transport planning in their respective cities to be aware of how the previous structures functioned.

2.4.15 All were able to cite specific examples of important projects that they felt would not have been implemented (or would have been implemented much more slowly) without the regional body. These included:

• Integration of urban and interurban bus services; and the creation of an integrated public transport tariff system (Helsinki, Madrid and Arnhem-Nijmegen in the Netherlands).
• In Madrid, regional public transport patronage was falling until the creation of the regional body, and has risen steadily ever since. The respondent felt that this would not have happened without the integrated tariff introduced by his organisation.
• Metro extensions, and integration of public transport services (Stockholm). Furthermore, Stockholm felt that this integration helped to keep levels of car use in Stockholm constant, and the level of motorisation at the lowest level of any county in the country.
• A new bridge that was of regional significance but had been of no interest to the strategic roads authority until control of those roads passed from the Province ("State") to the regional body (Greater Vancouver).

2.4.16 Where regional organisations have been introduced, respondents reported an improvement in implementation. Examples of this included Jonkoping, Berlin, Arnhem-Nijmegen and Helsinki. Given that regional organisations have been in existence for many years in most of the areas that responded, then it is difficult to know what would have happened without them. However, a number of the interviewees were representatives of new regional bodies. These were GLA/TfL in London; GVTA in Vancouver; and VBB around Berlin.

2.4.17 The representatives of regional organisations in Berlin and London were able to identify clear benefits that have occurred since the organisations were introduced. These include:

• Reduced operating costs for public transport (Berlin).
• Increased public transport ridership in both areas.
• The delivery of major improvements to bus services in both areas.
• In London, the work on a road pricing scheme for the centre of the capital (implemented on 17 ^th February 2003), with consequent additional revenue raised for alternative transport.

2.4.18 The interviewee from Berlin painted a picture of constituent municipalities and counties within the Verkehrsverbund that were happy to give up their public transport powers to the regional body, because it delivered greater benefits at the same or reduced cost than the municipalities working on their own were able to do. In London, a contrasting picture emerged, where municipalities do resent the power that they have given up to the Mayor; and where the Mayor's focus on the largest traffic flows and greatest problems has focused resources and attention on central London, arguably at the expense of outer London. On the other hand, major projects have been implemented.

2.4.19 Respondents in these new organisations were also asked if the projects that are now being delivered within the new transport governance structure would have been delivered within the old, or a different, structure. In Vancouver, it appeared from the interview that an independent regional body had been created only in theory, rather than in practice, and so there were few trends or schemes that represented a marked break from the past. In Berlin, it was clear that a regional body was key to the integrated services and ticketing now available to the passenger. In London, interviewees felt that road pricing, and major bus service enhancements, were both unlikely to have been delivered under the old structure.

2.4.20 On the other hand, in Zurich there appears to have been a reduction in the level of centralisation of the VVB - that is, an existing regional body has lost power - but without a concomitant reduction in effectiveness of transport policy implementation - suggesting that other factors remain more important.

2.4.21 In Vancouver, as in other parts of Canada, there is a regional body - but upward trends in ridership have not changed since its creation (in contrast to most other Canadian cities). Vancouver's transport system is performing much better in sustainability terms than other regions in Canada, but this may be as much for structural reasons (e.g. many bridges and an elongated geography; population and economic growth) as because of the existence of a regional body. Additionally, the regional body may not yet have had sufficient time to demonstrate the benefits of integrating responsibility for structure planning, public transport and major roads within one organisation.

2.4.22 The regional organisation in Copenhagen was not interviewed, although a brief discussion took place with a representative of the City of Copenhagen (the lower level of government). Here, a regional organisation - HUR - has recently been given some additional land use planning and transport co-ordination powers over and above those of the solely public transport organisation - HT - that preceded it. However, the interview and review of relevant literature do not point to any immediate concomitant improvement in transport delivery.

