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Economic Impact of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Scotland
5. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ON SCOTLAND
The 2001 Foot and Mouth outbreak in Scotland led to a number of social and environmental impacts which are difficult to quantify. These impacts are not taken into account in the economic modelling approach described elsewhere in this report. The aim of this section is to redress this situation by summarising existing literature and information on the nature and scale of social and environmental impacts so as to provide a more appropriate context within which the economic impacts can be assessed.
5.1 Social implications
Nearly all of the major inquiries into the impact of Foot and Mouth published to date have commented to some extent on the social effects of the outbreak, often distinguishing between effects on individuals and families and effects on rural communities (Countryside Agency, 2001a; Royal Society Edinburgh, 2002; House of Commons, 2002; Royal Society, 2002; Rural Task Force, 2001). With few exceptions, the discussion on social impacts is based on anecdotal rather than scientific evidence. However two general findings emerge:
The magnitude of social impacts were far higher within the areas directly affected by FMD, with effects outside the infected regions generally limited.
Although the duration of impacts remains unclear, some of the social impacts arising from the outbreak are likely to be felt for considerably longer than duration of impact itself and may outlive the more obvious financial impacts of the outbreak.
5.1.1 Individuals and families
Farmers and farming families
Not surprisingly, most of the studies have focussed on the effects on the farming community and, in particular, the psychological impacts on farmers and their families (see for example, Countryside Agency, 2001a, 2001b; Royal Society Edinburgh, 2002). The main issues identified as giving rise to concern to farmers are:
Bereavement over losing animals (in some cases bloodlines which had been established over many generations).
Concern over animal welfare (associated with lack of feed and poor conditions in the fields at a time coinciding with the lambing season).
Loss of control over lives and, in the case of farms experiencing a cull, a feeling of redundancy.
Isolation arising from both the legislative restrictions on movements and self-imposed restrictions on movements through fear of spreading the disease.
Short term financial concerns (associated with both the need to purchase feed, and, on a different point, inability to access benefits) and long tem financial worries.
Even prior to the FMD outbreak, the farming community was recognised as being particularly vulnerable to psychological morbidity. Hawton
et al (1998) cite agriculture as having the fourth highest occupational ratio for suicides and open verdicts. Similarly, statistics from the Samaritans indicate that the suicide rate in the agricultural sector is not only high but on an upward trend since the beginning of the 1990s (Countryside Agency, 2001a).
Through a comparison of farmers in a badly infected area (Cumbria) and an uninfected area (Scottish Highlands), Peck
et al (2002), quantified the additional psychological impacts on farmers associated with the FMD outbreak. Farmers were contacted by post and asked to complete a 12-item version of the General Health Questionnaire, some limited personal and farm details and finally some questions relating to the personal support networks.
Farmers in Cumbria were found to have higher levels of psychological morbidity than farmers in the Highlands, consistent with the argument that FMD increased levels of morbidity over and above background levels in the general farming community. More interestingly, they also found only moderate differences in the morbidity levels of farmers who had actually had their animals slaughtered and those who had not. They attributed this to the compensation regulations which meant the latter, despite experiencing financial hardships, did not receive compensation. It could also be associated with the longer duration of uncertainly faced by uninfected farmers. However the results from the study need qualification. There was a relatively low response rate to the questionnaire and a concomitant small sample size of respondents in each case study area: a total of eighty farmers replied to the questionnaire from the Highlands (response rate 28%) and 188 from Cumbria (response rate 29.5%).
In terms of other farm household members, studies cite the trauma effects on children caused by:
the slaughter of stock, in some cases family pets, and
seeing parents and relatives in distress (Countryside Agency, 2001a).
In some cases children from farms were moved from their homes for certain periods to allow them to continue to go to school. While this caused short-term distress, it may have been judged by parents to be less severe than remaining on the farm and observing the slaughter and disposal of animals. Where farming families kept children at home, this lead to feelings of isolation (Countryside Agency, 2001a). As argued in the Royal Society of Edinburgh report (2002), the central argument in both cases is that "Children and families directly affected could not conduct normal lives, or engage in social exchange…this will have a long-term impact on those affected".
