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Interim Guidelines for Smallpox Response and Management in Scotland in the Post-Eradication era

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Interim Guidelines for Smallpox Response and Management in Scotland in the Post-Eradication era

Appendix 5: minimum specifications for hospital isolation facilities to receive initial cases
  1. Initial probable cases should ideally be transferred to one of the UK High Security infectious disease Units (Newcastle).

  2. Transfer to alternative isolation facilities may be required if:

  • A High Security Unit is too far away and the patient's life may be put at risk by a prolonged transfer.

  • The High Security Units are full with other initial probable and confirmed cases.

  1. RSDRGs should therefore identify alternative hospital isolation facilities that could be used for the care of initial probable and confirmed cases before the Smallpox Care Centre can be opened.

  2. Facilities must:

  • Be an established infectious disease unit with substantial experience in managing cases of contagious pathogens.

  • Negative pressure rooms.

  1. Facilities should ideally have:

  • Staff who have been previously vaccinated and who could be revaccinated with a faster immune response and lower incidence of side effects.

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Page updated: Friday, June 24, 2005