2.4.23 Thus in conclusion it appears that the existence of a regional public transport organisation or (less usually) a regional government with transport responsibilities is commonplace. Scotland is unusual in not having such a regional body. The results of the interviews demonstrate that the representatives of regional bodies who were interviewed were able to point to improvements that these bodies had delivered, some of which would not have been delivered, had a more fragmented structure been in place. However, no representatives of local authorities - who may have had a different view - were interviewed. In addition, the interviews and questionnaires do demonstrate that giving additional powers to a regional body (as in Copenhagen, for example) does not necessarily lead to enhanced transport delivery.

Remaining barriers to implementation

2.4.24 All respondents identified lack of money as a barrier to the implementation of transport policy. For this reason, the representative of the Greater London Authority praised the authors of the London Government Act for permitting the Mayor the ability to introduce road user charging. Nonetheless, a lack of central government grant funding for major rail schemes remains key in slowing transport policy delivery in the capital. In France, in contrast, the ability of nationalised transport companies - SNCF and RATP (the Metro operator) - to borrow outwith the public sector borrowing requirement makes the funding of major investment somewhat easier. In Vancouver it is autonomy of funding - specifically, inability to use funding options because of Provincial Government interference - that is the primary barrier to better transport policy implementation. In Arnhem-Nijmegen, the spending of public transport funds at the regional level, coupled with a form of contracting of services, has permitted greater efficiency in public transport provision. However, this may not be sufficient to weather the forecast reduction in central government support for public transport over the next two years.

2.4.25 All interviewees identified continuing lack of integration between bodies responsible for transport as a continuing barrier to the (even) more effective implementation of regional transport policies. In the case of London, the ill-defined relationship between the SRA and the Greater London Authority (and Transport for London) is the difficulty. In the case of Stockholm and Helsinki, similar difficulties sometimes arise: commuter rail runs on their equivalent of Network Rail infrastructure, and that body sometimes has priorities that are not the same as the regional transport body. Additionally, YTV and SL have to negotiate with their constituent municipalities on the use of road space. The representative of SL also cited difficulties in securing a bus lane in Stockholm city centre for a trunk bus route, as the municipality had other priorities for the road space. His solution was greater power for the regional body; however, his counterpart at YTV in Helsinki felt that, as long as YTV was dependent on municipalities for funding, it was to be expected that some negotiation and compromise would take place.

2.4.26 Local politics was seen to be a barrier on some occasions to implementation of schemes that are important to the region as a whole. Examples in Stockholm included bus lanes, and a third railway line across the city centre, that have met with vociferous local lobbying and opposition from politicians, even those at the county level (who are elected at large). (It was stressed, however, that these examples are quite rare.) In London, however, local politics was now seen to be much less of a barrier to the implementation of schemes than under the previous structure.

2.5 Conclusions to interviews and questionnaires

2.5.1 The picture of transport policy delivery that emerges from the interviews and questionnaires is as follows:

• Transport policy objectives are similar across the cases surveyed, and thus similar to those in Scotland.
• Progress has been made towards implementing the infrastructure and services to achieve these objectives, but little progress towards the objective of reduction in mode share for car and increasing that for public transport has been achieved in only a very few regions. Progress has been most marked towards accident reduction and increasing the accessibility of public transport fleets.
• Large scale regional projects - roads, rail schemes and new metros or trams - are more likely to be implemented than local schemes, according to the respondents for this research.
• Policies focusing on the restraint of the private car, and sustainable urban land-use (densification not dispersal) are the most difficult to implement.
• The most fundamental condition for the achievement of transport policy objectives is to have sufficient funding in place. This funding must also be spent on services and infrastructure that relate to those objectives (e.g. spend the money on public transport if the objective is to increase use of public transport).
• Political consensus and long-term political support for sustainable transport objectives is also very important, as it takes time to achieve transport policy objectives.
• The creation of regional bodies with responsibility for, especially, public transport has been shown to have beneficial impacts on transport policy delivery in some of regions from which questionnaires and interview results were obtained.

2.5.2 These, and other issues, are discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.

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