Deaville and Jones (2001) undertook a telephone survey of organisations supporting individuals. They established that while farmers' wives and their children used health services to discuss issues arising from the FMD outbreak, that farmers generally did not. However, one farming organisation found that 7 out of 10 farmers' wives had severe anxiety about their husband's state of mind during the outbreak. The authors concluded that the family was seeking support from health services to take back to the farm.
Several other studies also considered the support mechanisms used by farmers during the outbreak. This information was used as a means both of gauging the magnitude of social impacts of the outbreak and of assessing the implications for the development of effective support mechanisms in the future. Peck
et al (2002) found that farmers predominantly turn to their own local farming community for help and, beyond this, prefer anonymous forms of support, such as advice via the internet and self help booklets, rather than visits from health or social workers. Calls to certain networks, most notably the Rural Stress Information Network (RSIN), the Royal Scottish Agricultural Benevolent Institution increased dramatically (Countryside Agency, 2001a; Church of Scotland Committee on Church and Nation, 2002).
Importantly, Peck
et al (2002) and Deaville and Jones (2001) identify veterinary surgeons as a crucial source of support. This was attributed to two factors:
the long established relationships vets often have with members of the farming community
shared feelings about the loss of livestock (Deaville and Jones, 2001).
It is generally accepted that the outbreak was dealt with more effectively in Scotland than in areas of England and Wales. Certainly, some of the situations cited as causing distress south of the border (such as carcasses waiting on the farm for some time while disposal sites were negotiated) were largely avoided in Scotland. This will have helped to minimise the distress caused to farm families directly effected by the cull.
Other owners of rural businesses and rural inhabitants
Although it is widely recognised that the direct effects of FMD outbreak extended beyond the farm sector, very little has been written about the social impact of the outbreak on rural non-farming inhabitants.
The Countryside Agency report (Countryside Agency, 2001a) and Rural Health Institute report (Deaville and Jones, 2001) both suggest that in the case of business owners, the effects were largely stress-related impacts associated with the financial problems and uncertainly caused by the outbreak. The Countryside Agency report goes as far as saying that the trauma caused by Foot and Mouth may be less severe in some cases than for farmers because such owners identity might be less tied up with the business than is the case for farmers.
Certainly the media coverage of the crisis focussed on farmers, rather than other rural entrepreneurs. The Church of Scotland report argues that this is partly because the burning of sheep and cattle is a more emotive image than, for example, empty hotels and pubs (Church of Scotland, Committee on Church and Nation, 2002). However, it should be noted that in addition to short-run and long-run financial worries, owners of non-farm businesses and other local inhabitants in affected areas will have felt a similar lack of control over their livelihoods. And, of course, unlike those farmers directly impacted by the FMD outbreak, no financial compensation was available.
Frontline workers
The other group of individuals recognised as being adversely affected by the outbreak were those working to implement the control policies. Those directly involved in the cull, were not all used to slaughtering animals and dealing with distraught people (Countryside Agency, 2001a). Moreover, they will have had to handle this whilst working extremely long hours in difficult working conditions. It was these people who were most at risk from developing FMD-related health problems, as discussed further below.
Secondly, both SEERAD's and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency's (SEPA) own reviews into the handling of the Foot and Mouth outbreak in Scotland drew attention to the stress caused to SEERAD, State Veterinary Services (SVS) and SEPA staff. This originated in the long hours worked and/or in the nature of the work. As a response SEERAD, suggest a need for a corporate stress strategy so that, in similar circumstances in the future, mangers will be better placed to deal with both their own personal stress and that of their staff (Scottish Executive, 2003). Within SEPA, a planner has been appointed to oversee potential future emergency situations
10.
5.1.2 Community life
One of the main effects of the FMD outbreak for rural communities was the cancellation of social and community group meetings and activities. Initially, such activities were cancelled throughout rural Scotland. However, they were restarted quite quickly in uninfected areas as the course of the epidemic became clearer. However members from farming families often stayed away from such events, even when they re-started (Countryside Agency, 2001a). In areas directly infected by the outbreak (Dumfries and Galloway and the Borders), the scale and duration of impact on community life was greater.
The curtailment of social and community activities would have been felt most severely by those considered vulnerable in rural area, that is, the elderly, women with young children and youths (Shucksmith
et al., 1996). Initially there was concern that the outbreak would have a long-term effect on the viability of community groups and resources. However, subsequent reports have suggested that the outbreak actually helped to validate the important role played by social and community groups in rural areas (National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2002). In England and Wales, there is even evidence of new community groups forming in response to the crisis. An example is the Forest of Dean Foot and Mouth Action group. Such groups might form a lasting basis for rural regeneration (Countryside Agency, 2001a).
The SEERAD-funded case study analyses of the impact of foot and mouth showed that the effect of the outbreak at the community level was highly diverse across space. For example, both Castle Douglas and Kelso communities were directly affected by the outbreak. However, while in Kelso the community remained close knit and very supportive of local farmers, in Castle Douglas the outbreak created tensions both within the farming community and between farmers and other businesses affected. Similarly, the social impacts in the two Highland areas were very different. In the Black Isle, a general feeling of sympathy about the plight of the agricultural community was sustained. On the other hand, in Skye, at the height of the outbreak, there were reports of conflicts between the tourism and crofting interests. This was attributed to tourism businesses being run by "incomers" who did not understand the importance of crofting to the local community. Such differences confirm that generalisation about the social impacts of Foot and Mouth are difficult to sustain.
Finally, an important social impact referred to in some, but not all, of the studies is that of increased tensions within the farming community. In some cases these were related to financial aspects and in particular differing livestock valuations and the details of compensation rules. In other cases, tensions arose from perceptions of how the disease was being spread and accusations of bad husbandry practices. However, it should be noted that the literature suggests such tensions were insignificant compared to the way in which the farming community pulled together in difficult times.
At society level, the outbreak served to bring to the fore the issue of the role of agriculture and rural areas in contemporary life. In Scotland, the perception of farming and rurality is very different and, arguably, less contentious than it is in England and Wales (Slee
et al., 2001). Even so, it is likely that the main long-lasting social impact of the Foot and Mouth crisis will arise from the new public awareness of the complexities and interconnectedness of rural economies (Donaldson
et al., 2002).
5.2 Environmental Implications
As with the social impacts, most of the published reports on the 2001 Foot and Mouth outbreak have commented on its environmental impacts. Not surprisingly, scientific evidence is far more abundant concerning the environmental, as against social, impacts of the outbreak. For example, the Environmental Agency published a 51-page report considering the environmental effects of the Foot and Mouth outbreak in England and Wales up to December 2001 (Environmental Agency, 2001).
The literature relating to Scotland suggests the following general findings:
General awareness of the potential environmental effects arising from the outbreak and control strategies was high and, as a consequence, all potential effects were/are monitored closely.
The confinement of the outbreak to only two local authority areas in Scotland - Dumfries and Galloway, and the Borders - meant that the environmental effects were far less severe than they would have been if the disease had spread more widely.
All evidence to date suggests that environmental effects have been negligible although some longer run impacts cannot be ruled out.
The shorter lines of communication that existed between relevant organisations in Scotland, and the willingness of those involved to work closely together, greatly increased the rate at which the disease was brought under control.
Most of the environmental issues discussed in the literature concern:
Both are discussed briefly below.
5.2.1 Disposal of carcasses
The Government's policy throughout the crisis was to use the safest and most effective means of carcass disposal. However, there was an ongoing debate throughout the crisis about what constituted the safest means. Initial advice was that, after rendering, incineration was preferred because of the threat of burial to aquifers in Dumfries and Galloway. This was later amended to relegate incineration to the third preferred option because of both toxin threats and the growing public revulsion to the sight and smell of pyres (Royal Society Edinburgh, 2002).
Within Scotland, four types of disposal took place:
incineration on infected farms.
incineration at a remote site in a large scale pyre (of which there were three at Eastriggs, Hoddom Quarry, both in Dumfries and Galloway, and Crook Knowes, near Jedburgh).
burials on farm. A total of 9 on-farm burial sites were used in total during the outbreak. This compares with over 900 such sites in England and Wales.
burying in a large scale burial site (of which there was only one in Scotland, at Birkshaw forest).
Incineration
The key environmental issue arising from the burning of carcasses was the potential impact on air quality. Air quality monitoring was carried out on a small pyre, co-ordinated by the Dumfries and Galloway Council, so as to respond to concerns on both contaminants and odours. The main conclusions were as follows (Glasgow Scientific Services, 2001):
Various sulphur and oxygen-containing compounds were detected that would contribute to the odour. However, while recognised as affecting quality of life, odour annoyance was not regarded as an adverse health effect.
Apart from the odour concentration, the concentrations of other potential contaminants was well within air quality guidelines and no toxic effect would be expected from them.
Although it was intended that such air sampling would be replicated to cover the three larger pyres, success in controlling the spread of disease was such that the pyres were extinguished before the programme could be extended. Similar low health risks from pyres were found in England and Wales. In all cases, the level of exposure of particularly inhaling toxins was obviously far higher for those tending the pyres.
Another public concern associated with carcass incineration was the potential exposure to dioxin emissions via the food chain (through deposition on grass, crops and soil downwind). As a precaution, the Food Standards Agency monitored dioxin concentration in soils, crops and milk from animals grazing near to pyres. The Agency originally conceded that there might be a slightly higher, although still very small, health risk for people who exclusively consume whole milk and whole-milk products only from animals within 2km of pyres (Food Standards Agency, 2001a). Subsequent analysis concluded, however, that there was no additional risk to health through the food chain and no need for anyone to change their diets (Food Standards Agency, 2001b).
Finally, the disposal of ash from pyres created a risk of leaching into water courses. As a result, such pyres were located as far as possible from water courses and ash from the sites transported and buried in a landfill site engineered to receive controlled waste (Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), 2001; Royal Society Edinburgh, 2002).
Burial
The main environmental risk associated the burial of carcasses was the impact on ground water. Ground water could be infected by the release of
micro organisms such as E coli, campylobachter or cryptosporidium
the abnormal prion protein thought to cause BSE/CJD
chemicals, such as ammonia or phosphates, released through the decomposition of carcasses (Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health website).
Within Scotland SEPA had the role of ensuring that the quality of Scotland's watercourses was protected. In conjunction with the British Geological Survey, SEPA undertook risk assessments so as to advise SEERAD and the Scottish Veterinary Service on the suitability of burial sites and, in particular, the location of the mass burial site at Birkshaw forest.
Government instructions were that confirmed cases of FMD had to be reported to slaughter within 24 hours, adjoining properties, within 48 hours. SEPA therefore had to respond with advice on carcass disposal within extremely short time scales. Fortunately, due to the poor market conditions for cast ewes in the preceding 2 to 3 years, the Agency had recently developed policy and guidance for staff on animal burial. This greatly assisted field staff in undertaking burial site assessments. Not surprisingly, however, there were occasions when apparent conflicts between agencies emerged. For example, the December report on Foot and Mouth by SEPA (SEPA, 2001) notes four cases where the agency threatened to serve a notice under the Groundwater regulation to prevent burials at specific sites. As a result, the recent Royal Society of Edinburgh inquiry recommends that in future SEPA's role in protecting the environment be incorporated more formally into contingency planning and the management of the crisis at the highest level (Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2002). This, again, has been reflected in the Scottish Executive's recently published Foot and Mouth Contingency Plan (Scottish Executive, 2003).
Following the initial risk assessment, an ongoing programme of groundwater monitoring has been initiated at the mass burial site in Scotland. This is co-ordinated by SEERAD, with reports from the monitoring programme publicly available. All evidence to date suggests that the site is well contained and that no leaching is occurring.
In relation to the impact on drinking water, the Public Health Laboratory Service published guidance on the possibility of human gastro-intestinal infection from polluted ground water. Private water supplies, which are largely untreated, were the most vulnerable. As a result, a sampling programme for those private and public water supplies considered most at risk was initiated. Again results to date suggesting no need to expand such monitoring programmes.
5.2.2 Biodiversity and landscape
The Countryside Agency report (2001a) suggests several potential impacts of the outbreak on biodiversity and landscapes. These can be summarised as follows:
negative impact on the livestock gene pool due to the loss of certain breeds
overgrazing and heavy poaching of pastures, arising from the restrictions on animal movements during the outbreak.
delay of capital works associated with agri-environmental schemes.
improvement in the establishment of nesting sites for ground nesting birds arising from the closure of rural footpaths.
The report also highlights the fact that there might be longer-term impacts on biodiversity and landscapes associated with both agricultural restructuring and changes in agricultural policy following the outbreak.
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